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 Synopsis 
 
This thesis is a constructive work in theology. The aim is to show the 
centrality of liturgy for theological investigation, exposing how liturgical 
action at once shapes and gives rise to theological articulation and also 
manifests an implicit theology. The meaning is in the making, as it were, and 
this thesis seeks to show the descriptive nature of theology and liturgy as that 
which makes all theology possible. What is liturgy? Following the earliest 
usage of leitourgia in the ancient world, and especially as articulated by Saint 
Paul, Clement of Rome, Ignatius of Antioch, and Irenaeus, I show that the 
ChurchÕs earliest articulation of liturgical action bears an implied ontology of 
participation, namely in the singular liturgical action of Christ. Liturgy is not, 
therefore, to be defined or understood as Òthe work of the people,Ó but rather 
as the Òwork of the One for the sake of the many,Ó in which all of creation 
participates. I argue that the human is to be understood as a liturgical animal 
who by virtue of her being(-)created is incorporated into the Liturgy God is. I 
also argue that liturgy names the inter-offering of the Persons of the Trinity, 
whereby each hypostasis exists as mutually constituting and constituted. The 
humanÕs participation in this liturgical action is a participation of the whole 
person, mediated by the materials and movements involved in the liturgical 
actionÑliturgy as the mediation of the divine economy. I also show how late 
medieval liturgical reforms issue a gradual and unwarranted relegation of the 
laityÕs involvement in the liturgical action. Although inadvertent, this 
continual extraction of lay participation serves to secularize their role and 
extract them from the economy to which the liturgy is meant to assimilate. All 
of this is to expose how the liturgical action, which was vastly influential to 
the social imaginary of the medieval world, construes and conditions the 
human more and more along a secular line. Additionally, it is to recover the 
essential nature of liturgical action for social construction. Indeed, liturgical 
action as social constructionÑthe embodying of the reciprocal and mutually 
constituting life of God in whose image the human is created and to whose 
Being, through Christ the Liturgy, the human has been assimilated, is being-
assimilated, and will be assimilated. 
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 Introduction 
 
ÒFor it is an instinct of human beings, from childhood, to engage in 
mimesisÉ.Ó 
ÐÐAristotle 
ÒAnnihilate the Selfhood in me, be thou all my life!Ó 
ÐÐWilliam Blake 
 
 
 
 
This essay is about liturgy, especially as it regards the formation of the human 
imaginary. It is common today to speak of liturgy as Òthe work of the people,Ó 
as the work of gathered persons in the worship of the church. Following the 
liturgical renewals of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the awareness 
and importance of the laityÕs (non-)involvement in the liturgical action was 
heightened in new and important ways, and a more faithful account of the 
whole churchÕs involvement came to the fore. This concern was nothing new. 
This was in large part the concern of the fifteenth and sixteenth century 
reformers as well. Of seminal importance in each season of the church is the 
contrasting of clergy and lay functions within the liturgical action. How to 
account for the church as a whole body of actors involved in the liturgical 
drama, not simply an elite group of clerical engineers for a conglomerate of 
untrained or ill-prepared consumers, stands at the fore. The questions that 
were posed focused their attention on the apparent chasm that had been 
created between the layperson and cleric, of which the twentieth century saw a 
plethora of pamphlets, essays and conferences, culminating with Vatican II 
with a watershed of theological examination that ensued and continues to this 
day. 
 Leitourgia, ever since its use in the translation of the Septuagint, has 
been broadly understood as and related to the worship of the Temple, naturally 
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resulting in its employment as that which refers to the worship of the church 
catholic. This understanding of liturgy continues to present day; however, the 
need for a more narrow definition was deemed necessary by the various 
liturgical movements of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, which has 
more recently gained even greater attention to account for the formation of 
human desire on the wholeÐÐthe human as homo-liturgicus, and to raise 
questions of hierarchy within the church and how Christ's bodyÐÐhistorical, 
sacramental, and ecclesialÐÐis constituted.1 This essay is not an attempt to 
retrace well trodden ground but is an effort to recapture non-nostalgically what 
the church throughout the ages has understood itself to be doing in liturgy and 
how liturgy is understood to inscribe itself upon the bodies of the faithful as 
the condition for a certain acoluthetic reasoning.2 The purpose of this essay, 
then, is to deal philosophically and phenomenological with the liturgical 
action in its historic understanding as the constituting of human nature by a 
mimetic relation to the singular act of God in Christ. Accordingly, Christ is the 
event of the human's knowing God and herself as an extension of this singular 
liturgical event, being incorporated into the making-present of the eternal 
event Christ himself is. All liturgical action is hereby rendered participatory in 
relation to the singular Christ-event, who is in himself the embodied, Eternal 
Liturgy. 
 The first part of this work takes issue with the post-Enlightenment 
definition of liturgy as "the work of the people." This understanding of liturgy, 
the first use of which seems to have been during The Fourth General Council 
of the Alliance of The Reformed Churches holding The Presbyterian System 
(London, 1888), is rooted in a nominalist understanding of a divisibility of 
God and creation. This meaning may not at first be evident; however, to speak 
                                                            
1 Most notably with Henri de Lubac and Gregory Dix. 
2 Robert P. Scharlemann, The Reason of Following: Christology and the Ecstatic I (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1991), 117-130. ÒAcoluthetic, or Christological, reason is that 
form of reason in which the I of selfhood is exstantial; the inwardness of self is confronted 
with itself outwardly. It is not the relation to a thou or an it (he, she) but to the I. The mark of 
this relation is that it involves an ecstatic possibility of the egoÓ (117). I only came across 
ScharlemannÕs work recently, after completing the chapters of this essay. However, his 
understanding of acoluthetic reasoning as a particular following, a mimetic relation to the 
known, whereby the self is confronted with itself through this embodied following, is very 
much akin to Maximus ConfessorsÕ understanding of how the human manifests to herself her 
true identity through the liturgical action, which is dealt with in chapters three and four of this 
essay. 
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of "the work of the people" assumes a work, offering, or capacity of the 
human that the early church privileges only to the Second Person of the 
Trinity. Liturgy as the work of the faithful inverts the human's relation to the 
salvific offering of the Son to the Father. That is, this narration of liturgy 
elicits a lack in GodÐÐthe lack of GodÕs own worship. Additionally, liturgy as 
the work of the people separates the liturgical action from the creative agency 
of the Son and the human's volitive participation in the re-creating of the 
world, infinitely actualized in Christ. It is notable that the documents of 
Vatican II, while stressing the importance and absolute need for greater 
participation in liturgy by the faithfulÐÐthe laity, do not refer to the liturgy as 
Òthe work of the peopleÓ or ÒpeopleÕs work.Ó This is largely a Protestant 
construal of the term that, while the Roman Catholic liturgical renewal 
movements of the twentieth century certainly provide the language and 
practice for this development, remains imaginable primarily from a post-
Enlightenment understanding of an absolute distance between the temporal 
and the Eternal. The Transcendent is hereby absolutely transcendent and there 
is no mingling of God and creation. I say largely Protestant because there is an 
implicit Gnosticism to this logic that is largely influenced by articulations of 
Christ's presence or absence in the Eucharistic action. While Roman Catholics 
are likewise prone to speak of liturgy as the people's work, it remains within 
the context of the hierarchical ordering of the ecclesial body determined by 
one's proximity to the Eucharistic celebration. For Catholic narrations of the 
liturgical constitution of the body of Christ as Eucharistically mediated, to 
articulate leitourgia as Òthe work of the peopleÓ detracts from the inherent, 
relational nature of liturgy as that which gathers the people of God into the 
eternal life of reciprocity that is Holy Trinity. 
 The first section of this essay will explore how the term leitourgia is 
employed throughout the classical world and by the fathers of the church. This 
exploration is to lay the foundation for understanding liturgy both as the 
essence of divinity manifest in Christ, attested to by the early and medieval 
church, and as the anagogic relation of participation that is the essence of the 
church catholic, with explicit reference to how this is articulated by Maximus 
Confessor whereby God and the human are mutual paradigms through the 
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liturgical action of Christ who restores the original co-creative purposes of 
human nature through imitation and figure in the activity of the church. 
Liturgy is, therefore, to be understood not as "the work of the people" but as 
the work of the One for the sake of the many. Christ himself is this "work," 
this event, who is the Liturgy he enactsÐÐpriest and victim, an offering to the 
Father for the life of the world. 
 An ontology of participation is of utmost importance in this regard, 
especially as this relates to human self-knowing as a liturgy of Christ the 
Liturgy, which is in keeping with the earliest articulations of leitourgia by 
Saint Paul, Ignatius of Antioch, Irenaeus, et al. The above is in no way to deny 
the role of the human in the liturgical action nor is it to denigrate human action 
in any way; rather, it is to show how the vitality of human action bears no 
meaning except in a contingent relation of participation to the singular act of 
Christ who is himself the Liturgy par excellence for the life of the world. This, 
it will be argued, is the inescapable logic of the earliest articulations of the 
human's relational role as a manifesting agent of redemption, whose liturgical 
participation is both her participation in Being and her teleological function as 
one who gathers creation into the eschatological reality of Christ's reconciling 
the world to himself through recapitulated human nature. While some 
commentary on leitourgia in its historic use has been done,3 little exploration 
as to the implications of defining liturgy in this way has been conducted, nor 
has the importance of sustaining the singular reference of leitourgia to Christ 
as the absolute fusion of offerer, offering, and act of offering been either 
strong or clear enough, especially in the West. 
 Central to this thesis is the early church's understanding of the 
perichoretic life of the Trinity. The second chapter of this work, then, unpacks 
the historic understanding of the perichoresis beginning with the reciprocal 
natures within Christ, who, following John of Damascus, penetrates humanity 
that humanity might penetrate divinity. Following the Cappadocian Fathers it 
will be shown how this understanding of perichoresis is used later to explain 
the inner economic life of the Holy Trinity as a community of Persons who 
                                                            
3 See Odo Casel, The Mystery of Christian Worship, ed. Burkhard Neunheuser (New York: 
Crossroad Publishing Company, 1999), and Michael Kunzler, The Church's Liturgy (London: 
Continuum, 2001) as helpful starting points. 
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know only as each is known by the other Persons. The absolute reciprocity of 
giving and receiving, proceeding and returning, that is Father, Son and Holy 
Spirit, is the life of Liturgy made manifest in Christ, whose unconfused union 
of human nature to the Eternal Son is the assimilating action that gathers 
creation into the Eternal Liturgy God is. It is the human's entering into the 
being-known of God, whereby the Father knows himself as Father of the 
Eternal Son, and by whose Spirit has assimilated human nature to himself, 
knowing himself as Father only of the Son in his unconfused union with 
human nature, to the glory of the Father, for the hope of humanity and for the 
world's redemption. Relating the perichoretic dynamism within the Triune 
economy to the liturgical action of the ecclesial body is key for understanding 
how the early and medieval church describes the worship of the church. To 
know the God who has come in Christ is for the early church nothing short of 
a re-membering, whereby anamnesis is not a mere cognitive exercise of "not-
forgetting" but a memory of memberingÐÐbeing assimilated to that which one 
knows and by which one is known. Liturgy so understood is more akin to a 
co-habitating, which is to say that through the liturgical act of making 
Eucharist the participant comes to inhabit the space of Christ's body through 
Christ's inhabiting the body of the human, gathering her into his own eternal 
offering of himself to the Father. It would be impossible, therefore, not to 
unmask how the early and medieval church understood this totalizing reality 
to be discernible to the faithful. In this section we will explore Gregory of 
Nyssa's dictum for the Christian to "know thyself," which is not to be 
compared to modern notions of self-awareness; rather, for Gregory this form 
of knowing is akin to Aristotle's phronesis, whereby knowing is inseparable 
from the form of knowing, inseparable from the habitus in, by and through 
which the human is disciplined to know. Knowledge of God is attained only 
by doing the works of God in Christ, imitating the liturgy Christ himself is, 
which conditions the perceptive capacity of the human to see all things in their 
christic relation. 
 The third chapter will extend the range of this formative knowing by 
engaging the works of Maximus Confessor, reading him alongside the 
phenomenological investigations of Maurice Merleau-Ponty in order to 
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appreciate the full sense of how the human, through the habitus of the 
liturgically constituted body, manifests to herself her ontologically contingent 
reality as a logoi of the Logos, a liturgy of the Liturgy. Maximus understands 
the human's participation in the manifesting of the Christ event in the sense of 
giving birth.4 This giving birth to Christ through volitive participation in the 
liturgical actions of the ecclesia is that which manifests to the human her 
recapitulated identity as homo-liturgicus, not simply as a desiring animal, but 
as one who stands in eschatological tension to the fullness of her relation of 
participation as one assimilated to the perichoretic economy, known together 
with the Son.5 
 Throughout this liturgical exploration arises an understanding of time 
and space as that which is constituted by the liturgical action to be inhabited 
by the liturgical participant. Understanding the nature of human action as 
participatory in God's singular act of creating and redeeming creation is 
critical to any articulation of leitourgia. In chapter four we will work through 
Ivan Illich's "Tools for Conviviality" to show how the human relates to others 
and all things through certain extensions of herselfÐÐtools, and how these 
tools either make way for human flourishing or constrict human relating. How 
a person relates to her tools and how by her tools she relates to others is 
Illich's concern. We will explore how various technologies lend themselves to 
invert the relation of the human to her tool, whereby, following John Ruskin, 
the human becomes a tool, rather than the tool being an extension of the 
human for the establishing and sustaining of reciprocal relations. For Illich, 
tools are social mechanisms that construe the human imaginary. This is not 
necessarily negative; however, it will be explored with Illich how certain 
forms of tooling contort human relations in inhumane ways. We will further 
substantiate Illich's argument with Ferdinand TnniesÕ "Community and 
Society" to show how each social structuring narrates and navigates human 
relations in ways that either promote a common sense of flourishing or 
institutionalize enmity. The work of each will then be related directly to the 
                                                            
4 Maximus, ÒCommentary on the Our Father,Ó in On the Cosmic Mystery of Jesus Christ: 
Selected Writings from St. Maximus the Confessor, trans. Paul M. Blowers and Robert Louis 
Wilken (Crestwood: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 2003). 
5 Maximus, ÒDifficulty 10,Ó in Andrew Louth, trans., Maximus the Confessor (New York: 
Routledge, 1996), 125-126. 
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liturgy whose formative tooling either gives way to the mimetic manifesting 
described in the prior sections of this essay or detracts from it. Following, it 
will be shown how the liturgies of the early church make this formative 
knowing available to the participant as an active agent in the manifesting of 
Christ. 
 The purpose of each section is to show how the church understood the 
manner by which the human came to know herself as assimilated to God in 
Christ, relating this to how the human knows by being membered to the 
knowableÐÐthe extent of this knowledge standing in direct relation to the 
knowers proximity to the known, in order to show that the human is one 
whose being participates in BeingÐÐGod, and thereby has existence. The 
emphasis here is on how the human comprehends her contingent relation 
through the liturgical action of "making Christ" in the Eucharist. That is, 
Christ is the single actor who makes himself present in the Eucharist, but the 
human's awareness of her participatory nature is available to the extent that 
she is involved in this liturgical manifesting of herself recapitulated and 
assimilated to Christ in the divine economy. 
 The purpose of relating the liturgy to human knowing is to show, in 
chapter five, how this mimetic relation is gradually distanced from the non-
cleric throughout the late medieval era. A series of reforms over the course of 
hundreds of years, largely for practical and even at times pious reasons, serve 
to alienate the faithful (the laity) from their liturgical identity as manifesting 
agents in making Christ present. This has little to do with lay reception of the 
Eucharist, although it is not inconsequential, but rather has to do with the 
formative movements of the liturgy, once the primary means of the human's 
knowing herself as one who gathers the world into the divine life. This 
distancing is to show how the lay participant is conditioned to re-imagine what 
it means to be human, no longer ontologically conditioned by her participation 
in the liturgical action, the liturgy having become spatialized in such a way 
that the procession and return of God from and to himself no longer involves 
her participation nor, therefore, her co-habitation with God in Eucharistic 
mediation. This distancing, as I will argue, is a bodily comportment that 
conditions the human to perceive or imagine herself as autonomous from the 
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event of knowing that is the liturgy. The movement of liturgy hereby ceases to 
be an end in itself that gathers into itself the common that terminates in Christ, 
but serves to distance the common from the holy (sacred and profane) in such 
a way that a gulf between God and creation enters the human imaginary. The 
secular human identity, it will be argued, has its roots in the liturgical reforms 
of the late medieval church that creates conditions of perception whose body-
schemas do not manifest what Maximus Confessor calls the "natural nature" 
of the human, who with God is a mutual paradigm. 
 This essay is limited in its scope, focusing primarily on western 
liturgies and their influence. The liturgically inclined reader will also note a 
lack of more traditional scholarship on liturgy, most notably the work of Dom 
Gregory Dix. Nevertheless, it will be easy to find his influence throughout. 
The near absence of such a key figure has to do with the nature of this work. 
Liturgy is addressed herein as the primary habitus of western cultureÐÐliturgy 
as culture, especially as it exists up to the thirteenth century. The emphasis, 
then, is on the inseparability of the liturgical actions of the Catholic Church 
and how it transmits and transforms the social body. By getting at the cultural 
implications of liturgical forms, this essay seeks to show, as noted above, that 
what has become known as sacred and secular has a deep history in the 
liturgically constructed reality of the social body that conditions the human to 
perceive objects and others, not in their contingent and participatory relation 
to God, but as isolated and autonomous, related only by social mechanisms 
that assume an a priori fragmentation. It would be impossible to make a causal 
link from late medieval liturgy and modern, secular humanism. However, it is 
the purpose of this essay to show how the dominant habitus of the social body 
conditions the perceptive capacity of the human, and how this is inscribed 
upon the human subject in such a way that delimits how she understands her 
existence, in order to expose the logic of secular humanism inscribing itself 
upon the faithful in late medieval society. 
  
1 A Genealogy of Liturgy 
 
ÒIf there is anything worth fighting over, it is our words.Ó   
Ð G.K. Chesterton 
 
"God, by whom all things are being made, is the real doer of all that is here 
done." 
Ð Evelyn Underhill 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
With every logical equation, if the premise is false, though the whole of the 
formula be valid, the argument must be false.  It is this that names the great 
dilemma of modern liturgical scholarship.  Liturgical theology stems from a 
particular meaning or understanding of the term liturgy itself.   Liturgy is most 
often defined as Òthe work of the people,Ó or Òthe peopleÕs work.Ó  However 
defined, it is determinative for where the Church locates human flourishing 
and fulfillment.  Liturgy so understood situates human flourishing within an 
immanent frame.  Defined as Òthe work of the people,Ó the Church stops short 
of its participatory nature as the body of Christ.  It will be argued in this 
section, with the fathers of the church, that liturgy is Òthe gift of one for the 
sake of the many,Ó namely the gift of God in Christ for the life of the world.  
Naming as it does the worship of God, from the vantage point of a ÒpeopleÕs 
workÓ one could argue that God is never actually worshipped.  Man, of his 
own, is incapable of worshipÑincapable of making offering to God.  Only 
God can worship God; that is, only God can make offering to God.1 
                                                            
1 Later in chapter 5 this particular incapacity will be teased out further, all the while noting 
how liturgies in many ways effort to sustain this inability to offer but also dislocate the human 
from the offering altogether.  It will also be argued that various liturgical forms and actions 
often falsely presume a human capacity to offer apart from offering with the Son, which elicits 
a lack within the absolute self-contingency of God. 
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The liturgical gatherings of the church in antiquity were understood to 
be much more than social meals or mere ritual gatherings.2  The coming 
together of the body of Christ was itself the reordering of human sensibilities 
to divine sensibilities.  Liturgy names this ritual gathering, which creates and 
is the community it habituates; it is the convergence of thought, word, and 
deed, rendering the churchÕs being and doing inseparable.3  The identity of the 
church, then, is inherent to its liturgical action, which has for its paradigm the 
incarnation, death and resurrection of Jesus.4 
Liturgy, so understood, is paradigmatic for Divine-human and human-
human relations.  It is humanityÕs participation in the economy of God.  This 
is so because there is but one liturgy in which all faithful liturgical activity is a 
participation and of which it is an enactment.  Christ is the Liturgy, the 
singular δοξα of and to God, who by his incarnation, death, and resurrection, 
offers to the Father the only holy and acceptable sacrifice for the life of the 
world.  Christians are made participants in the Divine self-offering of the Son 
to the Father, through liturgical rite, whereby they offer themselves with the 
Son to the Father, and by the power of the Holy Spirit their offering becomes 
the offering of the SonÐÐthe Christian becomes offering, becomes liturgy.  
The gathered body re-presents the bread and wine to God, which is of his own 
bounty, who then reciprocates with transubstantiated giftsÑthe body and 
blood of Christ, which renders each as one in the shared Body of Christ.  The 
people become that which they have consumed, granting to their bodies 
immortality.5  The church, therefore, as the body of Christ, is the liturgy of the 
Liturgy.  The church does not perform or enact liturgy.  It is the liturgy in 
which it participates. 
In this section I will unpack the use of the term liturgy by the early 
church, tracing its lineage from the ancient Greek λειτουργια, in order to show 
how the church is identified with Christ in its liturgical action.  Liturgy, hereby 
                                                            
2 Gregory Dix, The Shape of the Liturgy (London: Continuum, 2005), 48-102. 
3 Ibid., 1-35. 
4 Chapter 4 will also interrogate the logic inherent to liturgical forms of worship and show 
how the logic of the practice can serve and has served to nullify the particularity of the Christ-
offering. 
5 Augustine, ÒTractate 26,Ó 12-18, in Tractates on the Gospel of John, 11-27, trans. John W. 
Rettig, vol. 79, The Fathers of the Church (Washington: Catholic University of America 
Press, 2003). 
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understood, is its own end.  It is not the means to an alternative end; rather, as 
a participation in the Liturgy-Christ the church becomes the end she 
eschatologically is in Christ.  The liturgical action is humankindÕs 
participation in the economy of the Triune GodÑthe means by which God 
makes himself available to his people and through which Christians make 
themselves available to God.  Therefore, liturgy is the necessary paradigm for 
all relations, be they celestial or temporal, and all liturgical action must find its 
intelligibility in the incarnation, death and resurrection of Jesus.  Liturgy must 
not be understood, then, as the Òwork of a people,Ó but must always be 
identified as the gift of OneÑJesusÑin, by and through whom the liturgies of 
creation participate by being gathered into the reciprocal life of love that is 
Father, Son and Holy Spirit.  Liturgy, it will be shown, is the doxological 
identity of the church whereby humanity is caught up in the procession and 
return of God from and to himselfÑthe gift of the Son to the Father through 
the Spirit, the receiving of the Son by the Father through the same Spirit, and 
the reciprocal love between Son-bound humanity and the Father through the 
Spirit. 
 
I 
The Greek word from which is derived the term liturgy is a compound word 
literally meaning public (laos) work (ergon).  (λειτο, a derivative of λαος 
(ÒpeopleÓ), meaning ÒpublicÓ and εργια, from εργον (ÒworkÓ), meaning 
service/duty/work.)  In the ancient world this term carried with it different 
meanings and was employed in a variety of ways, each having to do with the 
specific office held or action done that involved a sacrifice of one (λειτουργος) 
for the sake of the many (πολυς).  Leitourgia hereby carries the broad meaning 
of Òpublic service.Ó6  The service does, however, engender that of a sacrificial 
gift or donation, usually in the form of a financial offering or service rendered 
without expectation of return payment, e.g. paying for a festival or holding 
public office.  Although leitourgia is generally understood to have involved a 
financial sacrifice/obligation by the individual, the greater weight is placed on 
                                                            
6 Sviatoslav Dmitriev, City Government in Hellenistic and Roman Asia Minor (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2005), 17-19. 
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the sacrificial or obligatory aspect of the action itself, as done by one for the 
sake of the particular polis or demos involved.  The sacrificial element comes 
out most clearly in the case of military obligations.  The citizen is obliged to 
offer himself for military service, which is his liturgy, because of a public 
need.  Leitourgia has the double meaning for naming a personÕs obligation and 
the nature of the obligation, not because said person is individually culpable 
for military action, but because the person, as mutually culpable with all other 
persons in his polis, is capable.  His capabilities may be found in his ability to 
afford the financial expenditure, thereby obligating him to the sacrifice of 
trierarch, or it may be his strength, thereby compelling him to bear the sword.  
It is important to note that leitourgia in the ancient world does not bear the 
connotation of ÒworkÓ; rather, it is more closely akin to something like a 
Òservant-offering,Ó whereby the one who offers is his offering, be it a service 
or donum.   
In the military obligations of the Greco-Roman world is evidenced the 
sacrificial, as opposed to financial, underpinnings of this word leitourgia.7  
Even the obligation of an official to afford the expenditures associated with 
his office, e.g. the official that managed the road systems would be expected 
to pay for road repair, etc., was not the emphasis of his liturgy.  The financial 
aspects of the office could be delegated to another or, as taxable infrastructure 
developed, covered by taxable income.  In fact, Aristotle shows how the 
sacrificial element of oneÕs leitourgia can be abused.  A personÕs ability to 
afford the expenditure of an office would make him more likely to acquire the 
post, if he so desired,8 as there was a certain prestige that accompanied the 
liturgical office.  In the Politics, Aristotle gives the following warning against 
competing oligarchs and aristocrats: 
                                                            
7 See also Frank Tenney, An Economic Survey of Ancient Rome: Rome and Italy of the 
Republic, vol. I (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1936).  ÒCrews were supplied by liturgy.  In 
214 (BC) when a fleet had to be equipped quickly for the impending war in Sicily the Senate 
imposed a ÒliturgyÓ on the propertied classes of the kind well known from Athenian practice 
and from the last year of the First Punic War.  Rowers were to be supplied by Private 
individuals according to wealth.  For instance, men rated from 50,000 to 100,000 asses must 
supply and pay the wage of a rower for six months and supply him with food for a month, 
while senators had to supply eight men for a year.  There is no mention of any proposal to 
repay these outlaysÓ (86). 
8 Ibid., 43-45. 
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It is a good thing to prevent the wealthy citizens, even if they 
are willing, from undertaking expensive and useless public 
services, such as the giving of choruses, torch-races, and the 
like.Ó9 
Leitourgia was the bearing of a communal burden by those who had the means 
or ability, so to enable everyone to have a common sense of human flourishing 
(eudaimonia).  Because it was a dutiful contribution to society, it was not seen 
as a charitable act.  The gift was almost always compulsory.   
Festivals in the ancient world were frequent; there were as many as 90 
to over 100 festivals statewide each year, 60 of which were in Athens alone.  
At the turn of the third century BC, underwriting these festivals singularly 
became burdensome, giving rise to state allocated funds funneled through the 
magistrates.  In 5th century BC, it would be common for someone to serve as 
trierarch (commander/captain of a trireme) for an entire year to command the 
trireme (warship).  This undertaking not only meant that he would commit 
himself for an entire year of service, but also that he would absorb the 
financial expenditures that went along with the maintenance and repair of the 
ship itself, which is why only the wealthy would be called upon to be a 
trierarch.  This was the case for Demosthenes in 4th century BC, whose liturgy 
it was to serve for a year as a trierarch.10  Demosthenes was also highly 
critical of those who attempted to evade their liturgies.  In one of his speeches 
he admonishes such a person who, by distributing the costs involved in his 
own liturgy among so many people, no longer put forth what in any way 
resembled a sacrifice.11  What is evidenced in Demosthenes is the nature of 
the liturgical action or donum as sacrificial. 
In the classical age, leitourgia also exacts a desire for the public good.  
Aristotle situates leitourgia within the context of friendship and concord.12  
And, as aforementioned, he warns against frequent liturgies by individuals, 
                                                            
9
 Aristotle, Politics, V.viii, in The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford 
Translation, ed. Jonathan Barnes, vol. II (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984). 
10 Demosthenes, Orations 50-59: Private Cases in Neaeram, 53.4, trans. A. T. Murray, vol. 
351, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1939). 
11 Ibid. 
12
 Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, trans. H. Rackham (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1999), IX.vi.3-4. 
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even when they are able.  In this regard, Aristotle is not unusual in his 
employment of leitourgia.  Though it is the gift of one it is done for the good 
and concord of the people.  It was plainly and simply a matter of good 
citizenry.13  Included in this class of liturgists, then, were not simply the 
wealthy, but also the priests, doctors, military, or those who provided lodging 
for travelers to the city.  Leitourgia for the ancient Greeks was, however, 
primarily adverbial, describing the manner in which an act was done, i.e. 
sacrificially.  The liturgical action so understood bears an implicit logic of a 
sacrificial giving of oneself for the good of the body polis.14 
Liturgies in the ancient world were primarily festive.15  The three 
liturgies of the choragus, gymnasiarch, and hestiator, were solely for 
entertainment.16  It was public entertainment, but entertainment nonetheless.  
The choragus contributed the monies necessary to provide choruses for 
dramatic and lyric contests.  The gymnasiarchÕs liturgy was to organize and 
pay for and maintain the competitors in the torch races.17  And the hestiator 
provided food for his tribeÕs festivals.  The choraguses, gymnasiarchs, 
hestiators, trierarchs, military, doctors, priests, those who opened their homes 
to travelers, and yes Òeven jugglers,Ó says Plato, were all liturgists, giving 
their dutiful services for the common good of the people.18 
In each employment of leitourgia, the word is used to express the gift 
of one, or at least a minority of persons, regarding an act-office, for the sake of 
the demes or people.  There is a recognized social need and leitourgia names 
the satisfaction for this need as the sacrificial act of one, or a specified group 
of persons, for the sake of the social body.19 
During the third and second centuries BC, much of the Hebrew 
Scriptures were translated into Greek, what we know as the Septuagint.  The 
Hellenistic translation of the Hebrew Scriptures becomes very important in 
                                                            
13 Demosthenes, Oration 59. 
14 Dmitriev, City Government in Hellenistic and Roman Asia Minor, 39. 
15 Peter Wilson, The Athenian Institution of the Khoregia: The Chorus, the City, and the 
Stage (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 25. 
16 Ibid., 11-49; see also Ilias Arnaoutoglou, Ancient Greek Laws: A Sourcebook (London: 
Routledge, 1998), 117-123. 
17 Arnaoutoglou, Ancient Greek Laws, 117-123. 
18 Dmitriev, 34-63. 
19 Ibid. 
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understanding the use of leitourgia.  In the Hebrew language there are any 
number of words used to make distinctions in office held or action done, with 
regard to the priestly services.  The words Ôeved and Ôaboda denote servant 
and service.  Kohen is a priest, while tziva and mitzvah bear the meanings 
constitute, command, appoint, and privilege.  We find these words in Exodus, 
Numbers, Leviticus and elsewhere, all of which are translated into the Greek 
using the general term leitourgia or its derivations.  It is the spread of the 
Septuagint translation that begins to refine the meaning of leitourgia as having 
specifically to do with a ministry or service that is done for GodÕs honor and 
glory, as opposed to the more generalized Greek understanding.  The 
ministerial connotations did not do away with leitourgia as a general point of 
reference in Greek society; however, the Hellenistic influence on the Hebrew 
texts enables the churchÕs employment of this word to relate specifically to the 
act-office of Christ as High Priest.  Just as the Ancient Greek usage of 
leitourgia has a variety of meanings, each use engendering that of a sacrificial 
action, likewise does leitourgia become for the early church the term directly 
related to the act-office of a priest. 
Paul is of utmost importance in refining the definition of leitourgia.  
Being trained in the most prestigious of Hebrew schools, Paul would have had 
at his disposal any number of terms to denote the ministry of priests, offerings 
gathered, or services rendered, but Paul uses liturgy, as he does with reference 
to Epaphroditus as λειτουργον, in direct relation with one who gathers 
together the offerings of a people to God.  The ministerial connotation 
pervades here, as someone gathering and offering, or providing service on 
behalf of a people, to God, for the mutual benefit of all involved.  This is 
EpaphroditusÕ liturgy, done to God, for Paul, on behalf of the Philippians.  The 
use of leitourgia in PaulÕs letter to the Philippians takes as its precedence the 
understanding of the temple priestÕs role in the divine drama of sacrificial 
offering.  The Israelites would bring their gifts to the temple, but it was the 
priest who mediated their offerings to IsraelÕs God.  In Philippians 2:17, 2:25, 
and 2:30, the term is situated in the context of gathering the offerings of a 
community for the sake of giving glory to God, whether it is Paul being 
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poured out as a libation on behalf of the Philippians,20 which is his sacrificial 
service, his λειτουργια, to God for their mutual benefit (θυσια now being 
linked here with λειτουργια by Paul) or EpaphroditusÕ coming to PaulÕs aid, 
bearing the gifts and support of the Philippians.21 
In the letter to the Romans leitourgia is used in the same way as it is in 
PaulÕs letter to the Philippians.  The minister/λειτουργον of Christ is the one 
who gathers the peopleÕsÑin this case the GentilesÕÑofferings together, so 
that their offering will be acceptable to God by the Holy Spirit, through the 
apostle of Christ: 
I myself feel confident about you, my brothers and sisters, that 
you yourselves are full of goodness, filled with all knowledge, 
and able to instruct one another.  Nevertheless, on some points 
I have written to you rather boldly by way of reminder, because 
of the grace given me by God to be a minister (λειτουργον) of 
Christ Jesus to the Gentiles in the priestly service 
(ιερουργουντα) of the gospel of God, so that the offering of the 
Gentiles may be acceptable, sanctified by the Holy Spirit.22 
Paul makes a distinction here between the particular office of minister and the 
universal priestly service of the Gospel.  The common service of all people to 
the gospel of God (ιερουργεω) has within it specific roles for those that make 
up the ιερουργουντα of all believers, of which PaulÕs λειτουργια is as an 
administrator of the world to the Father as one holding the office of apostle.  
This is also the context of PaulÕs gathering of the resources from the 
Macedonians and Achaians,23 in order to give to the poor in Jerusalem.  Paul, 
as GodÕs λειτουργον, gathers the offerings of the many for the sake of Christ 
and only then extending it to others; this is his liturgical officeÑwho he is in 
the Divine Economy.  As in the classical Greek usage of the term, the act and 
office are inextricably linked.  Paul is the liturgy he enactsÑChrist.  His 
liturgical role is to serve as Christ, to gather the offerings of the faithful into 
the offering Jesus is in himself.  Only in this way do the liturgical actionsÑ
                                                            
20 Philippians 2.17. 
21 Philippians 2.25, 2.30. 
22 Romans 15:14-16. 
23 Romans 15.27. 
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offeringsÑof a people become bound to the offering of Jesus to the FatherÑ
the one, holy acceptable offering. 
It is this gathering together of gifts that becomes of central importance, 
especially in the letter to the church in Corinth.  In PaulÕs first letter he 
addresses their shortcomings in the liturgical economy.  ÒWhen you come 
together, it is not really to eat the LordÕs Supper.  For when the time comes to 
eat, each of you goes ahead with your own supper, and one goes hungry whilst 
another becomes drunk.Ó24  Paul condemns their practice of gathering together 
in a public space (ecclesia) for a shared mealÑthe LordÕs SupperÑand yet 
having complete disregard for one another, not discerning rightly the make-up 
of the Body they are in Christ.  He emphasizes to the Corinthians that every 
meal is an image of and participation in the Last Supper when Christ broke 
bread and gave, not to a few, but to all gathered, even giving his body to one 
who would betray him.  Not to gather the gifts as a single offering to God, that 
is, not to gather together as one body, is to reject being gathered into ChristÕs 
Body.  The gathering of the body through its offering is the realization of the 
Church as sacramentÑas GodÕs unifying force in the world whereby 
communication with the triune God is made available. 
It is important to note that PaulÕs criticism of the Corinthian meal is 
that it has as its paradigm the meals of the idol temples and common meals, 
whereby social status determines food preference and seating arrangements.  
The LordÕs Supper, however, shifts the paradigm so that all meals, feasts, 
services of worship, and all bonds of human relations participate in the shared 
communion of the human with the Father, in Christ, through the Spirit.  Not to 
gather the resources together as shared resources is a refusal to be gathered 
into Christ.  Hierarchy of succession, however, is not eliminated with the 
abolition of a hierarchy of goods.  In this light is the bishop best understood as 
the primus inter pares.  None are deserving of the benefits of GodÑnone 
deserve to be gathered into the GodheadÑbut the same gift is offered to sinner 
and saint alike, which demands that all goods be shared in common.  The 
corrective for the Corinthians is undergirded by PaulÕs articulation of giving in 
his letter to the Philippians, as mentioned above.  To give is to give to God, 
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necessitating as a consequence the benefit to oneÕs neighbor, which has the 
double-effect of a mutual binding in Christ.  (This could also be seen as a 
positive carry-over of the negative side found in Psalm 51, Òagainst thee only 
have I sinned.Ó  Sins are committed against God, which, as a consequence, 
fracture the human relationship.  Reading this in conjunction with Matthew 5, 
where the offerer is called to be reconciled with his brother prior to making his 
offering, shows not that the brotherly relation establishes the relation to Christ; 
rather, reconciliation and communion with God demands reconciliation and 
communion with one another.  Reconciliation with your brother or sister 
presumes a prior participation in the life of God, which is why the 
reconciliation between brothers and sisters is a necessary consequence of 
communion with God, though not the establishment of it.  Right relation with 
others, then, is understood as a consequence of right relatedness to God, even 
though a necessary consequence.  This is reinforced also by ChristÕs 
radicalization of the first and second commandmentÑÒThou shalt love the 
Lord your God with all your heart, soul, mind and strength, and your neighbor 
as yourself.Ó) 
Clement of Rome, as with Paul and the ancient writers before him, 
carries forward the union between office and action expressed by the word 
leitourgia.  In Clements Epistle to the Corinthians, leitourgia is used in 
reference to the priestly office, specifically bearing the meaning of the temple 
priest as one who speaks repentance.25  Clement makes no distinction between 
the office held and the action done.  Leitourgia also takes on a more 
generalized definition of a service done in obedience to God, which is 
compared with NoahÕs obedience in building the ark and gathering the 
animals,26 and even the liturgy of the wind as it participates in its proper 
fashion within the economy of creation.27  Nevertheless, following his 
                                                            
25 Clement of Rome, ÒThe First Epistle to the Corinthians,Ó VIII, in James A. Kleist, 
trans., The Epistles of St. Clement of Rome and St. Ignatius of Antioch, ed. Johannes Quasten 
and Joseph C. Plumpe (New York: Newman Press, 1946). 
26 Ibid., IX. 
27 Ibid., XX.  We see this also in Chrysostom, who speaks of the day and the night as ministers 
(λειτουργον), who perform their liturgies for the sake of humanity, drawing humanity closer 
together as a unity.  The wild beasts are also liturgists, as they drive men into cities out of fear, 
forcing humanity to live in solidarity with one another, living peacefully and harmoniously, 
rather than being eaten alive in the wilderness alone (See Chrysostom, Homily on the Statutes, 
8.1). 
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explanation of the windÕs liturgy, participating in due fashion within the order 
of creation, Clement goes on to narrow the use of leitourgia as the hierarchical 
offices of all, each having their role in the liturgy of Jesus through the liturgies 
prescribed to them.  Drawing on Hebrews 10, Clement links λειτουργια with 
θυσια and προσϕερεω, so that the priest is the one who offers the people's 
sacrifice.  Following the logic found in Hebrews, the people so gathered are 
"consecrated through the offering of the body of Jesus Christ," enabling 
Clement to say that every liturgist, each in his/her order, participates in the 
liturgy Jesus is.28  It is through participation in JesusÕ liturgy that the Christian 
is consecrated to God.29  It is worthwhile to include the whole passage here. 
Since, therefore, this is evident to all of us, and we have 
explored the depths of the divine knowledge, we are obliged to 
carry out in fullest detail what the Master has commanded us to 
do at stated times. He has ordered the sacrifices to be offered 
(προσφορας) and the services to be held (λειτουργιας), and this 
is not in a random and irregular fashion, but at definite times 
and seasons. He has, moreover, Himself, by His sovereign will 
determined where and by whom He wants them to be carried 
out. Thus all things are done religiously, acceptable to His good 
pleasure, dependent on His will. Those, therefore, that make 
their offerings at the prescribed times are acceptable and 
blessed; for, since they comply with the ordinances of the 
Master, they do not sin. Special functions (λειτουργιαι) are 
assigned to the high priest; a special office is imposed upon the 
priests; and special ministrations fall to the Levites. The 
layman is bound by the rules laid down for the laity. Each of 
us, brethren, must in his own place endeavor to please God 
                                                            
28 Clement does not say it as explicitly as ÒJesus isÓ the liturgy; however, his articulation of 
liturgy as synonymous with office makes the act-office of Christ as the liturgy he performs a 
natural claim for Clement. 
29 Clement of Rome, The First Epistle to the Corinthians, VIII - XLII, especially XL and XLI.  
Clement reiterates the argument made in Hebrews 10, where it is Christ who is the sacrifice, 
the one offering, and it is in his liturgy that the Christian participates when they come to offer 
themselves as a living sacrifice, and it is the bishop who stands as Christ and gathers the 
people into GodÕs economy. 
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with a good conscience, reverently taking care not to deviate 
from the established rule of service (λειτουργιας).30 
The liturgies of the bishop, deacon and layman are likened to those of the 
angels.31  It is hereby that Clement links the bishop with Christ.  It is ChristÕs 
liturgy that is now assigned to the bishop to carry on, gathering the offerings 
of the many into one as acceptable and pleasing to God.32  The offerings of the 
people are inseparable from the people themselves.  When the bishop gathers 
the gifts of the people, he simultaneously gathers the people, so that what is 
consecrated and given to God is not merely the people's offering; it is they 
who are presented with the offering (they are what the offering signifies).33  
Clement specifically locates the plurality of liturgical activity within the 
singularity of ChristÕs liturgical act.  As with Ignatius of Antioch, the bishop 
stands as Christ; it is he who gathers the body, discerning rightly according to 
each order, making the many offerings of the masses a single, consecrated and 
blessed offering acceptable to God. 
In Ignatius, the bishop is undeniably Christ to the church, to be 
reverenced as if we were reverencing Christ. ÒPlainlyÉ one should look upon 
the bishop as upon the Lord Himself.Ó34  The bishop is hereby the οικονοµιαν 
for the οικοδεσποτης (the economist/administrator for the economy/household 
of the Master).35  He is the master on behalf of the MasterÑGod, who 
administrates the LordÕs economy in the terrestrial realm as analogous to its 
orchestration in the celestial realm, through whom in Christ these realms co-
inhere.  For Ignatius, then, Christ is the gatherer of the whole world into God, 
the chief economist if you will, or ÒcaptainÓ as Ignatius says, and the bishopÑ
επισκοποςÑis the gatherer of the people in Christ, literally the over-seer (επι 
                                                            
30 Clement of Rome, The First Epistle to the Corinthians, XL-XLI. 
31 Ibid., XXXVI, again drawing on Hebrews (1.10). See also Leviticus 3.5. 
32 Ibid., XL.  It is in this passage that Clement makes most explicit the ordering of the 
liturgical economy by Christ, whose services/liturgies are now assigned to the episcopate, and 
through him are enjoined the offerings to be presented and the services to be performed to the 
glory of the Lord.  See also ICL, XLI. 
33 There is no distinction to be made here between the signified (bread) and the thing-signified 
(giver).  As will be shown later in chapter four, the bread and its donor are inseparable. 
34 Ignatius, ÒEpistle to the Ephesians,Ó VI, in James A. Kleist, trans., The Epistles of St. 
Clement of Rome and St. Ignatius of Antioch, ed. Johannes Quasten and Joseph C. Plumpe 
(New York: Newman Press, 1946). 
35 Ignatius, Epistle to the Ephesians, VI. 
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over/above, σκοπος sight/see) of the economy, through whom the peoplesÕ 
offerings, that is, the people themselves, are conjoined or assimilated to God.36 
The Greek meaning of λειτουργια is both carried forth and given new 
meaning in Jesus of Nazareth.  It maintains its emphasis both as sacrifice and 
donation; however, the meaning is radicalized by the fact that there is only one 
who can give the giftÑJesus, and his specific form of self-offering now 
determines the very nature of sacrifice and how a liturgical economy is to be 
enacted.  Leitourgia must be a sacrificial offering of the self to God, which is 
consequentially beneficial to others.  Perhaps the clearest example of this is 
found in Similitude 5 of the Shepherd of Hermas, in his explication on fasting. 
After having done what is prescribed, on the day of your fast do 
not taste anything except bread and water. Compute the total 
expense for the food you would have eaten on the day on which 
you intended to keep a fast and give it to a widow, an orphan, 
or someone in need. In this way you will become humble in 
soul, so that the beneficiary of your humility may fill his soul 
and pray to the Lord for you. If you perform your fast, then, in 
the way I have just commanded, your sacrifice (θυσια) will be 
acceptable in the sight of God and this fast will be entered in 
the account [in your favor]; a service (λειτουργια) so performed 
is beautiful, joyous, and acceptable in the sight of the Lord.37 
Fasting alone would not be ÒenoughÓ in this light, for if a person fasted and 
kept the money that would have afforded her meals, there would be a gain 
involved in the sacrificial act, which would not fully participate in the self-
emptying of God on the cross.  (It is important to note how PaulÕs emphasis on 
the service is not to the other, even though it is for the other.  It is a necessary 
consequence that service to God is for the benefit of others; however, it 
remains a consequence of the liturgical action, not what determines the 
liturgical action.)  FastingÑabstaining from eatingÑdoes not mean that food 
is wasted, says Hermas.  It means that it is denied by one for the sake of being 
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 Ignatius, Epistle to the Ephesians, VI. 
37 Shepherd of Hermas, ÒParables,Ó V.iii, in Francis Xavier Glimm, Joseph Marie-Felix 
Marique, and Gerald Groveland Walsh, trans., The Apostolic Fathers (Washington: Catholic 
University of America Press, 1969). 
Christ the Liturgy 
 14 
eaten by another.  In this way is fasting liken to JesusÕ liturgy, whose offering 
is always to the glory of the Father and for the life of the world.  A gift given 
to another does not imply, on the basis of something given, that it is a mimesis 
of JesusÕ self-offering; however, an offering to God does entail that it be 
sacrificial in nature with the consequence of benefiting an other.  Only when 
the offering to God is truly self-emptying in this way shall the person receive 
the blessing that only God can give.  The radicalization of leitourgia is found 
in the mimetic offering of one as living-sacrifice, whereby God is glorified, 
the other receives the benefits, and the offerer is drawn into communion with 
God.  This is how the other is drawn into the procession and return of God 
from and to himself. 
When the gifts are gathered as an offering to God, they are then 
distributed to those in need, be they the poor or apostle.  It is here that 
λειτουργια comes into direct relation with κοινονια (a gift jointly contributed, 
as exhibiting proof of joint fellowship).  Foreshadowed in PaulÕs articulation 
is the functioning of the medieval guild system with its inherent liturgical 
nature for sustaining a society of reciprocity.  Paul describes this fellowship in 
his letter to the Philippians, where the gifts of the Macedonians and Achaians 
bind them together in the fellowship of Christ with the Christians in 
Jerusalem.  But such κοινονια is never unilateral for Paul; it is inherently 
reciprocal.  The sharing/εκοινωνησεν is in giving/δοσεως and 
receiving/ληµψεως.38  Nowhere in PaulÕs letters is this shared liturgy more 
explicit than in his second letter to the church in Corinth.  ÒThrough us,Ó says 
Paul, the liturgy of the Corinthians will be a Òthanksgivings to God,Ó39 and it 
is through their liturgy that koinonia with other Christians is possible, which 
glorifies God.40  This koinonia, however, is a mimesis of the Òindescribable 
giftÓ of God in ChristÑthe Holy SpiritÑwho simultaneously realizes with the 
Christian community the fellowship/shared life in God through the same 
Spirit.41 
                                                            
38 Philippians 4:15. 
39 2 Corinthians 9:11-12. 
40 2 Corinthians 13. 
41 2 Corinthians 13:13. 
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In Marcel Mauss' ÒThe Gift,Ó he shows how giving has historically 
defined the nature of human relations within a local community and 
differentiated bodies of people.42  All giving occurs in and through the 
fellowship of those who participate in the social body or the fellowship 
between social bodies.  This is due to the nature of a gift.  A gift is never to be 
understood as a thing that bears meaning apart from its giver or recipient.  In 
giving a gift, "one gives away what is in reality a part of one's nature and 
substance, while to receive something is to receive a part of someone's 
spiritual essence."43  The gift creates a shared life between giver and recipient.  
Fellowship, however, is contingent upon reciprocity.  The offering is not 
enough to bind the two parties together.  The gift must be received.  If the gift 
is denied, it is as though the would-be recipient has declared war on the 
giver.44 
This is comparable with the parable of the man who held a banquet for 
his son45 where none who were invited came.  By not attending the banquet, 
all those invited were not simply refusing to attend a meal at the home of the 
one married or his father, each were denying fellowship with the one who 
extended the invitation to the banquet.  The ancient gift-economy illustrated 
by Mauss is extremely helpful in order to discern how fellowship between 
persons or bodies of people is established and sustained, especially as it relates 
to the development of liturgy throughout church history.  The tangible gifts 
shared between people are not understood to be inert objects, but as endowed 
with the spirit of the giver, and by receiving it the recipient enters into 
fellowship with the giver.46  As with Augustine, the thing is inseparable from 
the thing-signified.  What is signified in the gift is the giver herself, which 
binds or separates the two persons or communities, depending on the reception 
or denial by the receiving party.  Irenaeus points this out in regard to the 
widowÕs mite, who in casting her two coins into the treasury casts also herself. 
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The oblation of the Church, therefore, which the Lord gave 
instructions to be offered throughout all the world, is accounted 
with God a pure sacrifice, and is acceptable to Him; not that He 
stands in need of a sacrifice from us, but that he who offers is 
himself glorified in what he does offer, if his gift be accepted. 
For by the gift both honour and affection are shown forth 
towards the King; and the Lord, wishing us to offer it in all 
simplicity and innocence, did express Himself thus: ÒTherefore, 
when thou offerest thy gift upon the altar, and shalt remember 
that thy brother hath ought against thee, leave thy gift before 
the altar, and go thy way; first be reconciled to thy brother, and 
then return and offer thy gift.Ó  We are bound, therefore, to 
offer to God the first-fruits of His creation, as Moses also says, 
ÒThou shalt not appear in the presence of the Lord thy God 
empty;Ó so that man, being accounted as grateful, by those 
things in which he has shown his gratitude, may receive that 
honour which flows from Him.  And the class of oblations in 
general has not been set aside; for there were both oblations 
there [among the Jews], and there are oblations here [among 
the Christians]. Sacrifices there were among the people; 
sacrifices there are, too, in the Church: but the species alone 
has been changed, inasmuch as the offering is now made, not 
by slaves, but by freemen. For the Lord is [ever] one and the 
same; but the character of a servile oblation is peculiar [to 
itself], as is also that of freemen, in order that, by the very 
oblations, the indication of liberty may be set forth. For with 
Him there is nothing purposeless, nor without signification, nor 
without design. And for this reason they (the Jews) had indeed 
the tithes of their goods consecrated to Him, but those who 
have received liberty set aside all their possessions for the 
LordÕs purposes, bestowing joyfully and freely not the less 
valuable portions of their property, since they have the hope of 
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better things [hereafter]; as that poor widow acted who cast all 
her living into the treasury of God. 47 
The widow, in casting all her living into the treasury, has given also herself to 
God, entirely; she is glorified in what she has offered, because she has 
received the Gift to now be gift.  In her poverty she becomes wealthy, because 
she has emptied herself to GodÕs glory, and is now the dwelling place of the 
Lord. 
Koinonia for the Christian community becomes distinct, however, 
because of the gathering of many offerings into a unified offering.  A gift 
cannot be given in isolation or unilaterally.  All giving in a Christian 
community is an extension of divine generosity and a drawing into absolute 
reciprocity.  Christ has given the only gift that can be given.  All other gifts 
either participate in or deny the kenotic gift of the Son to the Father.  The 
willed, self-emptying and slave-hood of the Son is the Gift; it is the action by 
which the whole of creation is united as a single offering to the Father.  This 
willed, self-emptying is the liturgy of the Son, and fellowship in Christ is 
inseparable from participation in the liturgical action of Christ.  Koinonia is 
exacted by the liturgical action.  The Father gives the Son to the world and the 
Son gathers the world into himself as a consecratedÐÐassimilatedÐÐoffering in 
his return to the Father.  This procession and return is sustained by the shared 
life of the Spirit now made available through the church.  Through the 
mysteries the human is initiated and gathered into this procession and return, 
whereby she becomes a vessel of the holy,48Ñshe becomes mysteryÑbeing 
co-opted, as it were, into the divine drama. 
Ambrose, perhaps better than any other, draws together the essence of 
koinonia (or in his case communicatio) as the manifestation of the liturgy of 
the Son. 
So the Father gave His Son, and the Son Himself gave Himself.  
Charity is preserved, and devoutness is not harmed, for there 
can be no harm to devoutness, where there is no hardship in 
giving.  He gave Him who was willing; He gave Him who 
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offered Himself; surely the Father did not give the Son for 
punishment but for grace.  If you inquire into the merit of the 
deed question the word Ôdevoutness.Õ  The vessel of election 
clearly shows this unity of divine charity, for both Father gave 
the Son, and the Son Himself gave Himself.  The Father gave, 
who Ôspared not even His own Son, but delivered Him up for us 
allÕ (Romans 8:32).  Of the Son also he says: ÔWho delivered 
Himself for meÕ (Galatians 11:20)É  [As] the Father gave the 
Son, and the Son Himself gave Himself, learn that the Spirit 
also gave Him.  For it is written: ÔThen Jesus was led by the 
Spirit into the desert to be tempted by the devilÕ (Matthew 4:1).  
So the Spirit, too, loved the Son of God and gave HimÉ  
Moreover, it is manifest that there is fellowship with the Father 
and with the Son, for it is written: ÔOur fellowship with the 
Father and with His Son, Jesus ChristÕ; and elsewhere: ÔThe 
communication of the Holy Ghost with you allÕ (1 John 1:3; 2 
Corinthians 13:13)É.49 
Offerer, offering, and the act of offering converge in the giving of the Son, 
which is the fullness of the GodheadÑGod the Father, God the Son and God 
the Holy SpiritÑwho gives himselfÑthe whole of DivinityÑestablishing 
koinonia with all humanity through the receiving of the Gift, as giver and 
recipient are fused together in ecstatic, unconfused union of love. 
Koinonia with Christ, therefore, is the telos of humanity, which occurs 
by sharing in his sufferings and death (Phil. 3:10).  This can only mean that 
the gift received through the mysteries, which incorporates the Christian into 
the Triune Communion, is now her gift to endlessly give.  A gift can be given, 
because the Gift has been given.  By receiving this gift the human becomes 
bound to God and, consequentially, to neighbor, for with the gift comes the 
fullness of the giver.  The human is bound through ChristÕs liturgy, as he has 
gathered humanity into himself in obedience to the Father.  Being so gathered 
Christians now participate as an assimilated body that labors together, strives 
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in company together, sleeps together, awakens together, as liturgists of God.50  
It is in this shared fellowship with others in Christ that the human exhibits the 
likeness of the Triune God. 
Once again, however, it is the primacy of the bishop that comes to the 
fore, as it is his liturgical office as christotokos through which God deigns to 
continue the ministry of reconciliation.  Nevertheless, as Ignatius and Cyprian 
remind us, the singular liturgy of the church is a conjoined liturgy of the whole 
body, whereby the bishop can only perform his office as bishop to the extent 
that the lay person performs her office as lay person, and vice versa.51  Office 
and action, as in the ancient world, are in Christ inseparable.  The hierarchical 
administration of the liturgical economy is a division of labor, not a 
partitioning of classes.  Just as the bishop makes the people available to God, 
likewise do the people make God available to the bishop. A logic of 
reciprocity is embedded within the action.  By necessity of her communion 
with God, the Christian must be in fellowship with ChristÕs holy Church, 
through its bishops.52 
The nature of sacrifice in the ancient world and how this is 
transformed by Christ is of utmost importance for discerning how liturgy is to 
be understood, especially given the inherent nature of liturgy as a self-
emptying of God and assimilation of humanityÐÐthe absolute refusal of the 
Creator to live apart from creation.  The form is anticipated in Israel, as 
Hebrew sacrifice presumes an a priori relation to God, not as something that 
establishes the relation.  GodÕs action is always primary; human action is 
always a response to GodÕs act. 
In the world of ancient Greece, offering sacrifices to the gods were a 
complex affair bound together with deep rooted customs and surrounded by 
prayers that made the reciprocal relation between Greek and god sensible.53 
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Among other things, the primary role of sacrifice for the ancient Greek was to 
remind the god(s) invoked that they were the offerersÕ god(s). This meant that 
if the god expected continual sacrifices from the offerer the god better ensure 
the well being of the offerer.54 If the god did not save the life of the offerer in 
battle it would effectively put an end to the sacrifices made to the god by that 
person or people. The god, therefore, had dog in the fight, as it were, 
depending on the pleasure derived from the sacrifice.55 The expectation, 
however, was surely that the god would respond in kind to the offerer(s), 
which was the purpose of accompanying prayers in the ritual offering.56 
Without the accompanying prayer the god would not know exactly what the 
offerer hoped to receive from the offering.57 There is no hint, says Simon 
Pulleyn, that the Greek gods were omniscient.58 They needed clear instruction 
from the offerer how they should reciprocate, aside from general mindfulness 
of the offerersÕ flourishing. 
Robert Parker has shown that the sacrificial engagement between 
Greeks and gods was integral to the cohesion of the social body.59 Like Greek 
heroes, the gods were offered sacrifices because of the benefits procured in the 
present.60 It also met a distinctly human need for contact with the invisible 
world humans knew to exist.61 The primary way to gain access to this unseen 
world, however, was through animal sacrifices, which were themselves 
understood to be Òself-offeringsÓ to the god(s)Ñvicarious offerings.62 Animal 
sacrifices also evidence a relationship that is initiated by the offerer, rather 
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than the god.63 The relation is reciprocal, even if Ôgive-and-take,Õ and while 
the initial engagement may not be from the human it remains the sacrifice that 
sets the stage for the god to return in kind.64 In HomerÕs Iliad, Chryses recalls 
to Apollo, after the failed attempt to free is daughter from the hands of 
Agamemnon, to remember his sacrifices and Òin exchangeÓ avenge his 
daughter. 
Hear me, you of the silver bow, who protect Chryses and holy 
Cilla and rule with might over Tenedos, if ever I have roofed 
over for you a pleasing temple or burnt up fro you fat thighs of 
bulls or goats, fulfill for me this wish: may the Danaans pay for 
my tears by your arrows.65 
Here Chryses makes a prayer, one that he assimilates with past sacrifices to 
Apollo in his holy temple. The animal sacrifice hereby serves as a sort of 
binding contract between god and human. This should not be understood in 
the typical way one might understand a contract today, however; rather, it is 
that which binds together the reciprocal relation between the two parties. The 
offerer obliges herself in the offering and the god returns the obligation by 
receiving the offering.66 
 This transaction-like reciprocity runs markedly opposed to the form of 
sacrifice and prayer we find among ancient Israel. As Simon Pulleyn has 
argued, the crucial difference for the Hebrew is that the covenant relation 
between human and God is the fact that the relation is instigated by God.67 
Additionally, whereas χαρις is an obliged return for the Greek god for 
YHWH it is definitely not.68 As for the sacrifice the offerings and activities of 
the Hebrews are responsive rather than antecedent.69 
                                                            
63 Jan N. Bremmer and Andrew Erskine, eds., The Gods of Ancient Greece: Identities and 
Transformations (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2010), 90. 
64 Pulleyn, 1-38. 
65 Homer, Iliad, 1.37ff. 
66 Pulleyn, 16-17. 
67 Ibid., 18. 
68 Ibid., 21. As Simon Pulleyn has shown, there is a world of difference between Hebrew 
prayer and the prayer of Chryses or any other Homeric hero who expects his god to pay back 
one good turn with another. 
69 Ibid. 
Christ the Liturgy 
 22 
The most notable Hebrew sacrifice that comes to mind when is the 
story of Abraham and Isaac.  Abraham is told by God to offer his sonÑhis 
only sonÑIsaac as a burnt-offering.70  This test of faith is often read solely 
from the vantage point of God demanding the only son of Abraham.  What is 
often overlooked in the assessment is the fact that God first gives Isaac to 
Abraham as a gift.  Isaac is the offering that God has given, not the other way 
around.  Abraham has nothing of his own to give to God; he can only offer to 
God that which God has given him to offer.  When a ram if offered in IsaacÕs 
stead, it remains God who has provided the sacrificial offering. 
 The burnt-offering in ancient Israel is a thank-offering, whereby the 
offerer and God are united by the offering.  In the case of Abraham, it is 
presumed that union with God will be made available to Abraham through the 
sacrifice of Isaac.  Other forms of offering within Judaism are peace-offerings, 
meal offerings, and the sin and guilt offerings.71  The peace-offerings were 
offerings of thanksgiving.  These offerings were given in response to GodÕs 
redemption of Israel, and in anticipation of the coming restoration of Israel.  
Meal offerings were sacrifices made from the fruits of the land, which had 
been given to Israel by God.  A sin offering was a sacrifice made as reparation 
for sins committed in ignorance.  The sin offering acknowledges a failure to 
properly participate in the life God has given to his people.  Guilt offerings 
differ from sin offerings to the extent that the sin was committed knowingly 
and the sacrifice was meant to be expiatoryÑthat is, the animal sacrificed was 
symbolic of the person offering.  Through the animals dies the sinful life of 
the offerer that he might live holy to God.  The sacrifice served to repair the 
covenantal relation established by God with his people.  The sin and guilt 
offerings are not efforts to gain or regain favor with God, but are meant to 
mourn the fractured relationship between God and his people, who favors his 
people even when they sin against him.  What is important to grasp here, is the 
initiating factor of the covenant.  For the Greek, a covenant with a god is 
established by the sacrifice of a people, whereas for the Hebrews, the covenant 
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is the gift of the God who comes before, not after, the human.  The sacrificial 
offerings of the Hebrews are in response to the gifts of YHWH, who creates ex 
nihilo. 
 Isaac stands as paradigmatic for Jewish understandings of sacrificial 
offering.72  GodÕs gift precedes all forms of giving.  ÒAll things come from 
you, [O God,] and of your own have we given you.Ó73 GodÕs giving, however, 
anticipates a return; and it is the return that seals the union with God.  In 
offering Isaac to be sacrificed, Abraham is offering himself, who confesses 
through knowledge of GodÕs prevenience that ÒGod will provide.Ó  God has 
provided Isaac, beyond all biological certainty.  By returning Isaac to God, 
Abraham is drawn into the fullness of the divine economyÑgathering Isaac 
into this same economyÑwherein all necessary means of giving are 
provided.74  The test of Abraham is whether or not he trusts that all things 
truly come from God, as opposed to human ingenuity.75  God is the sole giver 
of gifts; and it is only God who can receive himself.  AbrahamÕs giving and 
receiving are to be understood, therefore, as a participation in the giving and 
receiving of God from and to himself. 
 Within Judaism sacrifice takes on a true leitourgia.76  AbrahamÕs 
offering of Isaac is a liturgical act.  Abraham informs those who have traveled 
to the land of Moriah with him and Isaac to stay behind, that Òthe boy and I 
will go over there; we will worship, and then we will come back to you.Ó77  
The procession up the mountaintop by Abraham with Isaac, is AbrahamÕs 
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offertory procession with the gift God has given him to giveÐÐIsaac.  
Nevertheless, the gift of Isaac is transformed by GodÕs giving of the ram, and 
Isaac returns to Abraham radiating the glory of the Lord.  It is upon this 
liturgical backdrop that the cross is staged.  The notions of sacrifice found in 
the ancient world of the Greeks is turned on its head, while the Hebrew 
liturgical offerings find their eternal rest.  Christ, in his procession before the 
world, ushers in a complete ÒtransfigurationÓ of the sacrificial offering of a 
people, locating all sacrifice and offering within his singular liturgy, 
foreshadowed in the liturgy of Abraham and Isaac. 
When we come to Paul, what we find in his letters is a clear 
articulation that the sacrificial offerings to God and one another, participate in 
JesusÕ liturgy, which is his obedience to the Father.  The SonÕs liturgy is the 
gathering together of the whole world, sanctifying the whole of creation, 
which makes the liturgies of humans acceptable and pleasing to the Father, 
who in turn blesses and returns human offerings for the life of the world, 
uniting heaven and earth in the gift of the Holy Spirit, making humankindÕs 
continual offering to God possible, and GodÕs continual return available.  This 
liturgical drama between God and Creation effectually incorporates GodÕs 
people into GodÕs economy through koinonia in ChristÕs self-emptying, 
sacrificial offering.78  The Son is the ultimate Gift of the Father.  In receiving 
the Son, the human is conjoined to the Second Person of the Holy Trinity.  
The Father receives the human with the Son and returns to humanity the Holy 
Spirit, who makes continual fellowship in the love of the Father for the Son 
and obedience of the Son to the Father possibleÑa glorious cycle of 
procession and return of God from and to himself.  To receive the Son is 
simultaneously to give oneself to the Father.  Receiving a gift, as seen earlier, 
is to receive the one who gives the gift; it is to bind oneself, through the same 
reception, to the donor.  LiturgyÐÐoneÕs sacrificial offeringÐÐis, then, a 
participation in the faithful obedience of the Son.  Through the Holy Spirit one 
enters into the mutual, self-emptying reciprocal love that is the Triune 
Communion. 
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In the same manner that God has given Isaac to Abraham, so has the 
Father given the Son to all.  Likewise, as Isaac is demanded by God to be 
offered in return, so is the Son exacted, and God provides.  The ram is given 
for Isaac, as bread and wine are given for the faithful.  Having received Christ 
through the Spirit the Christian is now bound to the Father.  Return to the 
Father is hereby demanded, and God provides.  Because God provides the 
offering, the continuation of reciprocal love between Creator and creation is 
made available.  In offering bread and wine as symbols of the living sacrifice 
Christians are, God receives the offerings, gathered as they are into and along 
with Christ, and returns them endowed with the fullness of his power and 
grace, his body and blood.  In consuming the flesh and blood of God, the 
Christian is consumedÑincorporated through the corpus mysticum, to become 
the corpus verumÑa body that reaches beyond all spatial barriers to unite both 
seen and unseen.  The Body of Christ is then sent out into the world in its 
many parts; and is sent out to return. 
In the book of Hebrews, the nature of sacrifice and how it participates 
in the liturgical drama of God is made most explicit.  ÒThrough him then let us 
continually offer up a sacrifice of praise to God, that is, the fruit of lips that 
acknowledge his name.Ó79  The sacrificial offering here not only takes on a 
ÒspiritualÓ connotationÑthat is, it is a participation in the sacrifice of Jesus, 
not an animal being slain or the like, but most importantly the author unites 
sacrifice and offering with the liturgical action of Jesus as High Priest, who 
gathers creation into himself as a single offering in its return to the Father.  
Liturgy and sacrifice go hand in hand.  The liturgies of a people are analogous 
to the divine liturgy Jesus is, inasmuch as one participates in the singular, self-
emptying, and sacrificial offering of the Son to the Father. 
The liturgical sacrifice offered by the community to God, because it 
participates by way of analogy in the liturgy of Jesus, must be a pure offering.  
This pure offering is directly linked to the EucharistÑthe spiritual sacrifice.  
The bread of the Eucharistic offering, however, is inseparable from those 
making the offering.  Both Cyril and Irenaeus are explicit about the offering of 
the community and the offering of Christ as being indistinguishable, whereby 
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the various liturgies of the people participate in the one true offering.  As Cyril 
puts it: 
After this the bishop says: ÔHoly things for the holy.Õ The 
offerings are holy, because they have received the descent of 
the Holy Spirit, and you are holy too because you have been 
granted the Holy Spirit; thus the holy things are appropriate for 
holy people. Then you say: ÔOne is holy, one is Lord, Jesus 
Christ.Õ  For truly there is one who is holy, holy by nature; for 
though we are holy, we are not so by nature, but by 
participation and discipline and prayer.  After this you hear the 
cantor to a sacred melody encouraging you to receive the holy 
mysteries. ÔTaste and seeÕ, he sings, Ôthe goodness of the LordÕ 
(Ps 33.9; 34.8). Do not rely on the judgment of your physical 
throat but on that of unhesitating faith. For what you taste is not 
bread and wine but ChristÕs body and blood, which they 
symbolize.  So when you approach do not come with your 
wrists extended or your fingers parted. Make your left hand a 
throne for your right, which is about to receive the King, and 
receive ChristÕs body in the hollow of your hand, replying 
ÔAmenÕ. Before you consume it, carefully bless your eyes with 
the touch of the holy body, watching not to lose any part of it; 
for if you do lose any of it, it is as if it were part of your own 
body that is being lost.80 
As for Irenaeus, what Christians offer is the Òbeginning of the new creationÕs 
harvestÑthe humanity of Christ, in which the deification of human nature is 
perfected and offered to us.Ó81  To participate, therefore, as mentioned above 
in the gift of the widowÕs mite, is to be gathered into the kenotic love of God.  
It is a love that humans are incapable of enacting on their own.  Humankind 
cannot, as it were, love God.  All love is a participation in triune reciprocityÑ
humanityÕs share in GodÕs fullness.  The Spirit, as Cyril puts forth, enables 
one to participate in the offeringÐÐChrist, in the self-emptying of God on the 
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cross.  Sacrifice, hereby understood, cannot be made by humanity.  Only God 
can sacrifice.  Only God can suffer.  Only God can drink the cup.  All 
sacrificial action, then, is participatory.  Indeed, all action in the proper sense 
is Christ.82 
Furthermore, as found in the Didache, following JesusÕ teaching on 
bringing gifts to the altar,83 the established relationship of God with humanity 
requires right-relatedness within the community in order to participate in the 
life-giving sacrifice of the Eucharist.  The sacrifice is profaned if there is 
division involved in the one offering her gift.84  Into the latter first and early 
second century, there is a clear continuation and linkage between the 
sacrificial offering, the gift, and the liturgy itself that is identified with the 
offerer.  The Didache not only locates sacrificial offering in the liturgical 
action, but also connects it with the breaking of bread that occurs when the 
community is gathered.  The breaking of bread is how God makes himself 
available to his people, but reconciliation, which is revealed through the 
incarnation, death and resurrection of Jesus, is not somehow confected by 
divine fiat; rather, reconciliation is the order of the table.  Communion with 
God requires reconciliation with neighbor as a necessary consequence for 
being assimilated to the eternal Son.  All of this finds itself once again in the 
midst of the hierarchical liturgy of the people.  It is for all the reasons above 
that it is found in the Didache to Òappoint, the, for yourselves, bishop and 
deacons worthy of the Lord, me gentle and not money-loving and truthful and 
tested; for to you they likewise serve (unpaid) the λειτουργουσι (the unpaid 
public service) of the prophet-teachers.Ó85  In the Didache hierarchy is brought 
to the fore.  It is necessary to have faithful leaders who stand as 
representatives of and to God, those who will gather the gifts of a people 
together as a single offering, so that a people do in fact participate in the 
fullness of divine power and love.  The office of the bishop is clearly 
addressed: 
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You, therefore, O bishops, are to your people priests and 
Levites, ministering (λειτουργησαντας) to the holy tabernacle, 
the holy Catholic Church; who stand at the altar of the Lord 
your God, and offer to Him reasonable and unbloody sacrifices 
through Jesus the great High Priest. You are to the laity 
prophets, rulers, governors, and kings; the mediators between 
God and His faithful people, who receive and declare His word, 
well acquainted with the Scriptures. Ye are the voice of God, 
and witnesses of His will, who bear the sins of all, and 
intercede for all...  For you imitate Christ the Lord; and as He 
Òbare the sins of us all upon the treeÓ at His crucifixion, the 
innocent for those who deserved punishment, so also you ought 
to make the sins of the people your ownÉ  As you are patterns 
for others, so have you Christ for your pattern.86 
The bishop, as Christ to the church, gathers together the living sacrifices, the 
people, conjoining through the power of the Holy Spirit the body to its head, 
Christ, as a single, pure and acceptable offering to the Father.  The bishop 
stands as chief liturgist, analogous to Christ the one true liturgist, with whom 
the many liturgies of the peopleÑthe many living sacrificesÑconverge into 
one polyphonic unity in God. 
 The harmonious participation in the cruciform liturgy of the gathered 
community enables the human to realize her nature as created in the divine 
image.  It is the WordÑthe flesh of God speakingÑthat brings before the 
whole world the truth of its createdness. 
And then, again, this Word was manifested when the Word of 
God was made man, assimilating Himself to man, and man to 
Himself, so that by means of his resemblance to the Son, man 
might become precious to the Father. For in times long past, it 
was said that man was created after the image of God, but it 
was not [actually] shown; for the Word was as yet invisible, 
after whose image man was created, wherefore also he did 
easily lose the similitude. When, however, the Lord of God 
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became flesh, He confirmed both these: for He both showed 
forth the image truly, since He became Himself what was His 
image; and He re-established the similitude after a sure manner, 
by assimilating man to the invisible Father through means of 
the visible Word.87 
It is humankindÕs resemblance to the Son, through participation in the liturgy 
Jesus isÑthe convergence of office and action, that is, the union of God and 
creation88Ñthat assimilates humanity to the Divine.  This assimilation is a 
continuation of the sacrificial system of the Hebrews, for the point of 
departure from Hebraic understandings of sacrifice in the early church does 
not contradict the prevening acts of God.  It completes the sacrificial law 
because the sacrificial offering not only comes from God but is God incarnate.  
The suffering and death of God on the cross makes participation in 
resurrection available to humanity.  By bearing in her body the sufferings and 
death of the Spoken Word of the Father the human is resurrected with the Son 
to become Son.  Sacrifice as spiritually abstract is made unintelligible.  
Sacrificial action is a person, and his name is Jesus.  To participate, then, is to 
become. 
 
II 
It is important now back up and discern the overarching context of PaulÕs 
employment of leitourgia as evoking one who gathers the offering of the 
people, mediating koinonia in the Spirit.  It is PaulÕs testimony that he is an 
icon of Christ, seeking koinonia in, by, and through ChristÕs sufferings and 
death, that he might have koinonia with Christ in his resurrection.89  God has 
hereby made him an administrator/οικονοµους of the sacraments/µυστηριον of 
God.90  It is PaulÕs arbitration of GodÕs economy, made intelligible by his 
enslavement to Christ, that incorporates others into the economy.  Though free 
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from all, with Christ he made himself a slave to all, as this is the fabric of 
GodÕs οικονοµια.91  Leitourgia, the apostolic office and service of gathering 
together the people as an offering to God, is what makes humankindÕs 
entrance into the Triune economy possible, which is a participation in the self-
emptying of God in Christ made available through the mysteriesÑthe 
sacraments, whereby one, as offering, is endowed with grace.  PaulÕs liturgy, 
then, is his apostolic office of mediating the economy of God. 
Christ, according to Paul, is both oikonomia and oikonomous.  He is 
economy par excellence, the administrator of the economy he himself is.  Paul 
uses Oikonomia in his letter to the Ephesians to describe the totality of the 
plan of salvation made-manifest in Jesus of Nazareth.  Being gathered into this 
economy removes all divisions between giver and recipient.  It is the 
conflation of giving poles into one that ChristÕs mediation through the 
sacraments makes possible.  The Giver becomes the Gift, and the recipient 
comes to bear the Spirit of the Giver through the Gift, so to become gift. 
When Aristotle uses the term oikonomia it refers directly to the 
administration and management of domestic life, the regulation of which is 
essential for the well-ordered society.92  Following Aristotle, the use of 
oikonomia is found in reference to arrangements made concerning the sick, 
political administration, service in the home, etc., all having to do with the 
administration of each human organization.  Each dimension of economic 
thought will come full-circle in the church fathers in unprecedented fashion; it 
will come to bear the distinct mark of ChristÕs incarnation and the unfolding of 
the plan of salvation as oikonomia.  For the Greeks, oikonomia comes to 
designate the whole order of persons within society.  In general, oikonomia for 
the Classical Greek implies a functional organization of an order that has some 
form of profit, material or celestial, in mind.93  As we see in the early fathers 
of the church, this meaning is carried forth but refined such that it typifies the 
ordering of humanity to the liturgical action of Jesus.  Economics, then, is to 
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be understood as a science of relations and relative terms, but is not to be 
mistaken for a relative concept.  It simultaneously renders a service and takes 
account of the very idea of service.  It is, as it were, the logic of the active 
order itself.  The Classical oikonomia, then, implies the ordering of the 
plurality of liturgies into a unity, in order to serve the goals at hand in the best 
way possible.  It is this economical logic one finds in the explication of 
leitourgia by Paul and the early fathers.  The whole of the economyÑthe plan 
of salvation that is ChristÑis the gathering of persons who, being assimilated 
as gift with the GiftÑChrist, bear in their bodies the self-dispossession of 
God, which is their participation in liturgyÑthe fullness of GodÕs power and 
life.  Liturgy, hereby understood, is its own end.  It is the procession and return 
of God from and to himself, made-manifest in Jesus of Nazareth. 
For Paul, oikonomia bespeaks the totality of the divine plan of 
salvation through the incarnate Lord.  In Paul, as aforesaid, Christ is both 
oikonomia and oikonomous, because he is salvation qua salvation and the 
unfolding thereof through incarnation, death and resurrection.  As Paul states 
in his letter to the Ephesians: 
In him we have redemption through his blood, the forgiveness 
of our trespasses, according to the riches of his grace that he 
lavished on us.  With all wisdom and insight he has made 
known to us the mystery of his will, according to his good 
pleasure that he set forth in Christ, as the economy for the 
fullness of time, to gather up all things in him, things in heaven 
and things on earth.94 
Paul then pulls together the radical, participatory nature of the divine 
economy. 
So then you are no longer strangers and aliens, but you are 
citizens with the saints and also members of the household 
(οικεος) of God, built upon the foundation of the apostles and 
prophets, with Christ Jesus himself as the cornerstone.  In him 
the whole structure is joined together and grows into a holy 
temple in the Lord; in whom you also are built together 
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spiritually into a dwelling place (κατοικητηριον) for God.  This 
is the reason that I Paul am a prisoner for Christ Jesus for the 
sake of you GentilesÑfor surely you have already heard of the 
economy of GodÕs grace that was given me for youÉ.95 
It follows then that the divine economy is the body of Christ and the building 
up (οικοδοµην) of this body on earth.  This household is, however, all 
encompassing, such that even the earthly authorities are liturgists of God.96 
Nothing is outside the economy of God, and all, in its own way, participates in 
the administration of this economy, whether positively or negatively.97 
 It is this liturgical economy that Paul refers to throughout his writings, 
illustrated most clearly in his letter to the Galatians where he says, ÒI have 
been crucified with Christ; it is no longer I who live, but Christ who lives in 
me....Ó98 The force of this statement comes from the logic of the liturgical 
action of Jesus, who, by his incarnation, death and resurrection, identifies the 
specific nature of the Divine Economy.  The new nature the human puts on in 
her baptism is the death and resurrection of Jesus, which brings about, through 
the one Spirit, the new life of participation in the economy of God.99 
 Irenaeus likewise presses the reciprocal nature of this economy 
exemplified in Christ.  Giving is not an exchange of goods with the divine, as 
if humankind had something God lacked; rather, it is the action through which 
one enters into the reciprocal love God is.  Through human reception of the 
heavenly realityÑthe GoodÑearth and heaven touch, to the glory of God for 
the life of the world.   
For we offer to Him His own, announcing consistently the 
fellowship and union of the flesh and Spirit.  For as the bread, 
which is produced from the earth, when it receives the 
invocation of God, is no longer common bread, but the 
Eucharist, consisting of two realities, earthly and heavenly; so 
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also our bodies, when they receive the Eucharist, are no longer 
corruptible, having the hope of the resurrection to eternity.  
Now we make offering to Him, not as though He stood in need 
of it, but rendering thanks for His gift, and thus sanctifying 
what has been createdÉ  As, therefore, He does not stand in 
need of these [liturgies], yet does desire that we should render 
them for our own benefit, lest we be unfruitful; so did the Word 
give to the people that very precept as to the making of 
oblations, although He stood in no need of them, that they 
might learn to serve God: thus is it, therefore, also His will that 
we, too, should offer a gift at the altar, frequently and without 
intermission. The altar, then, is in heaven (for towards that 
place are our prayers and oblations directed); the temple 
likewise [is there], as John says in the Apocalypse, ÒAnd the 
temple of God was opened:Ó the tabernacle also: ÒFor, behold,Ó 
He says, Òthe tabernacle of God, in which He will dwell with 
men.Ó100 
There is no distinction made between the churchÕs offering and ChristÕs 
offering in the Eucharist.  In receiving the GiftÑChrist, Christians become 
gift, adding nothing to God, yet becoming gods through the Spirit.  Christians 
come to possess the fullness of GodÕs power and life through their very self-
dispossession, having emptied themselves with Christ, to become, in the 
words of Chrysostom, Òlittle christs.Ó 
God himself, in trinity of Persons and unity of Substance is the model 
of every economy, and the Son is the eternal event of this economy, who 
assimilates timeÐÐhuman actionÐÐto himself through his liturgy.  Though free 
from all, God in Jesus of Nazareth has bound himself to all, extending the 
invitation for humanity to be equally bound.  In receiving the self-offering of 
Christ, the human is consequently obliged to be a self-offering to God, for 
others.  Here is realized the radical, participatory nature of the liturgical 
economy, whereby all sacrifice and suffering, all gifts and offering, and all 
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human fellowship between persons and God exists within the eternal Liturgy 
God isÑthe Divine Economy. 
III 
The commonplace translation of leitourgia as Òthe work of the 
people,Ó101 creates a chasm between the liturgy enacted by a people and the 
Liturgy that Jesus is in himself.  In an immanent fashion the human is 
dislocated from the action of the One who has given a singular gift, in whose 
giving the church catholic participates.  Leitourgia is the sacrificial action of 
one capable of sacrifice, which gathers a people together in an economy they 
otherwise could not enter.  Within the Divine Economy, this capacity for 
sacrificial offering is singular.  There is but one Gift, the Son. 
The modern emphasis of leitourgia as Òthe work of the people,Ó or the 
ÒpeopleÕs work,Ó dislocates the gift from the giver, so that a thing has meaning 
in itself without reference to the thing-signified.  The movement from liturgy 
as a personÕs sacrificial donation or action for the public good to liturgy as the 
ÒpeopleÕs workÓ problematizes, with regard to Christianity, the participatory 
nature of the terrestrial in the celestial and, on a very basic level, the personÕs 
participation in the good of the body polis.  The irony, here, is that the more 
the work of a people is emphasized the less meaningful is the work, for it is 
stripped from the singular actionÑthe liturgy of ChristÑwhose liturgical 
action alone gives meaning.  This is but a short distance from the church as 
governor over the spiritual via the material, e.g. indulgences.  That is, the 
reign of the church no longer participates in the reign of Christ from his throne 
in heaven, but exercises ecclesial authority as a substitute for, not analogous 
to, the reign of Christ. The ÒpeopleÕs workÓ presumes a capacity to offer, 
making liturgyÐÐthe actual service of worship itself, nothing more than a 
system of ideas, an epistemological severing of act and being.  Language can 
complicate matters here, but the point to be made is that redefining leitourgia 
from being the singular procession and return of God from and to himself, 
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whereby the polyphony of liturgies are gathered into the self-same liturgy 
Jesus is, to a local response to GodÕs action, as though God has given 
something that Christians now give back to him, falsifies the Divine Economy.  
Rather, the divine love that radiates from God, which permeates the human so 
to become more fully human, assimilates humanity to the very being of God 
who is actus purus, the eternal community of reciprocal love, Father, Son and 
Holy Spirit, thereby making humanity one in body (image) to become one in 
spirit (likeness), animated by the mystery of Christ. 
Persons are, then, at one with Christ insofar as they come to bear 
Christ in their bodies.  The cross is paradigmatic, and is what makes all 
suffering intelligible and meaningful.  The notion of ChristÕs disembodied 
suffering with the human in the current circumstance is not meaningful; it is 
the bodily suffering of God on the cross that grants meaning to human 
suffering, for all suffering is participatory.  This brings to the fore the dialogue 
of Jesus with the sons of Zebedee when they ask if they can sit on the right 
and left side of Jesus in his kingdom, to which he responds ÒCan you drink of 
this cup?Ó  But Jesus goes on to say that they will drink of his cup; they will 
become inebriated with his passion.  It is this bodily bearing of ChristÕs 
passion that Ignatius uses in his argument against the Gnostics. 
Stop your ears therefore when anyone speaks to you that stands 
apart from Jesus Christ, from DavidÕs scion and MaryÕs Son, 
who was really born and ate and drank, really persecuted by 
Pontius Pilate, really crucified and died while heaven and earth 
and the underworld looked on; who also really rose from the 
dead, since His Father raised Him up,ÑHis Father, who will 
likewise raise us also who believe in Him through Jesus Christ, 
apart from whom we have no real life. But if, as some atheists, 
that is, unbelievers, say, His suffering was but a make-
believeÑwhen, in reality, they themselves are make-
believersÑthen why am I in chains? Why do I even pray that I 
may fight wild beasts? In vain, then, do I die! My testimony is, 
after all, but a lie about the Lord!102 
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This is a continuation of Paul who states that, Òif Christ has not be raised then 
our proclamation is in vain and our faith is in vain.Ó103 Ignatius, however, 
turns the notch a bit further making it undeniably clear that the death of Jesus 
is, in fact, the death and passion of God,104 and it is the very passion and death 
of God that informs the nature of being.105 
The logic of participation found in the early fathers refutes the modern 
notion that ÒChrist is with us in our suffering,Ó as though he is sitting in the 
car with the victim as it sinks to the bottom of the lake, dying all over again 
with her.  This is the disembodied logos of the Gnostics, not the fleshly Jesus 
who actually suffered, died and was resurrected.  While this may sound 
pastorally sensitive and therapeutically beneficial, it paradoxically denigrates 
human suffering.  What Paul, Ignatius and the early fathers with them 
understood, is that in them only one has sufferedÑonly one can suffer, and 
any suffering that may come upon the Christian is a participation in the 
singular suffering of God in Christ.  This in no way makes suffering on earth 
inconsequential; rather, the pain and suffering in this life, because of Christ 
and only because of his passion, death, resurrection and ascension, has 
meaning.  God is not an empathizing therapist in the sky.  God is the suffering 
Lord, who, through the bearing of ChristÕs suffering in oneÕs body, the human 
is gathered into, and with this Christ, by the power of the Spirit, she returns to 
the Father.  God with us, then, is not a moral or sentimental imperative, but 
with us in the sense that the active receiving of ChristÕs passion is reception 
into the Godhead.  No one has the ability to suffer.106  It is Christ who grants 
such ability, for whose sake suffering is endured that one might find 
fellowship in him.107  The offering and sacrifice of praise and thanksgiving, 
i.e. liturgyÑis a person, whose name is Jesus.   
The identity that is given to the church is not a system of obligations or 
ritual expressions, as important as these things may be.  The identity found in 
leitourgia as the singular Gift of God in Christ, which is the working out of 
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the Divine Economy in creation, is marked by the ecstatic love exemplified in 
the incarnation, death, resurrection and ascension of Jesus, whereby 
multiplicity is gathered into unity as a single offering and sacrifice of praise 
and thanksgiving that is the fellowship of the Triune God.  It is this identityÑ
the liturgy Jesus isÑthat exacts a mimetic form of expression through ritual 
action.  For this reason is the Eucharistic gathering properly called Òliturgy,Ó 
not because it is the work of a people, but because it is a peopleÕs participation 
in the mighty act of God in Christ, whereby the bodies, minds and souls of all 
are habituated by the faithfulness of the GodMan, and become through 
liturgical assimilation by volitive participation who they eternally are in 
Christ.108  The churchÕs liturgy, then, is the ritual expression of who God is, 
though not merely expressive.  In its Eucharistic feast the poles of heaven and 
earth are folded into one and the body of persons are gathered into God 
through the mystical feast, binding them together in actuality as the body of 
Christ. 
Liturgy, therefore, is its own end, because it is the procession and 
return of God from and to himself made-manifest in Jesus of Nazareth.  Jesus 
as the economy he himself administrates is humankindÕs entrance into the 
reciprocal love that is the Triune God, as the human receives the Gift and 
thereby becomes gift, which is her offering and sacrifice with the Son, through 
the Spirit, to the FatherÑDoxology. 
 
Conclusion 
Liturgy as Òthe peopleÕs work,Ó serves to locate a personÕs identity in her own 
hands.  Naming, as it does, the service of worship of the church, liturgy has 
been mistaken to be humanistic in the worst sense of the term.  It has been 
mistaken as an isolated act in time, either performed by a professional class of 
persons (clergy) for an audience (laity) or enacted collectively as a body of 
people (priesthood of all believers), which can only be assented to by faith, not 
participated in through the reason of the body.  In each instance the 
understanding is the same: God has given salvation to those who follow 
Christ; Christians, therefore, perform liturgies to offer thanks and praise for 
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the gift of salvation.  The assumption here is that the baptized have a gift to 
offer unto Almighty God, i.e. their selves.  To say that the human has 
something she can giveÑeven herselfÑto God, is to say that one possesses 
within her being the initiatory capacity to engage God.  It is both a rejection of 
human contingency and a denial of God as his own absolute contingency.  
This self-possession is the ultimate affront by the created to her Creator; it is 
the sin of all sinsÑit is Adam and Eve. 
Leitourgia as illuminated throughout the writings of the early church 
fathers refuses both the Gnostic rejection of matter and the humanist departure 
from metaphysics.  The modern mistranslation is more than a matter of 
semantics; it is an ontological chasm.  This redefining of the term, however, is 
not the direct result of a new system of ideas or revelation in understanding.  It 
is, rather, the evolution of rituals and practices throughout history that have 
served to dislocate the human from her participation in the singular, liturgical 
action that Christ is as Second Person of the Triune God, whose liturgy is the 
ontological union of God with us. 
In the following chapters it will be shown how various liturgical 
reforms, specifically as they relate to new liturgical Òtechnologies,Ó have 
served to create the necessary framework for the modern delusion of human 
flourishing and fulfillment as resting in the present tense of an intellectualism 
whereby human knowing is separable from active participation by knower in 
that which is known.  That is, it will be shown that these liturgical makeovers 
have actually made it possible to understand leitourgia as an epistemological 
event, giving rise to modern systems of ideas that serve to divide God and 
humanity, thing from thing-signified, subject from object.  The modern 
conviction that understanding must precede religious practice, it will be 
shown, is a fallacy.  It will also be made known that this erroneous idea 
becomes possible in light of the liturgical reforms of the late Medieval Era that 
serve to create an environment within which a system of ideas could ariseÑ
could come to exist apart from ritual practice and habituation by inverting the 
relation of the mind and body in liturgical praxis.  We will begin in chapter 
two with a sketch as to how the early fathers understood knowledge as 
derivative of GodÕs own self-knowing as perichoresis.  Chapter three will 
A Genealogy of Liturgy 
 39 
outline how human knowing is achieved by formative participation in liturgy, 
conditioned by the background provided by inhabiting a life of virtue and 
contemplation where the body is understood as inseparable from the 
soul/mind.  In chapter four we will move into how specific liturgical reforms 
dislocate the human from this embodied knowing, invoking a secular human 
identity that creates a chasm between body and soul, distancing the human 
from the truth of her nature as contingent upon a distinct relation-of-
participation to God.  The final chapter will explore how a recovery of the 
human as homo-liturgicus is possible through a bodily comportment to 
perceive all things as participating in the eternal, liturgical action of God in 
Christ, made-manifest in all actions of reciprocity within the whole of 
creation. 
  
2 Divine Liturgy and the 
 Epistemological Crisis 
 
ÒThere is really no action without Jesus Christ.Ó    
Ð Dietrich Bonhoeffer 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I suggested that essential to any articulation of the 
liturgical action of the church is a thorough examination of the meaning of the 
word leitourgia in its historical context prior to the inception of the church, 
especially its use in ancient Greek society as well as in the translation of the 
Septuagint. This is important for discerning how the apostle Paul distinctly 
employs the term as synonymous with the mediation of the divine economy, 
and how the traditional use of leitourgia in the early church creates certain 
parameters for understanding liturgical action as incorporation into the 
singular, eternal act of God in Christ. I have shown that this singular reference 
for understanding liturgical action shows that, so far as the early and medieval 
church is concerned, all liturgy participates positively or negatively1 in the 
Liturgy Christ himself is. 
 Following the examples of liturgical action in ancient Greek society, 
which is sustained throughout antiquity and into the medieval era, it is what 
we might call a festive reciprocity that proves to condition oneÕs engagement 
in the body politic. In both sensesÑfestival and reciprocityÑdo the earliest 
Christians enjoin themselves to the eternal festival of inter-Trinitarian 
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reciprocity through the liturgical act of making Eucharist. The apostle PaulÕs 
use of leitourgia exemplifies this understanding of liturgical action as 
inherently reciprocal because of the singularity of ChristÕs own liturgical 
action. The self-offering of Christ to the Father is, again, an inter-Trinitarian 
offering. Gift and giver, as I have shown, are hereby inseparable, bound 
together by a mutuality conditioned by the giving act, which is to say that God 
is the Gift he gives because he is the sole Giver as the singular act of Giving. 
 This understanding of leitourgia becomes increasingly clear as PaulÕs 
description is expanded in the writings of the early fathers. As I have shown, 
the singularity of ChristÕs liturgical action is that in which the hierarchical 
administration of the churchÕs economy participates through Eucharistic 
mediationÑthe mediation of the divine economy. Accordingly, the churchÕs 
act of making Eucharist is always to bear the distinct form of ChristÕs own 
sacrificial action, an act that is always directed toward God for the benefit of 
creation. Liturgy is hereby mediation by mimesisÑa participation in GodÕs 
self-mediation; it is to be enacted-by the Christ-act.2 As I have suggested, 
Christ is the sole liturgical actor, who manifests the reciprocal nature of God 
as inter-Trinitarian self-offering (self-emptying). It is necessary, then, to draw 
out the implications of this inter-Trinitarian emptying. In this chapter, what I 
will show is that any understanding of liturgy is bound up together with what 
it means for God to be a community of Persons who exist as eternal, reciprocal 
self-offering. 
To say, then, that Christ is Liturgy is to say that God is the end of all 
liturgical action.  As the earliest Christians understood Christ to be the liturgy 
par excellence, likewise did the earliest theological expositions on the nature 
of this liturgy directly attend to the Eternal Liturgy of the TrinityÐÐ
perichoresis, the Love who is Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.  Perichoresis 
names the self-identifying action of inter-Trinitarian reciprocal loveÑthe form 
of knowing the early church understood Christ to have revealed. 
                                                            
2 As aforesaid, to participate in the self-offering of Christ to the Father is to be gathered into 
the eternal act of reciprocal love God is, which is to be Òperformed-byÓ love through an 
analogous self-emptying, self-giving. We can also relate this to GadamerÕs understanding of 
an actor in a play. The words of a play are not so much spoken by the actor as they speak the 
actor into being. See Hans Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method (Continuum, 1985) 459. This is 
also to suggest that the poles of mediator and mediated are conflated by the act of liturgical 
mediation, which encompasses its participants. 
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The self-emptying of God in Christ3 reveals the nature of triune 
reciprocityÑmakes known the unknowable, the full and complete witness of 
the SonÕs identity as located in his being-known by the Father, i.e. identity as 
gift.  The Cappadocian Fathers, the champions of Trinitarian orthodoxy, name 
the relationality of the Three in One and One in Three as inter-Trinitarian 
permeation.  Perichoresis is the eternal interpenetration of love, the very 
substance of Father, Son and Holy Spirit.  Love is the act of knowing.  As the 
Father is to the Son so also is the Son to the Father, and likewise are both to 
the Spirit and the Spirit to Father and Son.  This is the knowing-love of the 
Trinity, what Sergii Bulgakov speaks of as Divine Sophia.  Each Person of the 
Triune God knows as they are known within hypostatic unity.  The Father 
receives himself in the eternal procession and return of the Spirit from and 
back to the Father through the Son. 
Liturgy is hereby the inter-Trinitarian reception of Personhood in the 
giving of the Father to the Son, who, identified in the FatherÕs knowing of 
himself as Father of the Son, receives his Personhood in the SpiritÕs 
procession and return to the Father.  The Spirit is the liturgical gift who 
proceeds from the Father and returns to the Father throughÑand only 
throughÑthe Son,4 eternally identified and identifying gift-giving-giver.  This 
eternal procession and return from and to the Father by the Spirit through the 
Son is the eternal differentiating of unity and gathering of difference into 
unity, which is the eternal knowing of the Holy Trinity in its absolute being-
knownÑabsolute triune contingency.  This eternal knowing is GodÕs self-
emptying, which is an eternal emptying.  While each Person of the Holy 
Trinity is God, neither Person considers their Godhood to be exploitable, but 
empty themselves, eternally, for one another, receiving their full Godhood in 
the eternal giving and receiving of each to and from the other. 
The three hypostases of the Holy Trinity are hereby at once more 
distinct one from the other than any materially divided beings, yet are more 
                                                            
3 Philippians 2. 
4 John of Damscus, ÒAn Exact Exposition of the Orthodox Faith,Ó I.viii, in Frederic Hathaway 
Chase, Jr., trans., Saint John of Damascus: Writings (New York: Fathers of the Church, 
1958). 
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whole and abundant than the most singular of created realities.5  The 
differentiating unity God is names a particular form of knowing that is 
inherently active.  Act and Being are inseparable in God; and this ontological 
particularity bears much on the early churchÕs understanding of how God 
knows and makes himself known.  The Father knows the Son in the eternal 
giving and return of himself to and from the Son in the procession of the Spirit 
who both frees the Father to love the Son and unites the Son to the Father in 
the eternal procession and return.  GodÕs own self-knowledge is not found or 
ÒdiscoveredÓ in the giving and receiving of himself to himself; rather, GodÕs 
self-knowledge is his own Trinitarian, reciprocal action of begetting and being 
begotten, of proceeding and returning.  Accordingly, GodÕs knowing is always 
a knowing of himself.  God knows that which is membered to him.  
Knowledge, therefore, of God and self are attainable for the human only by 
her being gathered into the procession and return of God from himself to 
himself.6  Christ is in his own Person the sacrament with whom the human 
returns to the Father, by the Spirit.  Christ, then, is the eternal axis on which 
all things hinge; he is the Tree of Life.  By his unconfused unionÑthe 
gathering of humanity into divine procession and returnÑhe re-members the 
episteme of human nature to the truth of transcendent Being. 
To know, therefore, is to be knownÐÐto be membered (assimilated) to 
that which one seeks to know.  To forgetÐÐamnesis (amnesia)ÐÐis to dis-
member oneself from that which knows and is known.  To be forgotten, then, 
is to be un-knownÐÐdis-membered.  ÒDepart from me, for I never knew you,Ó 
is to be outside the memory of God, external to the interpenetrating economy 
of knowledge the Trinity is.  To be forgotten is to be outside of communion 
(common-union) with God, which is to not be membered in the mutual 
permeation of God in the Eucharist. 
Before perichoresis is understood in terms of triune permeation, 
however, it is first used to describe the reciprocal penetration of the divine-
human natures in Christ.  It names the spatial altering of created reality that, 
though transformative, does not subsume the created, but rather frees it to be 
                                                            
5 Gregory of Nyssa, Oration 34, viii (NPNF). 
6 John of Damascus, An Exact Exposition of the Orthodox Faith, I.vii. 
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permeated and to mutually permeate the Creator.  It is, as Clement of 
Alexandria defines it, the permeation of creation by God,7 a permeation that is 
inherently reciprocal.  The two natures of Christ do not transform one into the 
other, but are at once more distinct in their union and more full in their being 
unconfused.8  That is, the two natures are made-manifest (made-present) one 
to the other, membered together, undivided and unconfused, i.e. assimilated, 
by divine permeation.  The two natures do not collapse into one nature, nor do 
the two wills coalesce into one will; rather, the human, divided against its 
nature by sin, is assimilated by volitive obedience to the divine will, showing 
forth the truth of human nature as the image of the invisible God, made visible 
in Christ.  The body of Christ is the tool by which all of creation is gathered 
into the eternal relation that is Holy Trinity.  The early church expressed this 
gathering via the sacrament of baptism, specifically creation as being gathered 
into Christ by his baptism in the river Jordan.  ÒWhat need has Jesus of 
baptism?Ó, they asked, and in harmonious reply it is the baptism of Jesus that 
baptizes creation.  ChristÕs descent into the Jordan is creationÕs ascent into 
God.  In Christ God assimilates humanity to divinity and through this 
unconfused union God assimilates creation to its Creator. 
Knowledge of God, therefore, according to the fathers of the early 
church, is only available through GodÕs self-disclosure in Christ.9  That God is 
is implanted in human nature,10 and divine revelation provides knowledge of 
God in action, making human action intelligible.  It is this that Paul describes 
in his letter to the Corinthians.  ÔIf I speak like angels, have prophetic powers, 
have all knowledge and faith, but do not have love, I am nothing.Õ11  Love is 
understood in terms of being-known by God.12  To have loveÑto be known 
by GodÑis to participate in the love of God in Christ; it is to know in being-
known and to do all things according to the free obedience of the Son to the 
Father. 
                                                            
7 op cit. Michael Kunzler, The Church's Liturgy (London: Continuum, 2001), 80. 
8 Gregory of Nazianzen, Oration XXXIV, vii (NPNF).  
9
 John of Damascus, An Exact Exposition of the Orthodox Faith, I.viii. 
10 Ibid. 
11 1 Corinthians 13. 
12 1 Corinthians 8.3. 
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Christ is, therefore, the locus of GodÕs knowing and the humanÕs 
being-known.  Irenaeus is most clear on the form that knowledge takes in 
Christ.  Knowledge is revelation:  
For no one can know the Father, unless through the Word of 
God, that is, unless by the Son revealing [Him]; neither can he 
have knowledge of the Son, unless through the good pleasure 
of the Father.  But the Son performs the good pleasure of the 
Father; for the Father sends, and the Son is sent, and comes.  
And His Word knows that His Father is, as far as regards us, 
invisible and infinite; and since He cannot be declared [by 
anyone else], He does Himself declare Him to us; and, on the 
other hand, it is the Father alone who knows His own Word.  
And both these truths has our Lord declared.  Wherefore the 
Son reveals the knowledge of the Father through His own 
manifestation.  For the manifestation of the Son is the 
knowledge of the Father; for all things are manifested through 
the Word.13 
The crucial aspect of IrenaeusÕ explication on how one comes to know God is 
in his relating of key points in scripture with the perichoretic relation within 
Christ.  No one can know the Father except the Son reveal Him,14 but Irenaeus 
goes on to say that Òit is the Father alone who knows His own Word.Ó  What, 
then, is the manner of this manifesting or revealing? 
[The] Word was manifested when the Word of God was made 
man, assimilating Himself to man, and man to Himself, so that 
by means of his resemblance to the Son, man might become 
precious to the Father.  For in times long past, it was said that 
man was created after the image of God, but it was not 
[actually] shown; for the Word was as yet invisible, after whose 
image man was created.  Wherefore also he did easily lose the 
similitude.  When, however, the Word of God became flesh, He 
confirmed both these: for He both showed forth the image 
                                                            
13 Irenaeus, Against Heresies, IV.vi.3, italics mine. 
14 John 8.19. 
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truly, since He became Himself what was His image; and He 
re-established the similitude after a sure manner, by 
assimilating man to the invisible Father through means of the 
visible Word.15 
The human knows the Son because she has become the Son, (re)assimilated to 
the Word.  As such, the human is known to the Father in the SonÕs being-
known with the Father in the perichoretic relation, making knowledge of the 
Father available to the human, having been gathered into the perichoresis by 
the SonÕs assimilating himself to humanity and humanity to himself.  Without 
the agency of the Son, none can know God.16  That is, unless humanity is 
assimilated to the Word by the incarnate act of God in Christ, knowledge of 
God is only conjecture. 
 Returning to IrenaeusÕ commentary on Matthew 11.27 and Luke 10.22, 
Òno one knows the Son except the Father, and no one knows the Father except 
the Son and anyone to whom the Son chooses to reveal him,Ó Irenaeus picks 
up with John 8, specifically 8.42, which he reads together with the passage 
above to enforce his claim that to know the Father is to love the Son and to 
love the Son is to do the will of the Father.  For Irenaeus, as with the rest of 
the early fathers, to know is to actively become united to that which one seeks 
to know.  To know is to be membered with what is known, opening the 
knower herself to being known by that which is known to her.  There is no 
subject-object relation in Christian antiquity.  To know is to participate in the 
reality of that which is known. 
 
I 
How the human knows or comes in contact with God has been the source of 
much controversy throughout all of human history, but prior to the incarnation 
of the Christ, much of divine presence is largely understood in terms of 
proximity and ritual.  The praesentia of a god in the ancient world is bound up 
with temple, image, and the priestly rituals that invoked the godÕs animate 
presence.  Gods occupied a space of worship, and this space was clearly more 
                                                            
15 Irenaeus, Against Heresies, V.xvi.2, italics mine. 
16 Ibid, IV.vii.3. 
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to the worshipper than a gathering place or a place within which rituals would 
occur.  The temple, shrine, icons and images were all spaces that mediated, 
through the liturgical action, the praesentia of the god.  Temples, statues, 
icons and various other objects were not understood in any sense to be the 
deity itself or things to be worshipped as the iconoclast would have one 
believe;17 rather, those who worshipped their deity before the image 
understood the deity to have come to visit them through the image.  Temple 
and image are portals through which the deity comes to rest amidst the lives of 
his/her people.  The various places and objects communicated the praesentia 
of the gods, they are the locus of their grace and favor, but there is a causal 
relation between the praesentia of the god and the cultic ritual his/her priests.  
By performing the various rituals of one's god, the priest or representative 
caused the ba (spirit/soul) of the god to animate the image and thereby occupy 
the space of the temple.18  This causal mediation carries with it the double 
effect of a godÕs absence with the absence of ritual.  The liturgical activities of 
a god's priest insures not the favor of the god but the presence of the god 
among the people.  One finds this in the complaints of the temple priests 
throughout Rome, claiming that it is the atheism of the Christians that have 
caused the misfortune of Rome due to the displeasure of the gods.19 
 The clear sense here is that in the ancient world the presence of the 
divine requires the causal mediation of priestly ritual.  The priests and their 
rituals guarantee the praesentia of the gods.  The temple/image is not the god 
itself, but is the medium for contact with the god.  The weight of divine 
presence, however, is bound up with the ritual activities of clerical elites who 
cause the spirit of the god to Òshow up.Ó  As mediated, the ritual actions of the 
priests take precedence over that which is mediated, namely praesentia divina.  
                                                            
17 For an interesting study on the fetishizing of images, see Bruno Latour, Pandora's Hope: 
Essays on the Reality of Science Studies (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999), 266-
292.  It is not the worshipper who believes her god to be the image or even ÒlocatedÓ in the 
image.  It is the iconoclast who believes this and confesses his belief by dashing the image 
with his hammer. 
18 John H. Walton, Ancient Near Eastern Thought and the Old Testament: Introducing the 
Conceptual World of the Hebrew Bible (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2006), 113-134. 
19 Critics will certainly see an element of job security here.  Without the priests and their 
rituals there is nothing to cause the animating spirit of the god to dwell among the people.  
Additionally, if things go wrong it cannot be related to the priestly ritual, for this only causes 
the mediation; disfavor by the gods is only evidence of their disappointment with the people 
whom they have Òcome downÓ upon to rest. 
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The divine has a secondary role in the liturgical economy of the ancient 
world.20  As Alexander Schmemann points out, it is for this reason that every 
reading, action, prayer, song, etc., be dramatized with precision that the reality 
of divine presence be mediated to its worshippers. 
The representation of the myth is therefore in some sense more 
real than the myth, since only within the cult and by 
participation in it is the idea of the myth communicated to 
people.  The cult is primary; the myth is defined by the cult and 
grows out of it.  Hence the symbolicalness of the 
mysteriological cult, its dramatic character, the elaboration in it 
of all the details of the myth.  Its whole meaning is the precise 
re-enactment of the drama of salvation, since the drama does 
not exist outside this cult.21 
In the sense the worship of the gods in the ancient world is something of a 
simulation, although these ancient norms cannot be criticized so easily from a 
modern point of view.  The simulacrum is not that of which Baudrillard 
describes in ÒSimulacra and Simulation,Ó where the image presents itself as 
the thing it represents.  This, once again, is the iconoclastÕs critique, and it is 
here that Schmemann may go a bit too far in his criticism.  To reiterate a 
previous point, there was not a time when the ancient worshippers at the 
temple throughout the ancient world would have thought the god to be the 
statue or somehow physically to be grasped.  As John Walton humorously 
points out, ÒThe Egyptians did not believe that one could go step on NutÕs (the 
sky goddess) toes, or throw a rock and hit her knees.Ó22  This is a modern 
projection onto an ancient understanding that simply didnÕt exist.  The space 
did not constitute the reality; rather, and this is the sticking point, it is the 
actions that surround the space or occupy the space that make it real.  
Simulation in the Baudrillardian sense of modern reifications that present 
copies as the real itself cannot be imposed on the ancient mind.23  What is 
                                                            
20 Alexander Schmemann, Introduction to Liturgical Theology (New York: St. Vladimir's 
Seminary Press, 1966), 106. 
21 Ibid, 107. 
22 Walton, Ancient Near Eastern Thought and the Old Testament, 181. 
23 Jean Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulation (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 
1994). 
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important here is SchmemannÕs insight that the reality of the myth in the 
ancient world only exists insofar as the cult exists.24  The rites of the priests do 
not participate in the greater reality of the actions of the divine; rather, they 
cause the divine to be present.  The human does not participate in the life of 
the divine; the human exists in a unilateral relation of exchange with her god 
and neÕre the two shall touch. 
 With Israel, this ancient mythological understanding of divine presence 
is surpassed, though many similarities remain present.  The shekhinah, or 
inhabitation, of YHWH was at Mt. Sinai, in the Tabernacle, and finally in the 
Holy of Holies in the Temple in Jerusalem.  The distinction is found in the 
construction of YHWHÕs dwelling place.  YHWH gives Moses the blueprints 
for the tabernacle in which the Lord would be present with his people (Exodus 
34-40).  Building the dwelling place of YHWH is understood in very different 
terms than how other ancient temples and shrines are created.  Among the 
Egyptians, temples and images are constructed to show the character or 
function of a god, but is done by the architectural sensibilities of a priest.  
When Moses sets out to build the tabernacle of the Lord he does so Òas the 
Lord had commanded.Ó25 
II 
There is a clear sense throughout the early church that the human knows God 
in proportion to the extent that she gives herself to being-known through a 
participation in the liturgical actions of the church, actions by which God 
makes himself knowable.26  A person likewise knows who they are in being-
known by God through active participation in erotic-knowing.27  Liturgy 
                                                            
24 Schmemann, Introduction to Liturgical Theology, 108. 
25 Exodus 39; ÒAs the Lord commanded MosesÓ is repeated eight times in Exodus 39, 
specifically relating that it is the Lord who has prescribed the order and construct of his 
dwelling place, not Moses. See also Terence E. Fretheim, Exodus (Louisville: John Knox 
Press, 1991), 313-314. 
26 Gregory of Nyssa, The Life of Moses, II.163-183. 
27 Erotic-knowing here describes the inter-subjectivity of knowing, where subject and object 
coalesce in the activity of making known, being-known, and being-made-known. Desire and 
understanding are hereby interwoven. To know erotically, therefore, is to know within the act 
of being-known-by that which one desires to know and thereby knows oneself as a participant 
in this contingent being-known-by a knower. Erotic-knowing refuses unilateral understanding; 
it is a knowing that is inherently reciprocal, a mutual giving and receiving that infinitely 
expands by the desire to know as known-by. See Hans Urs Von Balthasar, Studies in 
Theological Style: Clerical Styles, ed. John Kenneth. Riches, trans. Andrew Louth, Francis 
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names this inter-Trinitarian relation that has been made known to humanity 
through the mighty act of God in ChristÑgraceÑthat makes available the 
entrance of humanity into the reciprocal, eternal relation God is.  Gathered 
into the self-offering of the Son28 to the Father through the Spirit, the human 
takes from GodÕs own store to offer herself as an offering with the Son qua 
OfferingÑwhose self-offering is eternally present to the Father for the life of 
the world.  The humanÕs self-offering or living sacrifice is not to be 
understood, then, as an entering into a subject-object relation with God.  
Rather, it is to become lost in erotic-knowing, having been adopted into 
perichoretic interpenetration with God by the SonÕs assimilating of human 
nature to the divine nature.  This being lost, however, is the ultimate receiving 
of oneÕs identityÑthe being-known of God.  Grace moves humanity beyond 
its natural divisiveness,29 gathered into Reciprocity by assimilation, without 
negating difference.  No longer can the human know herself as humanÑ
cannot know the limitations and possibilities of her natureÑapart from her 
assimilation to Divinity.  The humanÕs being is eternally located in divine 
actionÑesse actus purus. 
God creates humanity to redeem humanityÑto deify humanity to 
become God.  Created life, then, is good by nature,30 but as created it is 
continually being created.  When the human willfully31 ascends through 
                                                                                                                                                           
McDonagh, and Brian McNeil, C.R.V., vol. II, The Glory of the Lord (San Francisco: Ignatius 
Press, 1984), 95-106. See especially Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, 
trans. Colin Smith (London: Routledge, 2002), 178-201. For Merleau-Ponty, ÒErotic 
perception is not a cogitation which aims at a cogitatum; through one body it aims at another 
body, and takes place in the world, not in a consciousness (note that Merleau-Ponty offers 
both an intellective consciousness and a body consciousness). A sight has a sexual 
significance for me, not when I consider, even confusedly, its possible relationship to the 
sexual organs or to pleasurable states, but when it exists for my body, for that power always 
available for bringing together into an erotic situation the stimuli applied, and adapting sexual 
conduct to it. There is an erotic ÔcomprehensionÕ not of the order of understanding, since 
understanding subsumes an experience, once perceived, under some idea, while desire 
comprehends blindly by linking body to bodyÓ (181). This Òcomprehending blindlyÓ is to 
suggest that embodied habits of the body that link bodies together, whereby human 
understanding is first and foremost intuited by sense perception and only secondarily 
intellective, even though intellection is vital to the relation. 
28 Hebrews 10. 
29 Maximus, ÒChapters on Knowledge,Ó II.21, in George C. Berthold, trans., Maximus 
Confessor: Selected Writings (New York: Paulist Press, 1985). 
30 John Meyendorff, Christ in Eastern Christian Thought (Washington: Corpus Books, 1969), 
149. 
31 Ibid., 145-151. 
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liturgical participation to the location of her identity in the perichoretic 
relation of the Holy Trinity, she realizes her personhood to be sustained in, by 
and through the shared life that is Father, Son, SpiritÑThought, Word, Deed.32  
That is, she loses herself, and in this losing is the ultimate receiving of her 
identity in the being-known of God.  The human becomes known with the Son 
through the Spirit by the Father, and thereby knows herself as the FatherÕs 
own, eternally identified with the Son. 
 Gregory of Nyssa speaks of knowledge as available only to one who 
participates in the severe and rigorous way of Christ.  To those who are 
incontinent, knowledge is inaccessible.  The incontinent are like thieves who 
try to steal the fruit of the pomegranate tree and are cut and pricked by the 
thorns that guard its fruit.  The incontinent do not realize that the pleasure and 
joy of the pomegranate is only available to those who are disciplined by faith, 
bearing the yolk of Christ.  For the continent person formed in the way the 
thorns yield, permitting full access to the fruit.  The continent is one who has 
not grown soft by the luxuries and pleasures of the present life and is truly 
able to taste the fruit of the tree.  Disciplined by the sacramental life of the 
church, the continent one progresses further and further in the grove of faith. 
For the aim of the life of virtue is to become like God; and this 
is the reason why the virtuous take great pains to cultivate 
purity of soul and freedom from passions, so that the form, as it 
were, of transcendent Being might be revealed in them because 
of their more perfect life.33 
When purity is cultivated in a person she is able to see and to Òknow herself,Ó 
for the glory of the Lord that lies within will have been made known to her.  
Gregory elaborates this point in terms of the beauty of the invisible made 
visible by the mirror of human nature.  First, however, it must be understood 
what Gregory means by mirror. 
                                                            
32 This is in no way to introduce any hint of modalism; rather, it is to draw together the 
implications of liturgy as the coming together for the human of thought, word, and deed, 
which is her being gathered into the Liturgy that is the perichoretic union, the God who is the 
Thought he thinks, the Word he speaks, and the Deed he does, known as none other than 
Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. 
33 Gregory of Nyssa, ÒCommentary on the Song of Songs,Ó Sermon IX, in Danilou, From 
Glory to Glory. See also The Life of Moses, II.157. 
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In the modern age it is standard to understand the mirror in terms of its 
reflective use.  Accordingly, a mirror is a reflecting tool that is wholly external 
to the image it reflects.  There is no engagement or interaction that occurs 
between the mirror and the image reflected.  The two are fixed, isolated 
entities.  The modern mirror as a reflecting tool reduces the image to the 
image in-itself, something re-presented back to the subject whose image is 
reflected. 
The modern Venetian mirror of the fourteenth century that introduces 
the first clear image, a looking glass without stains or bubbles, enabled 
persons to see for the first time not in a glass darkly or dimly but clearly and 
perfectly.  One could see the unclouded image of God.  This pure reflection of 
the image alters the whole meaning of what a mirror is and does.  The new 
looking-glass provides a release from the reciprocal essence of human nature, 
imposing an unilateral logic upon its viewer.  This modernized tool of 
reflection bears the logic of the self-knowing selfÑa person who can be seen 
through her own eyes, perfectly reflected. 
Before the clarified mirror self-knowledge is acquired only through a 
reciprocal engagement with people, places and things in a mingling of lights.  
In the ancient world the mirror is understood in very different terms.  
Following a Platonic logic of the mirror as described in the Timaeus, what 
takes place when a person stands in front of the mirror is that the light of the 
eyes mingle (coalesce) with the light on the surface of the mirror, the two 
lights forming the image on the mirror.34  There are at least two lights 
involved in the forming of the image, made present to the eye of the beholder.  
The image is real; it is there on the surface of the mirror.  The mirror can be 
anything, here.  The light of the human eye is not a kind of filter that when it 
sees the object before her she simply sees the object as something consumed 
by the eye.  Rather, the thing looks back at her with its own light.  The two 
lights come together to form the image that is thereby known by the human.  
The two lights permeate one another, mingle together to form an image.  It is 
in this sense that beauty lies in the eye of the beholder.  The co-mingling of 
                                                            
34 Plato, Timaeus, trans. Robert Gregg Bury (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981), 
46.A-C. 
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lights create an image that is received as beautiful based on the form made-
manifest by the co-mingling of lights.  Beauty does not simply reside in the 
object of the humanÕs gaze (Hume), nor does beauty lie purely in the 
abstracted, rationally trained eye (Kant).  Rather, the quality of light produced 
by the object and likewise the subject, mingle together to form an image, 
thereby construed as beautiful or hideous on the basis of the compatibility of 
lights. 
There is evidence of this mingling in the words of Jesus in Matthew 
and LukeÕs Gospel, where Jesus speaks of the lamp of the body.35 The 
language is primarily located in what is gazed upon by the human; however, it 
is clear in the gospels that objects emit their own light, be it darkened or 
dazzling. 
Your eye is the lamp of the body.  If your eye is healthy, your 
whole body is full of light; but if your eye is not healthy, your 
whole body is full of darkness.  Therefore, consider whether 
the light in you is not darkness.  If then your whole body is full 
of light, with no part of it in darkness, it will be as full of light 
as when a lamp gives you light with its rays.36 
In LukeÕs gospel, this discussion of light is preceded by a reference to the 
story of JonahÕs relation to Nineveh as a sign of GodÕs KingdomÑthe light of 
Christ.  Jonah is the mirror by which the light of God emanates to reconcile 
the people of Nineveh.  Jonah, the reluctant missionary, was no less a vehicle 
of light.  Reading the story of Jonah in light of LukeÕs gospel, Jonah is as 
Peter, who walked out upon the sea gazing upon the Lord and lost sight of the 
light because of the tumultuous winds and waves.  Jonah saw only the 
darkness of Nineveh.  The light emitted from the Ninevites was a darkened 
light; but gazing only upon their darkness Jonah is himself filled with darkness 
and moved to anger, even after Nineveh turns from its wickedness to serve 
Òthe God of heaven, who made the sea and the dry land.37Ó 
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 Jesus goes further and says, ÒNo one after lighting a lamp puts it in a 
cellar, but on a lamp stand so that those who enter may see the light.Ó38 Jonah, 
however, as we see evidenced in the two passages, had tried to do just that, 
place the light of God in a cellar, which is JesusÕ same condemnation of the 
Pharisees,39 reminiscent of the dialogue between God and Jonah under the 
bush outside of Nineveh.40  The Pharisees offered a simulation of divine light, 
while consumed by darkness within.41  Jesus goes on to say that the Ninevites 
received the sign-Jonah, though he was but a mirror reflecting GodÕs light, but 
this generation of Israel would be condemned by the Ninevites because, 
making a subtle reference to the light he is, Òsomething greater than Jonah is 
here!Ó42 
 We find here in LukeÕs gospel a continuation of the Song of Simeon.  
ÒFor my eyes have seen your salvation, which you have prepared in the 
presence of all peoples, a light for revelation to the Gentiles and for glory to 
your people Israel.Ó43 Simeon addresses Mary and Joseph after his blessing, 
saying that Jesus would reveal the inner thoughts of humans.44  The light of 
Christ exposes not only the darkness covering the world, but the gaze of God 
in Christ also exposes the divine light within all created life.  Christ is the gaze 
of God upon all creation.  He is the light that permeates the light inherent to 
creation as created, opening the human to her contingent lucidity in the co-
mingling of divine and created lights. 
 Accordingly, the healthy body is made healthy by its gaze upon the 
light-Christ.  This is brought into full view in MatthewÕs account, whereby the 
preceding passage regards storing up treasures on earth45 and the following 
passage concerns serving two masters.46  ÒWhere your treasure is, there also 
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your heart,Ó47 is likewise a casting of oneÕs gaze.  That upon which oneÕs gaze 
is cast is that which fills the body.  This casting of gaze, however, is no mere 
looking at objects; rather, it involves a master-slave relation.  The humanÕs 
gazeÑher seeing and knowledge of all thingsÑis located in her obedience to 
and being disciplined by the object of her gaze.  To gaze upon the light of 
GodÑChrist, is to be permeated by divinity, whereby the created light of the 
human mingles with the divine lightÑChrist, so that the human sees all things 
with a double-light, an unconfused light, that reveals the object of gaze to the 
human in its own manner of participation in divine contingency. 
 For Plato, the light of the form is the light that goes forth from the 
object of gaze.  The object participates in its eternal form by its likeness to the 
form.  The light of the object is not a light particular to itself but is alighted by 
the idea/form.  Christ, however, introduces himself as the primordial Form, i.e. 
Light, who has given the created a light Òof its own.Ó  This light remains 
contingent upon the LightÑChrist, yet the light of the created exists as an 
endowment.  It is there, embedded in the person, place or thing.  The all-
permeating light, Christ, does not simply shine through the empty vessel; 
rather, the Light permeates the created light whereby the two lightsÑCreator 
and createdÑmingle together to show forth the truth of the createdÕs nature 
with implications for knowing the Creator.  This third lightÑthe Light, 
ChristÑmingles with both created lights of subject and object, forming an 
image that is made visible in its contingent relation to the illuminating God, 
strengthening the distinction of subject and object while simultaneously 
removing the apparent division between the two.  Christ is the unconfused 
union of all things. 
 
III 
How the human knows herself and the world around her is, for Gregory of 
Nyssa, the difference between the two trees in the Garden of Eden.  The 
contrast between the tree of life and the tree of the knowledge of good and evil 
is nearly identical in the accounts of Athanasius, Gregory of Nyssa, Gregory 
of Nazianzen, Basil, and John of Damascus.  The tree of life is the tree of 
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obedienceÑChristÕs cross.  The tree of the knowledge of good and evil is 
disobedience, whereby the human understands his or her relation to creation 
only in terms of his or her unaligned passions and desires.  To eat the fruit of 
the tree of knowledge is to phenomenologize the world, a kind of Kantian, 
reasoned tastefulness.48  That is, to notice the other as naked is to only see the 
bodyÑto see only matter,49 which is not to truly see the body in its relation to 
the soul and its co-mingling with the divine light.  It is to construe the object 
of oneÕs gaze in a kind of radical subjectivity, permitting no reciprocal 
identification, only projection. 
There are, then, two faculties of vision, Òone that sees the truth, and the 
other that wanders off into senseless things.Ó50  The tree of life does not see 
through the bodily passions where all objects are objects of desire.  The tree of 
deathÑthe tree of knowledge of good and evilÑis the tree of non-being or 
privation of good.51  The two trees are two distinct ways of knowing.  The first 
is through active participation in the goodÑthe co-mingling of lights, the 
second denies the penetrating light of divinity, which is the result of an 
absence of virtue in actionÑprivation of good.52 
As seen with Aristotle, it is not that human action necessarily or 
causally gives way to knowledge, any more than knowledge necessarily 
produces action.  Nevertheless, a personÕs activities construe how one 
understands and what is intelligible to a person.  For instance, to continue the 
analogy of the mirror, the modern mirror construes how the human sees 
herself, by construing how she sees.  The human becomes an object of her 
own gaze, conflating the subjectivity and objectivity of the self into a single 
subject-object in-itself. 
This construal of the ancient mirror logic promotes a self that only 
knows by its own unilateral light, projected upon all objects, which, as it were, 
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have no light to reciprocate.  The un-mirrored self stands in a quite different 
relation to her object of gaze.  One knows an object to have a Òlife of its own,Ó 
which enables the self-subject to enter into a knowing relationship with the 
object.  The human looks upon, for instance, a beautiful daisy.  The daisy 
(object) is a real flower.  It does not exist in the eye of its beholder, even 
though the beholder uniquely sees the daisy.  OneÕs perceiving of the daisy in 
no way alters the truth of the daisy.  It is there, whether it is admired for its 
beauty or not seen at all.  The subject-object relation of a person to a daisy is 
not, therefore, unilateral.  The human is not the only one involved in the 
knowing that occurs between the person and a daisy.  The daisy does have 
something to say, namely that the human is not a daisy, which it says quite 
loudly.  It is as in the film The Seventh Seal,53 where a medieval squire stops 
to ask a dead man sitting on a rock for directions.  He returns to his knight 
saying, ÒEloquent.Ó  To which the Knight responds, ÒWhat did he say?Ó  ÒToo 
dark to repeat,Ó says the squire.  There is a reciprocity of knowing between the 
human and a daisy, even the dead, and such reciprocal knowing is vital for 
human self-knowledge.  This is necessary whether the subject-object relation 
occurs between a flower, a rock or another person.  Self-knowledge occurs 
when one becomes open to the knowledge of oneself from that which is not 
oneselfÑwhen an awareness of the created light is visible in all things.  The 
modern mirror deconstructs this field of knowledge.  Its very existence 
imposes a logic of individuation that is not easily avoided.  To gaze into a 
mirror is to enter into a unilateral, subject-object relation with oneself, 
whereby the subject (self) is the object (self) and the object (self) is the subject 
(self)Ñtautology.54  Self-knowledge is available to the self-subject by the self-
object, and the human knows herself in this falsely reciprocal, unilateral 
virtual relation. 
One thinks of Johannes GumppÕs Self-Portrait (1646), here.55  The 
painting is that of one in the act of painting his own image via his reflected 
image.  The artistÕs back is the portrayed Òself,Ó who is reflected in the mirror 
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image to his left, with the canvas receiving the artistÕs reflected image being 
painted on the right.  The artist bears witness of himself to himself; all is 
conjecture and subjectivity.56  The individual portrait, which arises when the 
human comes to understand herself as a human subject, capable of objectivity, 
comes about on the heels of the perfected glass mirror.  It would be impossible 
to construe this argument causally, i.e. chicken or egg, yet it should not be 
dismissed that the logic of the mirror is evidenced in the rise of the self-
portrait in the 15th CenturyÑthe self-subject self.  Without the mirror, the self 
as subject may never have been thought.  This cannot be more than 
conjectured; however, the self as knowing itself by being known by itselfÑthe 
self as Òself-revelatoryÓÑis known with the mirror.  The mirror, like the 
photograph, assures the viewer that she is.  Following a sort of Cartesian logic, 
one could say with the modern mirror that ÒI reflect; therefore, I am.Ó  It 
should come as no surprise, here, that during the Enlightenment the reflected 
image becomes proof of oneÕs being.  The living-dead, the vampire, has no 
reflection.  He is dead.  Therefore, only the self can bear witness, via the 
reflecting-toolÑthe mirrorÑto itself that it is alive.57  GumppÕs Self-Portrait 
is important, not because he used a mirror to paint his own face; it is important 
because he painted himself bearing witness to himself that he is, revealing the 
unilateral self-knowledge that the mirror guises as reciprocal knowing.58  The 
modern Venetian mirror does not simply provide a perfected reflection to its 
image; it (mis)construes its viewer and her being-in-the-world.  The clarified 
mirror is itself a weltanschauung.  The world-view created by the mirror, 
however, does exactly what it cannot do, which is to provide an exact image 
of its viewer.  The mirror only deconstructs its viewer to what the mirror can 
reflect, which is only the material object in view, absent of mind and soul.  
With Gregory, however, to know oneself is not to see by way of the reflected 
re-presentation.  GregoryÕs call to know thyself is a call to know the Good and 
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know human nature only in its relation to the Light of God.  Indeed, Òour 
greatest perfection,Ó says Gregory, Òis self-knowledge.Ó59  To do so, however, 
humans must 
avoid the delusion that we are seeing ourselves when we are in 
reality looking at something else.  This is what happens to 
those who do not scrutinize themselves.  What they see is 
strength, beauty, reputation, political power, abundant wealth, 
pomp, self-importance, bodily stature, a certain grace of form 
or the like, and they think that this is what they are.  Such 
persons make very poor guardians of themselves: because of 
their absorption in something elseÉ one must know himself as 
he is, and distinguish himself from all that is not he.60 
The human, for Gregory, is at her core a participant in the divine life. 
[Humans] alone are made in the likeness of that nature which 
surpasses all understanding; you alone are a similitude of 
eternal beauty, a receptacle of happiness, an image of the true 
Light; and if you look up to Him, you will become what He is, 
imitating Him Who shines within you, Whose glory is reflected 
in your purity.61 
To know thyself, then, is to know oneself as the mirror upon which the LightÑ
Christ, the Image-Light of GodÑis cast and re-cast.  Such knowledge is made 
present to the human through the gaze of virtue, a continual becoming in 
likeness to the Image through participation in the tree of lifeÑthe taking up of 
oneÕs cross, the fruit showing forth the true nature of a tree,62 the brilliance of 
light showing the quality of the lamp.  Full illuminationÑdeification, is the 
end of virtue.  The mutual gaze of God upon the human and the human upon 
God is made known in the willed and active gathering of created lights into 
this reciprocal co-mingling in virtue.   
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It is the humanÕs participation in virtuous action that transforms her 
and makes known to her the nature of her humanity as a vessel for this double 
mingling of lights. 
The only way for the soul to be attached to the incorruptible 
God is for it to make itself as pure as it can. In this way, 
reflecting as the mirror does, when it submits itself to the 
purity of God, it will be formed according to its participation in 
and reflection of the prototypal beauty.63 
The logic, here, is that the divine light that shines upon the human, who has 
placed herself before God, supplies the image.  The mingling of lights on the 
surface of the mirror that is the objectÑin this case the Light of Christ and the 
light of the humanÑis, for Gregory, an active and mutual penetration of the 
two natures, divine and human, inasmuch as the humanÕs gaze is locked on 
Christ.  The human has Òher own beauty,Ó but it is not Beauty; rather, it is the 
truth of her createdness.  The human is made into the likeness, according to 
Gregory, of the imageÑthe beauty on which her gaze is cast.  This works 
positively and negatively.  To gaze upon evil forms an image of the beholder 
as depraved and capable only of sinful actions.  Casting oneÕs gaze upon God, 
however, makes manifest the humanÕs true natureÑthe divine image, a 
participant in divine goodness.64 
One need not take such elaborate examples to understand what 
Gregory is getting at here.  If a person is continually watching the exemplar of 
faith in the manner of her actions and does so long enough, a person will, in 
all likelihood, be moved to so act.  It is in this way that husbands and wives 
grow closer together and further apart.  The two who are bound together as 
one in holy matrimony, if they are continually present with the other they will 
begin to share many of the same characteristics in behavior and understanding.  
This is certainly true for children, the most observant of humans walking the 
earth, who see (or do not see) their parents day in and day out.  Children 
                                                            
63 Gregory of Nyssa, ÒOn Virginity,Ó XI, in Virginia Woods Callahan, trans., Saint Gregory of 
Nyssa: Ascetical Works (Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 1967). 
64 Ocular reception of the Eucharist as a becoming that upon which the gaze is cast.  
Nevertheless, this logic was doomed to fail as it is not the consumption of the body and blood 
that it is intended to be. 
Christ the Liturgy 
 62 
become near carbon copies of their parentsÕ character, some spending many 
years in therapy for it.  GregoryÕs observation here is quite elemental: you 
become the image formed by the co-mingling of lights, those of the human 
and her object of gaze. 
In days of old the human race grew cold with the chill of 
idolatry, and manÕs changeable nature was transformed into the 
nature of the immobile objects which he worshippedÉ For 
those who look toward the true God receive within themselves 
the characteristics of the divine nature; so too, those who turn 
their minds to the vanity of idols are transformed into the 
objects which they look at, and become stones instead of 
men.65 
Subject and object are hereby indivisible.  The two mutually know one 
another.  And to the extent that the humanÕs gaze is cast upon her object is the 
degree to which she locates her identity in the object of her gaze.  The two are 
folded into one, making the human subject into the likeness of the objectÑ
more specifically the object of worship, which, if the object of gaze is not 
God, is a forsaking of her true imageÑshe is as all who gazed into the eyes of 
Medusa and are turned to stone. 
This form of knowledge is clearly participatory.  Like Aristotle, 
Gregory makes the point clear that the ability to receive and process 
knowledge is contingent upon the human having been formed by the virtuesÑ
the sacramental life of the church.66 
Now, how can you see a beautiful image in a mirror unless it 
has received the impression of a beautiful form?  So it is with 
the mirror of human nature: it cannot become beautiful until it 
draws near to the Beautiful and becomes transformed by the 
image of the divine Beauty.  When our human nature lay fallen 
upon the earth it looked towards the serpent and held its image.  
But now that it has arisen and looks toward the good, turning 
its back on sin it takes on the form of the good towards which it 
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faces.  For it looks now upon the archetypal BeautyÑfor that is 
the Dove.  For, turning towards the light, it has been made into 
the image of light, and within this light it has taken on the 
lovely form of the DoveÑI mean the Dove that symbolizes the 
presence of the Holy Spirit.67 
The mirror of human nature shows forth the beauty of the image to the extent 
that the lights of the human and God mingle together on the mirror of the 
soul68 to show forth their union in glory by a likeness in participation and 
mutual penetration69Ñthe human nature having been pre-penetrated by the 
divine esse at creation,70 fully held together in Christ.  To say that the human 
is a mirror, then, is to say that she is the mirror for (not of) the imago Dei.  
The mingling of lights is an active participation that realigns the human gaze.  
Human action limits or expands the field of knowledge.71  In order for the 
human to know Beauty she must become beautiful; she must be impressed 
with BeautyÕs form.  Only when the human has been rightly formed through 
participation can she truly know; for the vision of the Good is made possible 
by a uniformity of life to virtue.72  This is the reason why the virtuous take 
great pains to cultivate purity of soul and freedom from the passions, so that 
the form, as it were, of transcendent Being might be revealed in them because 
of their more perfect life.73 
Self-knowledge is made available by a mystical seeing of the image of 
God revealed to the human through the cultivation of virtue.  Virtuous activity 
opens the human to self-knowledge, and, therefore, knowledge of God.  This 
knowledge, as we said before, is not causal.  It is as a farm field.  God creates 
the humanÑthe soil; the human tillsÑdisciplinesÑthe body, which opens the 
human to the seedÑChristÑof life, to be continually nurtured by the mingling 
of lightsÑdivine and humanÑupon the mirror of the soul.  Gregory makes it 
clear that it is the mysteries of the church that discipline the human to receive 
                                                            
67 Gregory of Nyssa, Commentary on the Song of Songs, Sermon V, italics mine. 
68 Ibid., Sermon X. 
69 Gregory of Nyssa, The Life of Moses, II.167-169. 
70 Gregory of Nyssa, Commentary on the Song of Songs, Sermon VIII. 
71 Ibid., Sermon IV. 
72 Ibid., Sermon VIII. 
73 Ibid., Sermon IX. 
Christ the Liturgy 
 64 
knowledge of the Good and know herself as a participant in the Good.  
VirtueÑthe clothing of the soulÑis none other than the actions of the body, 
which give way to knowledge of the self.74  The body is the perfect image of 
the soul.  Gregory here foreshadows Wittgenstein.  In his interpretation of the 
liturgical vestments of the priest, Gregory claims that these are no less than the 
actions that adorn the soul, Òwoven by the exercise of the virtues.Ó75 
The garments of faith, then, are the actions of the baptized that 
participate in the sacrificial action of Christ on the cross.  This is, says 
Gregory, what Paul means by living sacrifice.76  The garment of faith is a 
participation in the actions that are the eating of the fruit that comes from the 
tree of life.  To put on the garment of sensuous lifeÑthe tree of the knowledge 
of good and evilÑis to weigh down the soul with that which is thick and 
heavy, not allowing the human to ascend toward the holy.77 One must be 
careful to understand the nuances that Nyssen makes when he speaks of the 
sensuous life, however, as Gregory has a great tendency to speak of sensation 
positively and negatively and does so often in the same sections of his 
writings. 
Sarah Coakley has recently shown how important Gregory of Nyssa is 
to gaining a cohesive understanding of embodied perceiving.78 Directing our 
attention to GregoryÕs important and often overlooked De anima et 
resurrectione, Coakley shows how NyssenÕs robust understanding of 
knowledge and its acquisitionÑfollowing the apostle Paul, especially 1 
Corinthians 15Ñoccurs through a systematic increase in understanding by a 
series of sensual purgations.79 CoakleyÕs essay deals largely with Jean 
DanilouÕs description of GregoryÕs ÔdoctrineÕ80 of the spiritual senses in his 
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influential work, Platonisme et thologie mystique.81 Coakley argues that 
Danilou does not therein adequately address the nature of the spiritual senses 
in relation to epistemology in Gregory, faulting him for his lack of attention to 
De anima. It must be noted that CoakleyÕs accusation against DanilouÕs 
treatment is focused on his earlier work in Platonisme et thologie mystique, 
where he outlines this Òdoctrine.Ó Coakley does point this out, although not 
until the final paragraph of the essay, which is a bit misleading. Danilou 
does, however, account for this graded elevation of spiritual sense in the 
introduction to his selected texts from GregoryÕs writings in From Glory to 
Glory.
82 Whether Danilou adequately addresses GregoryÕs progression of 
spiritual sensing in his Platonisme et thologie mystique is debatable; 
however, he does address this elsewhere83 and succinctly in his introduction to 
From Glory to Glory, which Coakley curiously does not mention.84 
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CoakleyÕs reemphasizing of De anima is important, as it shows in 
Gregory an important account of physiological sensation as participating in 
true wisdom and understanding.85 Again, Danilou does emphasize GregoryÕs 
understanding of progressive change as essential to human nature, regarding 
perfection as a Òperpetual progress,Ó86 an Òinfinite growth,Ó87 a Òconstant 
becoming.Ó88 This is the purpose of the garment of skin, says Danilou.89 
GregoryÕs understanding of the body, as Danilou underscores, is a corrective 
to OrigenÕs speculation that the body is a punishment for sin.90 GregoryÕs 
notion of the garment of skin, however, is for the soulÕs remedy (both 
following and moving beyond Origen) not its punishment.91 What Gregory 
outlines in De anima is a spiritual ascent of descent, a luminous darkness, an 
entering into knowing by way of unknowing, all of which for Gregory is a sort 
of embodied disembodiment.92 As Coakley has shown, GregoryÕs position 
here involves delving eternally into darkness through the continuous purifying 
of human sensibility, whereby the prisoner and the free man, while Òvery 
                                                                                                                                                           
reason and ideas.Ó See Maximus, ÒAmbiguum 60Ó in Paul M. Blowers and Robert Louis 
Wilken, trans., On the Cosmic Mystery of Jesus Christ: Selected Writings from St. Maximus 
the Confessor (Crestwood: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 2003). There is no disjunction, 
here, as Coakley rightly points out, but neither is there in DanilouÕs account of Gregory. 
Rather, it is the paradoxical illumination by darkness and the true vision of not seeing that 
Gregory expresses. See Gregory of Nyssa, The Life of Moses, trans. Malherbe and Ferguson 
(New York: Paulist Press, 1978) II.162-164, to which Danilou directs our attention. 
85 Gregory of Nyssa, On the Soul and the Resurrection, trans. Catherine Roth (New York: St. 
VladimirÕs Seminary Press, 2002), 34. 
86 Danilou, introduction, 47. 
87 Ibid., 46. 
88 Ibid., 54. See also The Life of Moses, II.219-255. 
89 Danilou, introduction, 11. 
90 Ibid., 12. 
91 Ibid. 
92 Gregory of Nyssa, On the Soul and the Resurrection, 97-101. As Catherine Roth notes, 
Macrina denies in this section the Òmateriality of matterÓ (99 n.4). See also Vladimir Lossky, 
In the Image and Likeness of God (New York: St. VladimirÕs Seminary Press, 1974), 31-43. 
Lossky shows how distinct GregoryÕs understanding of gnosis truly is, differing greatly from 
Origen (and Evagrius). He also remarks how well aware of this Fr. Danilou is, describing 
Gregory to be Òpassing beyondÓ Origen in DanilouÕs book on Origen. This Òluminous 
darknessÓ is perhaps nowhere more clear in Gregory than in the Life of Moses. By the 
disciplining of sense perception the human opens the intellective part of her soul to deeper and 
deeper contemplation of the incomprehensible and thereby sees God in not seeing, see 
Gregory of Nyssa, The Life of Moses, II.163; see also Rowan Williams, The Wound of 
Knowledge, 62-67, where Williams notes that Danilou presents GregoryÕs understanding of 
the relation between the soul and the senses as Òrevolutionary,Ó although Williams does 
appear to be working on a problematic understanding of PlatonismÑseparating sensibility 
from the souls Òcelestial journey,Ó a reading of Plato that Coakley rightly reminds is not 
Platonic. 
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much alike in body during their lives [come to] differ greatly from each other 
in their experience of pleasure or pain.Ó93 This difference is the difference 
between one disciplined by virtue and another disciplined by the senses. 
Some people ascribe to the good part whatever seems pleasant 
to sense-perception, while others believe that only what 
appears to the mind both is good and should be so called. 
Those who have not trained their reasoning and have not 
examined what is better spend gluttonously in the fleshly life 
the share of good which is owed to their nature, saving up 
nothing for the life hereafter. But those who manage their life 
with critical reasoning and self-control, although in this short 
life they are distressed by those misfortunes which trouble the 
senses, yet store up good for the subsequent age, so that the 
better portion is extended for them throughout their eternal 
life.94 
This is the gulf, says Macrina, that is made by Òthe decisions of human lives 
divided towards opposite choices.Ó95 The senses, while they are part of this 
purifying journey of the soul, are nevertheless to be on the passive side of the 
souls activity. This ÒpassivityÓ is clearer in The Life of Moses, wherein 
Gregory continuously emphasizes the role of free will in the humanÕs 
elevation to virtue or descent to vice. It is the activity of the humanÕs free will 
                                                            
93 Gregory of Nyssa, On the Soul and the Resurrection, 120. For Gregory, this growth is 
eternal. At no point is the darkness surpassed; rather, each natural growth of the human in 
Christ is a growth that continually reveals the absolute transcendence of the God who is at 
once fully present to the human but so vast that all one can hope for is a deeper awareness that 
knowledge of God can never be exhausted or fully acquired; see Gregory of Nyssa, On the 
Soul and the Resurrection, 87; The Life of Moses, II.162-169. 
94 Ibid., 71. See also Gregory of Nyssa, The Life of Moses, II.157. In The Life of Moses, 
Gregory makes the more clear distinction between rational and irrational animals, whereby the 
irrational animals are those governed solely by sense perception, divorced from rationality. 
Following Gregory, we might say that understanding is gained through rational appropriation 
of the senses, which leads to spiritual sense, but apart from the intellective faculty the spirited 
and appetitive leave the soul to be trampled upon by insatiable passions (II.94-96, 154-158). 
95 Ibid. This understanding of decision or choice is, again, found throughout GregoryÕs The 
Life of Moses, see especially II.70-88. ÒWe have in ourselves, in our own nature and by our 
own choice, the causes of light and darkness, since we place ourselves in whichever sphere we 
wish to beÓ (II.80). Gregory makes a distinction throughout The Life of Moses regarding what 
is ÒwithinÓ human nature and what comes to it from the outside. The cause of light or virtue is 
within, part of the fabric of human nature, while the cause of darkness or vice comes from the 
outside, although through an exercise of free will, which is within. 
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that conditions her toward a sensitivity or insensitivity to virtue.96 Gregory 
here refers to the hardening of PharaohÕs heart by God. PharaohÕs resistance to 
the divine will, says Gregory, is not caused by God; rather, Pharaoh resists 
God because he has inclined his sensibilities to evil and is thereby hardened to 
the Òword that softens resistance.Ó97 
It is here that CoakleyÕs (re)assessment is of utmost importance. Her 
concern is that any disjunction between epistemology and spirituality in 
Gregory of Nyssa is a failure to see Òan emerging and developing sense of the 
significance of bodily life for Ôspiritual sensationÕ.Ó98 This union is perhaps 
clearer, however, in GregoryÕs discussion of the soul in The Life of Moses. 
Gregory follows an Aristotelian classification of the tripartite soul (vegetative, 
sensitive, and rational).99 For Gregory, the soul is as the doorpost of the 
Hebrew in Egypt, which received the blood of the lamb to protect the virtue 
within.100 The upper doorpost is the rational part; the side posts of the entrance 
are the vegetative and sensitive (ÒappetitiveÓ and ÒspiritedÓ).101 The rational 
part keeps the side posts from evil thoughts, while the appetitive and spirited 
free the upper doorpost more and more to greater illumination.102 There is a 
strong sense of reciprocity in GregoryÕs understanding of the relation between 
each part of the soul, whereby the each in its own way protects the other, all 
for the sake of participating in the divine life. This is also in keeping with 
GregoryÕs strong sense that Divinity is manifest to the degree that the human 
is capable of receiving.103 What is most telling, however, with regard to 
GregoryÕs understanding of the senses in their participation in the humanÕs 
ever progressing spiritual sensibility, is how he describes what is most natural 
to human desire with regard to physiological sensation, most notably in his 
description of the ÒstomachÕs nature.Ó 
                                                            
96 Gregory of Nyssa, The Life of Moses, II.86-87. 
97 Ibid., II.76. GregoryÕs point here is that God cannot be the cause of any evil or the source of 
evil. Rather, nothing evil exists apart from human generation by an act of the will (II.88). 
98 Coakley, Gregory of Nyssa on the Spiritual Senses, 52. 
99 Gregory of Nyssa, The Life of Moses, II.96, 169 n.116. 
100 Ibid., II.89-101. 
101 Ibid., II.96. 
102 Ibid. 
103 Ibid., II.119. 
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Even if much more were prepared than is needed, it is not in 
the stomachÕs nature to exceed its proper measure or to be 
stretched by the insatiate desire for what is prepared.104 
What is natural to human nature, even to the stomach, is to have what is 
needed; it is not to be filled through insatiable greed, moving human nature 
toward what is unnatural, for excess and hoarding lead only to 
covetousness.105 This continual progress in virtueÑthe disciplining of the side 
posts of the soulÑis the realignment of the senses to the spiritual sensation of 
the rational faculty, which leads to that eternal Sabbath.106 There is surely no 
division between epistemology and spirituality to be found in Gregory; rather, 
it is the epistemological alignment with spiritual sense that leads the human 
toward her true nature, whereby the soul by virtuous activity reweaves the 
body to suit its true nature.107 
 The difficulty with Gregory is the lack of specificity with regard to 
spiritual sense, coupled with his continued back and forth use of Òflesh,Ó 
Ògarment,Ó and Òsense,Ó as there is no uniform employment of these terms. If 
only he were as clear as John of Damascus who, perhaps clarifying Gregory 
on the matter of spiritual sense, is more to the point. The Damascene discusses 
the goal of each person bringing their mind to see the beatific vision, 
which means to be guided by their sense perceptions up to that 
which is beyond all sense perception and comprehension, which is 
He who is the Author and Maker and Creator of all. ÔFor by the 
beauty of his own creatures the creator is by analogy discovered,Õ 
and Ôthe invisible things of him from the creation of the world are 
clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made.Õ108 
This is GregoryÕs point as well, which is again clearer in The Life of Moses, 
that the spiritual senses are not separable from the physical; rather, spiritual 
                                                            
104 Gregory of Nyssa, The Life of Moses, II.142. 
105 Ibid., II.143. 
106 Ibid. 
107 Ibid., II.191. 
108 John of Damascus, ÒPhilosophical Chapters,Ó I, in Frederic Hathaway Chase, Jr., 
trans., Saint John of Damascus: Writings (New York: Fathers of the Church, 1958). 
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sense is the transcendental nature of the physical sense, the garment God 
provides for the attainment of beatific vision, which is oneÕs stepping into the 
dark cloud in order to comprehend the incomprehensible by realizing the 
insurmountability of God. For Gregory, as with John of Damascus, one who 
attends to the spiritual life is borne by sense perception to the Good.109 
GregoryÕs deepest concern is to secure a right apprehension of Being.110 God 
has given the human the garment of skin so that she might put on the garment 
of obedience and thereby rightly apprehend Being, which is true 
knowledge.111 This occurs through sense perception, for it is only through the 
senses that the human is capable of perception;112 however, once the human 
recognizes the truth of her subsistent relation to God it is then, through sense 
perception, that the spiritual senses are activated, as it were, to know God 
alone as existence himselfÑbeyond sense perception. This ÒflightÓ from the 
senses does not leave sense perception behind; rather, the human knows 
herself as contingent when she has become aware of her perception as 
physiologically conditioned and thereby attends to the One whose perceiving 
is self-contingent, unchanged by nothing externalÑGod. (Ironically for 
Gregory, attending to the passions of the body is more akin to a flight from 
sense perception, as the senses are given that the human might realize her 
contingent relation to GodÑher natural nature.113 The senses are given as a 
bride-companion for the humanÕs ascending of the mountain.114) 
 
  
                                                            
109 Gregory of Nyssa, The Life of Moses, II.6-8. Gregory describes the waters that carry Moses 
down the Nile, which toss him too and fro; however, because of ÒeducationÓ Moses is 
ÒnaturallyÓ thrust onto firm ground. What is natural is transformed by human education or 
discipline to the Good, re-creating (with God) the natural to divine purposes. For Gregory, the 
human is her own mid-wife, giving birth to her true self through the disciplining of sense 
perception that raises the human, not beyond herself, per se, but toward herself. 
110 Ibid., II.23. 
111 Ibid. Again, Gregory teeters back and forth here with Ògarment.Ó The garment of skin is at 
once the Ògarment of disobedienceÓ and GodÕs gift to the human to attain the garment of 
obedience. The discipline of virtue is the garment of obedience, which is acquired by the 
human through the active manifesting of the truth of Being in oneÕs body. 
112 Gregory of Nyssa, The Life of Moses, II.25. 
113 Maximus, Ambiguum 7, 1084D. 
114 Gregory of Nyssa, The Life of Moses, II.157. 
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IV 
The understanding of spiritual sensibility outlined above is an awareness of 
human perception conditioned and informed by oneÕs participation in the life 
of God in the world. Aligning human perception to spiritual sensibility entails, 
as aforesaid, a becoming in likeness to what the human subject is as created in 
the image of God. It should come as no surprise, then, that the fathers of the 
church, evidenced most notably with Gregory of Nyssa, understood this 
virtuous ascent to be a continuous revealing of who God is and how God 
relates to creation. How the human relates to God and all others is to be 
analogous to the inter-relatedness of the Persons of the Holy Trinity. 
What it means for God to be God, following the early fathers of the 
church, is to exist as a mutual adoration and service of inter-Trinitarian self-
offering.  That is, the Son is the eternal worship of the Father and the Father of 
the Son, and both of the Spirit and the Spirit of Father and Son.115  The 
Persons of the Trinity relate one to another in mutual obedience and 
penetration of love in the giving of the Son to the Father and the Father to the 
Son, which is the reciprocal giving and receiving in and of the self-same 
Spirit.  God hereby lacks nothing, not even his own worship.116  The mutually 
submissive Persons of the One Substance offer to one another their distinctive 
selfhoods.  The FatherÕs giving of himself to the Son and the SonÕs receiving 
of the Father is the shared gift that is the Spirit.  Reciprocal love and mutual 
submission occurs in the SonÕs return to the Father and the FatherÕs reception 
of the Son, which is the gift-giving, active-being that is the same Spirit.  The 
eternal Person of the Spirit names the endless procession of the giving and 
receiving of God from and through himself in the Personhoods of Father and 
Son. 
The subsisting persons of the Trinity give to each their own property, 
receiving from the other the same.  Each Person of the Trinity, then, knows 
itself only in light of its being-known by each subsisting Person.  The Father 
knows himself as Father only to the extent that the Son knows the Father as 
his Father.  Likewise, the Son knows himself as Son only to the extent that the 
                                                            
115 Irenaeus, Against Heresies, IV.vii.3. 
116 Pierre Berulle is known as having stated that God lacks only his own worship.  However, 
as Irenaeus reminds, even this is complete and not lacking in the Godhead.  See note above. 
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Father knows the Son as his Son.  This knowing is made possible by the Spirit 
who, following Augustine, separates the Father to know the Son as Son and 
for the Son to know the Father as Father.  One receives PersonhoodÑ
identityÑin being-known by the other subsisting Persons. 
With Maximus Confessor, the elevation of grace over nature discloses 
how it is that this knowledge is made available to humanity.  It is through 
grace that the human comes to know her true nature,117 as one cannot arrive at 
this knowledge by any other way save the divine illumination of the Spirit.118  
For the human to know herself as human she must, through grace, come to 
know her nature in being-known by the eternal Son.119 
The one who knows the meaning of the mystery and who is so 
incessantly lifted up both in work and in word through all 
things until he acquires what is sent down to him is likewise a 
messenger of the great plan of GodÉ  [Christ] underwent in 
himself through the incarnation as man our future destiny.  Let 
the one who is moved by a love of knowledge mystically 
rejoice in learning of the great destiny he has promised to those 
who love the Lord.120 
The humanÕs identity rests in its being-known by Mind,121 thereby learning of 
her subsistent nature, having been moved beyond her own nature by grace.  
Grace transforms human nature, not into something unnatural, but into what is 
at once so deeply and thoroughly human that it is more than human because it 
engages all of nature with the same gracious reciprocity that God the Son has 
engaged human nature.  The knower realizes herself as a participant in the 
grace that gathers her into the perichoretic relation, whereby the subject-object 
relation coalesces in divine unity.  The Father is not the subject whose object 
is the Son, nor is the Son a subject whose object is the Father, and neither is 
the Spirit to Father or Son.  Subject-object relations qualify the temporal 
                                                            
117 Maximus, Chapters on Knowledge, II.21. 
118 Ibid., II.24. 
119 Ibid., II.60. 
120 Ibid., II.23-24. 
121 Ibid., II.22. 
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exchanges between created beings.122  Humans are divisible, whereas God is 
complete oneness.123  The Persons of the Holy Trinity do not name divisibility 
within the Godhead, but rather bespeak the mysterious nature of eternal erotic-
knowing. 
The human gains such knowledge through the SonÕs descent.  But to 
know the Son the human must first know this eternal Person as flesh.  In 
knowing the Word made flesh the human comes to know the eternal nature of 
God the Son.  This knowing, however, first comes through the humanÕs being-
known as flesh124 by the all knowing eternal One.  KnowledgeÑGodÑmakes 
himself knowable through his being-known to himself as both human and 
divine.  God hereby knows himself as God by nature, fully and eternally 
complete, yet by grace knows himself in being-known to himself as divine-
human permeation.  Human nature is received into the perichoretic relation in 
the ChristÕs mutually permeating natures.  For the human not to know herself 
in light of GodÕs own self-knowing, then, is to neither know God nor oneself.  
Created in the image of God is revealed only in the ImageÑChrist, the mutual 
communication that God makes available by his being-known.  God is his own 
being-known, as it were, who receives his identity from himself through his 
own love and offering of himself to himself.  God knows himself only as he is 
known by himself.125 
The life of God is not that which unfolds in time; rather, the life of 
God gathers time into GodÕs own being-known.  Love is not deposited into 
humanity or creation.  These and all things are gathered into Love and only in 
this sense can there be love.  Accordingly, created love is always in some 
                                                            
122 This, it must be remembered, is a recent development in human history, articulated in the 
late 14th Century when the human becomes a ÒsubjectÓ whose experiences are subjective 
rather than collective.  The field of knowledge is altered forever.  Such knowing is made 
possible only by way creating an ontological division between corporeal and incorporeal 
realms.  Eric Voegelin argues that this begins to happen ideologically with the shift from 
pantheism to Christian monotheism during the reign of Theodosius in the late 4th and early 5th 
Centuries.  He remarks that Celsus criticized Christianity, stating that it brought with it a Òde-
divinizationÓ of the world.  By destroying the local divinities of each culture Christianity 
destroyed national and local culture.  See Eric Voegelin, The New Science of Politics, an 
Introduction. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952), Chapter 3. 
123 Maximus, ÒAmbiguum 7,Ó in Paul M. Blowers and Robert Louis Wilken, trans., On the 
Cosmic Mystery of Jesus Christ: Selected Writings from St. Maximus the 
Confessor (Crestwood: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 2003) 7.4. 
124 PG 44.804A-808B. 
125 Irenaeus, Against Heresies, iv.6.3-6.7 (ANF). 
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sense passive.  Only God is active Love, for God is Love.  Love does demand 
willed participation of the created in uncreated Love.126  Only in this sense can 
human action be understood.  Human activity can be both willed and unwilled; 
it can be for good or evil; and it can rejoice in Christ who makes all action 
intelligible or it can negate the truth of Christ. 
Situating this dialogue of love in the context of friendship with God 
clarifies AristotleÕs rejection of human capacity for friendship with God.  
Aristotle is precisely correct: friendship with God is impossible.127  Only God 
can love and know God!  ÒDepart from me for I never knew you,Ó128 could be 
read as JesusÕ declaration of this fact.  What does not participate in the love of 
God in Christ is not assimilated to Christ, and, therefore, is unknown to God.  
God cannot love what is not unitedÐÐassimilatedÐÐto the Son.  This is exactly 
what Clement of Alexandria is getting at when he speaks of perichoresis. 
God in Christ assimilates human nature to himself that the human 
might participate in the love of God, in the eternal friendship God is.  It is here 
that Aquinas both rightly and wrongly employs AristotleÕs Metaphysics.  For 
Aristotle, God is absolutely transcendent, and because friendship requires 
community such a bond is impossible between what is unchangeable and what 
is changeable.  God himself is subsistent thought; he cannot think outside 
himself.  That is, God cannot think not-God.  This is ClementÕs whole point.  
Yes, God cannot think not-God, which is why creation must be understood as 
always existing as a portion of God and within God, such that the changeableÐ
Ðcreated life, eternally being changed into God.  The changeable enters into 
subsistence with the unchanging at creation.    This inherent lovability of 
GodÕs portion within human nature is the dignity of the human. 
It is with John of Damascus that this perichoretic subsisting gains its 
full force.  Drawing on Gregory of Nazianzen, Gregory of Nyssa, Basil the 
Great, Denys the Aeoropogite, Maximus, and others, the Damascene weaves 
                                                            
126 ÒDemand,Ó here, is to be understood as a sort of non-compulsory compulsion, whereby 
love is absolutely free in its giving but receiving the free Love God is requires a returnÑa 
non-identical reciprocal engagement. 
127 Aristotle, ÒMetaphysics,Ó VIII.4-7, X.7, in Jonathan Barnes, ed., The Complete Works of 
Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation, vol. II (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1984), XII.7. 
128 Matthew 7.23. 
Divine Liturgy and the Epistemological Crisis 
 75 
together the finest of thread from each of the great theologians.  For John, 
when the Father, who is the primal cause of all things, speaks, his spoken 
Word subsists with him. 
Because our nature is mortal and subject to dissolution, for this 
reason our speech is non-subsistent. But, since God is existing 
always and is perfect, His Word must be always existing, 
living, perfect, distinctly subsistent, and having all things that 
His Begetter has. Now, our speech in proceeding from our 
mind is not entirely distinct from it. For, in so far as it comes 
from the mind, it is something distinct from it; whereas, in so 
far as it reveals the mind itself, it is not entirely distinct from it. 
Actually, it is identical with it in nature while distinct from it in 
its subject. Similarly, the Word of God, in so far as He subsists 
in Himself, is distinct from Him from whom He has His 
subsistence. But, since He exhibits in Himself those same 
things which are discerned in God, then in His nature He is 
identical with God. For, just as perfection in all things is to be 
found in the Father, so is it also to be found in the Word 
begotten of Him.129 
Unlike created persons, whose words dissolve in their speaking, the Person of 
the Son subsists and is differentiated from him from whom he derives 
subsistence.  The Son is begotten by the Father through the procession of the 
Spirit.  It is the Spirit that resides Òbetween the unbegotten and begotten, and 
[is] united to the Father through the Son.Ó130  The Spirit hereby subsists 
eternally with both Father and Son, 
a substantial power found in its own individuating personality, 
proceeding from the Father, coming to rest in the Word and 
declaring Him, not separated from God in essence or from the 
Word with whom it is associated, having might, not dissipated 
away into non-existence, but distinctly subsistent like the 
WordÑliving, endowed with will, self-moving, active, at all 
                                                            
129 John of Damascus, Orthodox Faith, i.6. 
130 Ibid., i.13. 
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times willing good, exercising His power for the prosecution of 
every design in accordance with His will, without beginning 
and without end. For the Word fell short of the Father in 
nothing, and the Spirit did not fall short of the Word in 
anything.131 
The Spirit is the eternal differentiating bond with whom the Father and 
Son subsist and are ReciprocityÑeternal, erotic being-known. 
In speaking, the Father gives the Son his Sonship.  This giving is the 
Spirit, who receives its Spiritship in the procession from the Father through 
the WordÕs return to its causeÑthe Father.  It is in this begetting and 
proceeding that the Father knows himself as Father.  The SonÕs receiving of 
his Sonship from the Father and his return to the Father makes known to the 
Spirit his identity as gift-giving-giverÑas the procession from the Father to 
the Son and through the Son as return to the Father.  This eternal knowing of 
the subsisting Persons of the Godhead in no way alters or surprises either 
Person.  Reciprocal knowing is who God is. 
It is this knowing that occurs in the incarnate relation of the two 
natures of Christ.  The Son, in uniting divinity and humanity in Jesus through 
the Spirit, permeates human nature with divinity.  This permeation of the 
human nature causes Jesus to know himself only as subsisting in the eternal 
relation that is Father, Spirit, Son.  ChristÕs human nature in turn permeates 
divinity by God the SonÕs entering into relation with human nature.132 And, 
just as Jesus hereby knows himself by divine permeation, so also does the Son 
know himself in relation to the subsisting human nature of Jesus.  This is a 
mutual communication, says John of Damascus, Òeach nature communicates 
its own properties to the other through the identity of their person and their 
mutual immanence.Ó133  It is the Òmutual immanenceÓ of the Son of God 
(divinity) and the Son of Man (humanity) that names the entrance of the 
human into the eternal knowing of either Persons of the Triune God with the 
                                                            
131 Ibid., i.7. See also Maximus, Chapters on Knowledge, II.20-25, from which it appears that 
John of Damascus draws. 
132 This language is following John of Damascus, Son of God as Divinity qua Divinity, Son of 
Man as Human Nature qua Human Nature. 
133 John of Damascus, Orthodox Faith, iii.4. 
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other two subsisting, eternal Persons. God graciously refuses to know himself 
apart from his being-known by the human nature of Christ.  That is, God 
refuses to know himself as Trinity apart from the incorporation of humanity 
into subsistent, eternal interpenetration, for though the divine action and 
permeation precedes human permeation of the divine, it permeates divinity 
nonetheless, and both without confusion. 
Christ, the union of the Word of God and human flesh, is the revelation 
of both the equality of the Divine Persons of the Trinity and the drawing of 
humanity into erotic knowing.  John of Damascus tirelessly makes this point 
throughout his De Fide Orthodoxa.  He examines the union and distinction of 
the two natures within the one person, Jesus.  The flesh of Christ is permeated 
by divinity, which enables his human nature to enter into reciprocation with 
the divineÑto permeate divinity as well. 
Because of the hypostatic union the flesh is said to have been 
deified, to have become God and of the same divinity with the 
word; at the same time God the Word is said to have been made 
flesh, to have become man, to be declared a creature and called 
last. This is not because the two natures were transformed into 
one compound natureÑit is impossible for contradictory 
natural qualities to exist together in one natureÑbut because 
they were hypostatically united and indwell mutually one in the 
other without confusion or transformation. The mutual 
indwelling, however, did not come from the flesh, but from the 
divinity, because it is inconceivable that the flesh should 
indwell the divinityÑrather, at once the divine nature indwelt 
the flesh, it gave the flesh this same ineffable mutual 
indwelling, which, indeed, we call union.134 
However, humanity, unlike the subsisting persons of the Trinity, though 
marked by divinity with the imago Dei (internal), nevertheless receives this 
permeating capacity from the Creator (external); the permeability of the 
                                                            
134 John of Damascus, Orthodox Faith, 4.18. 
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created is not generative but derivative.135  Human nature must receive the 
deifying grace of the Holy Spirit, that which substantiates the union of the 
unconfused natures of Christ.  It is hereby that God can be both eternally 
impassible and yet procure salvation through a passible body.136  This mutual 
permeation does not, however, elicit change in the Godhead.  The begetting of 
the Son does not come as a surprise to the Father; rather, the erotic knowing as 
known by the second hypostasis is an eternal event in God.  Permeation as 
well is not to be understood as a new occurrence but rather names the very 
state of creation in its continually being-created.  Human nature is gathered 
into triune reciprocity through the cross on that eternal day of creation.  
Humankind is by nature, then, a participant in erotic knowing, which is the 
created in the image of God.  The human is designed for the mutual 
permeation essential to its nature, the realization of this endowment of grace 
as created in the image of God, however, occurs through a willed becoming in 
likeness by the non-compulsory participation in compulsory grace.   
Humanity comes to understand this, says John of Damascus, through 
ChristÕs full embrace of human nature.  Though the sayings and actions of 
Jesus seem to confuse the shared life of the Son with the Father, one is made 
to understand that the seemingly contradictory words of Jesus, most notably 
the cry from the cross, are solely for the efficacy of human understanding.137  
They are not, as the Damascene makes clear, to be understood as revealing 
some kind of hidden knowledge the Father has to which the Son is not privy, 
nor as an accusation by the Son against the Father.  GodÕs forsaking of God on 
the cross reveals the eternal constituting of humanity in kenotic reciprocity.  
God empties himself to assimilate divinity to humanity, which establishes 
                                                            
135 John of Damascus, Orthodox Faith, 4.18. John continues to delicately walk this tightrope 
as to how God is penetrated by creation, making the clear point that it is God who initiates 
contact. Because it is God who initiates the relation it is God who permeates God from 
creation, which enables creation to enjoy the inter-communal permeation of the divine life 
through volitive participation, but such participation is always secondary to the inter-action of 
GodÕs own self-relating that creation is assimilated to by Christ. ÒThe mutual indwelling,Ó he 
says, Òdid not come from the flesh, but from the divinityÉÓ for when Òthe divine nature 
indwelt the flesh, it gave the flesh this same ineffable mutual indwelling, which, indeed, we 
call union.Ó 
136 Ibid. 
137 Ibid. 
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humanity in divinity.  This is the wisdom of Athanasius: ÒGod became what 
we were so we might become what he is.Ó 
This knowledge, or more appropriately way of knowing, is not to be 
reduced to a perspectival understanding whereby liturgy is a didactic, habit 
forming ritual that grants the human a new way of seeing the tree in the forest.  
Rather, it is an ontological, transelementing of human nature that opens the 
knower to an engagement with all things in the same manner that God in 
Christ has opened himself to the vulnerability of divine-human permeation.138 
It is knowledge by contact, by participation in the being-known of God.  As 
God in Christ refuses to know himself as Trinity apart from the SonÕs 
assimilation to human nature, likewise through liturgy is the human made to 
reject any form of existence that relieves her from the mutual binding of the 
whole of humanity in Christ.  It is true that even the tree will look different 
according to this way of knowing, as every tree becomes for the Christian that 
which points beyond itself to the true tree that was once stained by the blood 
of God.  The cross grants to the tree its transformed nature as something that 
extends human life, and inasmuch as it does extend human life it is a type.  To 
the extent that a tree is not used to extend life for humanity, it ceases to abide 
analogously.  Any element of creation that is used against its 
transelementation in ChristÑused not to extend the life of humanityÑis 
sin.139  This way of knowing is the humanÕs participation in becoming what 
God is, made possible, as Athanasius taught, by virtue of GodÕs becoming 
what the human is. 
In Christ, the Spirit fuses together humanity and divinity in subsistent, 
eternal, reciprocity of permeating knowledge, whereby either is known only in 
its being-known in the Spirit by the other subsisting Person.  The entrance of 
human nature into subsistent relation does not, however, establish a kind of 
                                                            
138 Cyril of Alexandria, ÒCommentary on John,Ó 96b-97b, in Norman Russell, trans., Cyril of 
Alexandria (London: Routledge, 2000). 
139 I will not get into theodicy here and describe what this might mean for tsunamis, 
earthquakes, or other natural disasters; it is only to say that all of creation has been 
transformed by the cross of Christ, which exacts a particular form of human engagement with 
the whole of creation.  A base example of this would be to say that any arrow made from the 
wood of a tree, if it is used to pierce the body of a man it does not participate in the way of 
knowing into which Christ has incorporated the world.  If a tree is cut down to provide wood 
for the fire upon which meat will be cooked and prepared for a family, the tree is participating 
in its truth (though the vegan might disagree). 
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demigod or fourth hypostasis of the Trinity.  Human nature enters into 
subsistence with the Second Hypostasis of the TrinityÑassimilation.  
Following, as either Person of the triune God subsists in the other, and as the 
action of one is ascribed to all,140 humanity subsists in the Father and Spirit, 
assimilated, as it is, to the Son.  The Father, then, does not simply know 
himself as Father of the eternal Son with whom he subsists, but knows himself 
as Father in relation to the assimilated natures of Christ, both human and 
divine.  Through the eternal Son, the Father is united with humanity, and 
likewise the Spirit,141 as the subsisting Persons remain one divinity, 
assimilated without confusion to human nature. 
This ontological identity of humanity as expressed by the fathers of the 
church is made available in and sustained by the liturgical action.  Liturgy 
creates and sustains humanityÑthe human as participant in the being-known 
of God through the Liturgy-Christ.  Its particular form breeds a particular 
people.  Liturgy is theology, and theology is liturgy.  That is, lex orandi, lex 
credendi, est lex credendi, lex orandi.142 However, this claim is only to be 
understood in the specific sense that the liturgical action is that which 
constitutes theologyÐÐthe conditions for doing theology, as it were. Likewise, 
credo or theological articulation are irreducible to mere words apart from their 
liturgical constitutionÐÐtheological articulation as always arising out of the 
body schema of the Church. 
To believe is to know through action.  Action precedes thought.  
Action makes thought possible.  As Aquinas says regarding faith and action, 
Just as man accents to first principles, by the natural light of his 
intellect, so does a virtuous man, by the habit of virtue, judge 
aright of things concerning that virtue.143 
As created, humankind is endowed with a natural light, an innate ability to 
think and reflect on that which crosses oneÕs path.  Nevertheless, to judge 
                                                            
140 Cyril of Alexandria, Commentary on John, 97c-e. 
141 Ibid., 96d-e. 
142 This will be explored further in chapter three regarding liturgy as theology and theology as 
liturgy.  In each instance, whether it is the rule of prayer and faith or liturgical action and 
theological articulation, each are capable of being differentiated but must always be 
understood as inseparable parts of a whole way of being and becoming. 
143 Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, II-II.2.4. 
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aright is to participate in that which is judged.  With regard to knowing the 
truth of faith, this is acquired only through a supernatural participation in 
Divine goodness.144  Within the liturgical economy knowing does not occur 
abstractly.  Knowledge is not ethereal but occurs through material engagement 
with the God who transubstantiates himself in bread and wine and 
transelements human nature through assimilating human nature to himself.145 
This is the knowledge Paul refers to that occurs through participation in the 
sufferings of Christ and being made like him in his death (Philippians 3).  
Character and cognition go hand in hand. 
 This is most explicit in the Letter to the Hebrews, where the writer 
states clearly that it is the disciplined child of God, the one who pursues peace 
with everyone, the one who lives the life of holiness, she is the one who Òwill 
see the Lord.Ó146  To see God is to see the Lord made manifest in the actions 
of holy disciplines.  It is a knowledge that inebriates the senses with the 
passion of Christ, participation in which brings the human to know her true 
self as ChristÕs christ.147 
 
Conclusion 
Liturgy is the epistemological crisis for the human, the true ontological 
manifesting of her actuality in the being-known of GodÑtriune, reciprocal 
penetration.  In ChristÑthe LiturgyÑknowledge and Being co-inhere.  Christ 
is Liturgy par excellence, by whom, with whom, and in whom all human 
action is intelligible. 
All the thoughts, words, and deeds of humanity are made plain in the 
hypostatic union of Christ.148  This is true whether the words spoken are in 
common conversations among friends in a cafe or in a prayer of thanksgiving 
offered in church. All speaking is verbal activity that expresses oneÕs 
understanding of God and how they understand God to relate to the world.  
                                                            
144 Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, II-II.2.4. 
145 Cyril of Alexandria, Commentary on John, 96b-97b. 
146 Hebrews 12.14. 
147 Casel, The Mystery of Christian Worship, 14. 
148 Meyendorff, Christ in Eastern Christian Thought, 116-131. This Òmaking plainÓ is to 
suggest that Christ, the subsistent speaking of God, is the interpretive form by which all 
speech-acts and ideas are to be understood. 
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One might argue that some conversations bear no meaning, as the words may 
have nothing to do with anything godly or of consequence.  However, even if 
a conversation shared between two persons has no particular end, the speaking 
and the words spoken are intimately bound up with the other, and it is the use 
of the wordsÑthe manner of speakingÑand the nature of the relationship 
between the two persons involved that bear the weight of each wordÕs 
meaning.149 That is, words are never mere words.150  Language is use; Christ, 
here, the Word of God, is the paradigm for all speech, and, therefore, the 
paradigm for all human action, especially as it pertains to the liturgical action 
that gathers all human action into hypostatic union with the Son as an offering 
to the Father.  Such speaking-made-known-by-action, here, construes all 
thought in accordance with their co-inherence.  The convergence of word and 
deed in Christ, then, makes known to all creation what God thinks of creation.  
That is, the hypostatic union Christ is makes known the purpose and will of 
God for creation.  Christ reveals what God knows in the how of GodÕs 
knowing.  The what is in the how. 
Human self-knowledge, then, is located neither in a personÕs activity 
nor in her linguistic articulation; rather, human identity is located in the 
hypostatic speaking God is in Christ.  Nevertheless, human action is not 
inconsequential, but bears consequence solely because of the hypostatic union 
with the hypostasis of the eternal Son.  While being is not acquired or 
                                                            
149 There is a telos inscribed upon the human; this telos is environmental, social, economic, 
etc., which conditions each personÕs speechÑa speaking that is, as it were, already spoken by 
conditioned habits engaged in and imposed upon the human. This will become clearer later 
with Merleau-Ponty. It is, however, to show that what Merleau-Ponty refers to as 
Òintersubjective beingÓ is precisely the inability of the human to privilege her perception over 
another, but must admit that meaning is always conditioned and intersubjective, rendering 
speech implicitly an articulation of being, the being what enacts and is enacted by, verbalized 
as a painter paints a paintingÑalways bearing more on the canvas than she is capable of 
realizing in the moment of the act, for she bears her world upon the work of art. See Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty, The Primacy of Perception, ed. James M. Edie (Chicago: Northwestern, 
1964), 18-21. 
150 See Alasdair C. MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (Notre Dame: University 
of Notre Dame Press, 1988), 390. ÒPhilosophical theories give organized expression to 
concepts and theories already embodied in forms of practice and types of community.Ó Words 
are tangible. It is the audible articulation of that which is already inaudibly articulated by the 
(social) body. 
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actualized in human activity151 it remains true that it is in action that the 
human receives knowledge of her being as a logos of the Logos.152 
God and man are paradigms one of anotherÉ as much as God 
is humanized to man through love for mankind, so much is man 
able to be deified to God through love, and that as much as man 
is caught up by God to what is known in his mind, so much 
does man manifest God, who is invisible by nature, through the 
virtues.153 
Christ, in whom act and being are indivisible, is the humanÕs eternal 
actualization.  Liturgy, hereby, is not an event wherein human actuality is 
momentarily made present, such that by the Eucharistic exchange a person is 
who she is and post-digestion falls once again to sub-human levels.  Rather, 
because of the eternal event Christ is, the humanÕs being is already 
completeÑfully actualized in Christ, and her participation in liturgical 
reciprocity with the Son is a becoming who she already isÑwho she is in 
Christ.  She is ontologically complete, though epistemologically limited by her 
bodily construed reality.  As Maximus affirms, it is the life of virtue that 
manifests this knowledge to the practitioner.  For what is known of God to the 
human mind comes through virtuous actionsÐliturgy. 
                                                            
151 Rowan Williams, The Wound of Knowledge. (Oregon: Wipf and Stock, 1998), 25. 
152 Maximus, ÒDifficulty 10,Ó 1113A-D, in Andrew Louth, trans., Maximus the 
Confessor (New York: Routledge, 1996). 
153 Ibid. 
  
3 Being-in-the-Liturgy 
 
"What is a man, but his thoughts and loves?" 
Ð St. Augustine of Hippo 
ÒI am the space, where I am.Ó 
Ð Noel Arnaud 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I outlined what it means for the church to say that she 
believes in God the Father, God the Son, and God the Holy Spirit. 
Accordingly, I have taken seriously what it means for God to be GodÑself-
contingent, lacking nothing, actus purus, etc. What I have shown, and what is 
central to this thesis, is that GodÕs absolute self-contingency entails that God 
has no lack, not even of his own worship. The divine economy is, therefore, 
the eternal act of self-giving and mutual constituting of the three hypostases of 
the one ousia, Christ the self-communication of Eros by the hypostatic union 
of God the Son with human nature, and the hypostatic union as that which 
assimilates humanity to the divine economy of eternal reciprocal love. 
This unconfused union of God and humanity is implicit to creationÑ
the human as icon of the Icon. What it means to be humanÑimago DeiÑis 
first and foremost to be a participant in the self-giving of inter-Trinitarian 
love. Working through human knowing as proscribed by Gregory of Nyssa, I 
have shown that self-knowledge as divinely contingent occurs through a 
particular gazing upon God. This gaze is the active self-knowing of the human 
as inherently divine, an awareness that is acquired through a likeness of habit 
to the rigorous way of Christ, whereby the human knows as she is known-by 
God in the reciprocal movement of divine self-offering. That is, the human 
knows herself only in relation to GodÕs own self-knowing, having been 
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incorporated in the procession and return of God from and to himself by 
hypostatic union with the Son. Human nature is hereby received into and made 
one with the perichoretic dynamism of the Holy TrinityÑpermeated by God 
to permeate God as God. 
 The divine contingency of human nature also implies a certain sense of 
becoming. It is to suggest that the human is always becoming who she already 
is, eternally recapitulated in Christ. Expressing the truth of the humanÕs eternal 
actualization in her hypostatic assimilation to God the Son has been the 
painstaking work of the early church. As we have seen, it is a complex 
articulation of human epistemology that co-inheres ontologically with her 
eternal actualization in Christ. As I have argued, the liturgical action as a 
participation in ChristÕs singular prayer and sacrificeÑhis Liturgy for the life 
of the worldÑis that which instigates and conceives within the human subject 
a self-knowledge that is implicit to her proximate relation to Christ. It is a 
knowledge by contact, involving an epistemological crisis whereby the human 
manifests to herself who she is by eliciting her true nature through liturgical 
activity that at once exceeds and completes her nature. 
This tension of inherent being and excessive being is implicit to the 
liturgies of the early and medieval church. When the earliest Christians 
gathered together for worship, they did not understand themselves to be 
merely handing down a set of practices and customs to be made normative for 
generations to come; rather, they knew themselves to be making available the 
same fullness of life that God in Christ makes available in his incarnation, 
crucifixion and resurrection.  As such, liturgy makes-manifest the creator God 
who gathers the human into eternal, triune reciprocity.  However, as the 
essence of the human and God are not the same, and as God absolutely 
transcends creation, the reciprocal relation of the human with God is not an 
absolute reciprocity as it is in the Triune Community.1  Liturgy, rather, is a 
participation in the particular form of knowing that is the perichoretic life of 
the Trinity, whereby the participant comes to manifest her identity to herself in 
a kind of gnostic epiphany.2  The knowledge that is made available is bound 
                                                            
1 Meyendorff, Christ in Eastern Christian Thought, 99-131. 
2 Gnostic in the specific sense that Irenaeus speaks of as Gnostic.  That is, as a full sensory 
relation where God moves one beyond a mere bodily or spiritual experience so to encapsulate 
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up together with Eucharistic reciprocity, such that knowledge is only true 
when it is knowledge as communion with God.  This manifesting is that of the 
speaking God, whose Word is heard, smelled, seen, touched, and tasted in the 
churchÕs liturgical action.  The knowledge available in, by and through the 
churchÕs liturgy, therefore, is entrenched in the most tangible way of human 
knowing: the body.  Bodily participation in prayer, procession, and the 
ingesting of Christ reveals the formative knowing of worship as direct 
encounter with GodÐÐthe communicatio idiomatum.  This, however, is not to 
be understood as a ÒmediatingÓ event of a divine substance to the human for 
her consumption.  This would reduce the engagement to an exchange of 
goods.  Rather, as Alexander Schmemann points out, this form of mediating 
the divine blessing is that which defines the Temple offerings of the ancient 
Hebrews not the liturgy of the early Christians.3  The inaccessibility of the 
Holy of Holies restricts divinity to a momentary encounter with the human, 
such that the oblation ritual serves as a kind of event within an event, one that 
never quite materializes. God does not communicate with the human towards 
her transformation; rather, God through mediating priests communicates to the 
human her judgment, in the manner of a judge upon his transcendent throne 
passes sentence.  In exchange for human sin God hereby grants pardon.  
Temple mediation is a radical objectification of God by the human subject and 
the same of the human by God as subject.  Each perform a unilateral 
exchange, remaining untouched by the other, such that neither human nor God 
experience their objectivity, only eachÕs radical subjectivity and the other 
objectified. 
In the previous chapter, we discussed the early churchÕs liturgical 
sensibilities as a participatory movement with the life of worship inherent to 
                                                                                                                                                           
the whole of a person beyond oneÕs ÒnaturalÓ state.  For further reading on this, see Williams, 
The Wound of Knowledge, 22-46.  We will later see how Maximus presses this in his 
Mystagogy, describing the Church as the image of God by virtue of its shared activity by 
Òimitation and in figure.Ó 
3 Alexander Schmemann, Introduction to Liturgical Theology (New York: St. Vladimir's 
Seminary Press, 1966), 99-103. Schmemann does not argue that the Temple sacrifices are a 
way of conjuring God; rather, what Schmemann suggests is that the Temple mediation of the 
Old Covenant is such that God and the Hebrew remains disconnected. They do not exist in a 
porous relation, as it were, but are in a sense buffered by the animal sacrifice. In other words, 
the Temple mediation mediates something other than God to the human or the human to God; 
whereas Christian Eucharist is both the self-offering of God for the human and the self-
offering of the human as a participation in GodÕs own self-offering. 
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the Trinity.  The perichoretic economy is that which emanates from liturgical 
praxis, which makes way for a theological reasoning that is intensely 
descriptive, in the specific sense of articulating the what embedded in the how 
of liturgy.4  That is, there is an inherent logic to the liturgy that calls out for 
words.5  One must be careful to qualify what SchmemannÕs means by 
theology as Òdescriptive,Ó as it cannot be so neatly separated as a category for 
investigation.  Schmemann presses for a Òwholeness,Ó which he claims to have 
been broken by centuries of ÒWestern captivity.Ó6  It would be wrong to argue 
in Schmemann for a kind of liturgical primacy.  He (over)emphasizes the act 
of liturgy to compensate for what he would call a Western, theological 
scrutiny that separates the two. 
To affirm that liturgy is the source par excellence of theology 
does not mean, as some seem to think, a reduction of theology 
to liturgy, its transformation into Òliturgical theology.Ó  The 
latter appeared only as result of the unhealthy mutual alienation 
between theology and liturgy, and is therefore an illegitimate 
child of an illegitimate situation.  All theology, indeed, ought to 
be Òliturgical,Ó yet not in the sense of having liturgy as its 
unique ÒobjectÓ of study, but in that of having as its ultimate 
term of reference in the faith of the Church, as manifested and 
communicated in the liturgyÉ.7 
Theology must, then, find its way back to its initial wholeness and disabuse 
both liturgist and theologian that they can be either one or the other.  Liturgy 
is always the speaking of a theology and theology is always spoken out of 
oneÕs liturgical constitution or conditioning.  Liturgy and theology hereby co-
inhere; they exist together or not at all, without the conflation of one into the 
other. 
                                                            
4 It is here that Alexander Schmemann is helpful.  Faith, says Schmemann, is an experience: 
Ò...the total and living experience of the Church, that constitutes the source and the context of 
theology in the East, of that theology at least which characterized the patristic age.  It is 
ÔdescriptionÕ more than ÔdefinitionÕ for it is, above all, a search for words and concepts 
adequate to and expressive of the living experience of the churchÐÐfor reality and not 
ÔpropositionsÕ,Ó Alexander Schmemann, Church, World, Mission: Reflections on Orthodoxy 
in the West (Crestwood: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1979), 133-134. 
5 Pierre Bourdieu, The Logic of Practice (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990), 52-97. 
6 Schmemann, Church, World, Mission, 140. 
7 Ibid. 
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As shown in chapter one, the person, her actions, and her office are 
each inseparable differentiationsÐÐthe speaking of the body a movement; the 
movement of the body a speaking.  In the West where speaking is largely 
reduced to rational words open to scientific dissection, grammatically 
extracted from their use and those who use it, as though words float in the 
heavens above, passing in and out of the human mouth, returning upon 
utterance to the realm of ideas for the sake of conjugation, it is increasingly 
difficult to mean anything.  Meaning as use, however, refuses any division 
between speaker, speaking, and that which is spoken.  Here is seen the 
easiness of separating the act from the word when the actor-speaker is 
likewise separable, as though there is an action or speaking apart from its 
entrenchment in the body.  A precedence of prayer over belief or belief over 
prayer is only possible when consideration is denied the one in, by, and 
through whom prayer and belief function.  It will be argued herein that this is 
largely due to the uprising of what John Walton refers to as a Òsubstance-
orientedÓ ontology versus the Òfunction-orientedÓ ontology of the ancient 
world.8  Augustine likewise sees this in the sacrament of baptism. 
Take away the word, and what is water except mere water.  
Word comes to the water, and the mysterium is there, itself like 
a word to be seen.  Where does water have so great a power 
that when it touches the body, it should wash the heart?  All 
that from the mere word.9 
As soon as you parse linguistically the differentiated parts of a whole, 
especially as it regards the human subject and her actions, words become mere 
words, objects mere objects, and people mere tools without a telos.  Each 
becomes Òsubstance-orientedÓ and cease to be named by its functional 
purpose.  Each is something in itself not as it relates to or for.  A person, thing, 
or actionÕs telos here is always and only itself; it does not move to a telos 
beyond itself nor is its telos in its movement or function but static.  We will 
see how even the language of ÒtransubstantiationÓ can be something of a 
misnomer, as the manifesting of Christ in bread and wine is reduced to 
                                                            
8 Walton, Ancient Near Eastern Thought and the Old Testament, 179-199. 
9 Augustine, Tractatus in Joann, 80, 3 cf 15, 4, cited in Casel, 42. 
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substance-accident claims, over against the incarnate action of making 
Eucharist.  Sacramental theology hereby transgresses to objectify sign and 
signified over against the constituting act of making the body of Christ in, and 
that is, the body, both individually and sociallyÑsubstance rather than a 
function.10  One can only speak of a ÒsignÓ and a ÒsignifiedÓ with concern for 
their relatedness when the activity and its binding actors are left out of the 
equation.   
The following is an attempt to interrogate the logic of liturgies 
(broadly speaking)11 throughout history to show the nature of inter-human 
relationships articulated by or implicit in the movements between the human 
and God.  This will set the backdrop for chapter five of this work that will 
expose how various liturgical reforms have likewise construed the human 
imaginary, with intent to problematize the embedded logic of secularism in 
various liturgical reforms, denying liturgy as perichoretic reciprocity.  A 
phenomenological critique will help to expose the bounded nature of meaning-
making that resides in the body, showing liturgy to be inherently active, co-
inhering with speech.  Liturgical action hereby names the conditions of 
possibility for human understanding, or even more boldly: liturgical action 
construes human knowing and is that which it makes known.  What is made-
manifest is the how of its manifesting. 
 
I 
All action is a meaning-making speaking, whereby a particular form of 
knowing manifests the identity of the actor and all things in-the-between of all 
parties involved in the relation.  This in-the-between names the active relating 
that is the relation between persons, places, and things, which refuses both a 
chasm between and conflation of the subject and object.  Two persons are 
hereby bound together by the movement between them, which simultaneously 
                                                            
10 Catherine Pickstock, After Writing: On the Liturgical Consummation of 
Philosophy (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1998), 159. 
11 While ÒliturgyÓ throughout this work takes for granted a participatory nature in the singular 
Liturgy Christ is, be this a positive or negative participation, it will be important to name the 
various liturgies beyond ÒChristian worshipÓ that condition the human imaginary and to show 
how a functional ontology is articulable because of the pervasive singularity of the Liturgy 
Christ. 
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differentiates and fuses each together.  The ÒsubstanceÓ here is a movementÑ
a function.  As we will see with Merleau-Ponty reminds, ÒI cannot understand 
the function of the living body except by enacting it myself, and except in so 
far as I am a body which rises toward the world.Ó12  While Merleau-Ponty 
primarily addresses the individual subject here, it is important to note the 
emphasis on the human as a body inseparable from her function and the 
particular relation to the world this functioning reveals.  The human is a body 
whose functional posturing manifests to the human what it means to be 
human.  In other words, the human subject knows who she is in the manner of 
her relating to that which she is not, having the double effect of revealing who 
she is.  Namely one who relates to the world through a particular bodily 
comportment. 
It may be said that the body is the Òhidden form of being 
ourself,Ó or on the other hand, that personal existence is the 
taking up and manifestation of a being in a given situation.13 
The primary emphasis here for Merleau-Ponty is that what is manifest is 
inseparable from its manifesting.14  The human is her action.  Additionally, 
inherent to her action is a conscious telos intended in the act, be it known or 
unknown to the actor.15 
 Shortly following the publication of the Phenomenology of Perception, 
Merleau-Ponty addressed the Socit franaise de philosophie in an attempt to 
re-present the central thesis of the work.16 ÒI am only trying to show,Ó says 
Merleau-Ponty, Òthe organic tie, so to speak, between perception and 
intellectionÉ.Ó17 What Merleau-Ponty shows is that all acquisitions of 
knowledge involve some application of the body, a body that is never to be 
understood as an Òadd-onÓ to intellection; rather, Òat the moment I am thinking 
                                                            
12 Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. Phenomenology of Perception (New York: Routledge Classics, 
2010), 87. 
13 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, 192. 
14 Ibid., Òthe thing expressed does not exist apart from the expression.Ó 
15 Ibid.  A body-conscious exists, for Merleau-Ponty, even in the absence of cognitive 
awareness. 
16 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Primacy of Perception, ed. James M. Edie (Chicago: 
Northwestern, 1964). 
17 Ibid., 20. 
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or considering an idea, I am not divided into the instants of my life.Ó18 This is 
to say that there is no division to be made between perception and intellection, 
they are differentiated parts of a whole person that are mutually contingent, 
what we might call interdependent consciousnesses.19 Extending the argument 
he makes in Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty clarifies his 
argument that the perceiving subject, other perceiving subjects, and the objects 
of perception, are part of an intersubjective world that refuses the privileging 
of one subjectivity over another, all the while admitting that each subject is a 
bodyÑa system of all holds on the world.20 Accordingly, rather than 
objectivity being the result of agreed upon ideals that are attached to the world 
(i.e. Kantian pure reason), objectivity happens when two persons enter the 
perceptive gaze of the other and come to know through their intersubjectivity, 
whereby neither are at the luxury of their own perception of the truth but must 
grapple with the habits and conditions that constitute both the truth of their 
perception and the perception of truth. This involves a deep awareness of 
knowledge as intimately bound up together with how knowledge is gained. 
We must sayÉ that our ideas, however limited they may be 
at any given momentÑsince they always express our 
contact with being and with cultureÑare capable of being 
true provided we keep them open to the field of nature and 
culture which they must express.21 
This intervolvement22 with nature and culture is a porous relation, very similar 
to that described by Charles Taylor in A Secular Age.23 All knowing is hereby 
contingent, which is to say that mapped onto the body is a schema that 
opposes deliberation and is moved by that which it is disciplined, most often 
unbeknownst to the active subject.  ÒTo be a body, is to be tied to a certain 
world,Ó24 a world that both precedes and proceeds-from the body.  The 
                                                            
18 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Primacy of Perception, 20 
19 Ibid., 17-20. 
20 Ibid., 18. 
21 Ibid., 21, italics mine. 
22 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, 168. 
23 Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 
2007), 25-89. 
24 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, 171. 
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particularity of the ÒworldÓ here is that which has impressed itself upon the 
subject and calls out to the subject for her return. 
Bodily experience forces us to acknowledge an imposition of 
meaning which is not the world of a universal constituting 
consciousness, a meaning which clings to certain contents.  My 
body is that meaningful core which behaves like a general 
function, and which nevertheless exists, and is susceptible to 
disease.  In it we learn to know that union of essence and 
existenceÉ.25 
The substance, in other words, of the human subject, is her function, which 
construes her own knowledge of her essence as human.  As Merleau-Ponty 
evidences, this bodily construal may very well discipline the body to perceive 
itself not as body but as a purely rational subject who transcends the body, i.e. 
secularism.  Nevertheless, one only arrives here as body, and as a body who is 
part of a world. 
 For Merleau-Ponty, the world Òis the totality of perceptible things and 
the thing of all things.Ó26 This totality is the whole of oneÕs environment, 
navigated by oneÕs own ÒstyleÓ of engaging in the world, which moves a 
person to understand what they mean when they say ÒrationalÓ or ÒrealÓ or any 
other word used to articulate the ÒtruthÓ of oneÕs world.27 In other words, my 
articulable world is embedded in the world, which I navigate by certain habits 
or stylesÑmovements by which I engage my environment and by which I am 
capable of thinking or understanding. 
 Phenomenology moves closer to a healthier and more ancient 
understanding of ontology as operation.  It is movement that relates bodies 
together, be they humans or Òthings.Ó  The manner of this movement 
determines the character of the relation, a mutuality of relating where 
everything exists in-the-between.  The human does not exist in-herself; the 
human exists in the movement between other humans which serve to create 
and re-create time and space.  This constituting and re-constituting of human 
                                                            
25 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, 170. 
26 Merleau-Ponty, Primacy of Perception, 16. 
27 Ibid., 16-17. 
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relating, both regarding the relations between persons and other animate and 
inanimate bodies in the worldÐÐthe in-the-betweenÐÐnames the indivisibility 
of action, actor, and acted upon or  with.  All movement is a relating, which is 
always a bodily relating. 
ÒWorship,Ó in the general sense of the word, is helpful here.  Worship 
is an ascribing of worth to that which is worshipped.  Such ascription is not 
necessarily to a god but is broadly a movement by the subject whereby a 
posture is taken that implicates the subject in the "being" of the one 
worshipped.  Think of royalty, of medieval kings and lords.  The customary 
posture of royal subjects is to bow before the king to show his worth, to give 
honor, i.e. to worship.  The act of worship in this regard is not a cerebral 
assent to a person or deity but a bodily posturing that confesses a personÕs 
identity as bound up with the one to whom the body is offered.28  In worship, 
the worshipper gives herself to one who is not herself, even if the external 
ÒoneÓ is a projection of her Òself,Ó for it remains a relocation of her identity in 
that which lies beyond (or seems to lie beyond) her own selfhood.  To 
worship, then, on a very base level, is to confess oneÕs selfhood as identified 
with the object of adoration. 
One can see this in the pledge of allegiance in the United States.  
Placing the hand over the heart as one confesses their national creed is no 
simple gesture; it is an act of worship.  Identifying oneself with the flag and 
the ÒRepublic for which it standsÓ is to align oneself, for better or worse, to 
the state.  There is great reluctance to call this an act of worship, primarily 
because the majority of Americans disregard the body as the locus of 
meaning-making and belief, incapable of seeing how their ÒthinkingÓ is 
entrenched in a body disciplined by civil religion.  This, however, is nothing 
new, and may not be overtly negative either, depending on the state of the 
Republic at any point in time.  The point to be made here is that the body is 
the home of the humanÕs allegiance, the locus of oneÕs identity. 
This treatment of the Pledge of Allegiance is helpful in exposing how 
the flag is treated as a "symbol" in the secular age.  The flag is a "symbol" in 
                                                            
28 This is most clear in medieval marriage rites, whereby the husband to his wife to be says, 
ÒWith my body I thee worship.Ó  This sense of worship entails more closely a sense of 
belonging and allegiance. 
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the most modern sense of the word, something that communicates an idea, 
simply a visual aid so that you have something to which to pledge your 
allegiance.29  Yet this is not how the flag works upon the body-mind.  Though 
the statesman articulate his pledge and flag as inconsequential and merely 
symbolic of his love for God and country, rather than bound up together with 
it, one need only burn this flag to see how his secular ideal breaks down.  
Though a person rationalize the flag their bodies refuse such a reduction.  That 
is, the flag-conditioned body refuses the mind abstraction.  The comportment 
of the body is the condition for the mind's rationale. 
To speak of Christ as Liturgy and the church as the locus of this 
LiturgyÐÐthe enacted body-Christ, makes for the natural transposition of 
"liturgy" to the church's ritual participation in Liturgy.  Christian liturgy is a 
participatory, bodily posturing of the ekklesia in the Liturgy-ChristÐÐa 
mimesis.  Christian worshipÑliturgy, then, is to be understood with the early 
church as the humanÕs entering into the way of knowing that God makes-
manifest through the church.  A bodily comportment that re-presents (and this 
is not representation) human nature and the nature of the church as itself a 
body, the body of Christ.  Human identity is revealed in liturgy.  The human is 
told who she is in her baptism and is continually made to re-member who she 
isÑone of the baptized, or faithfulÑin the Eucharist.  The Eucharist, the 
sacrament that makes all sacraments intelligible as it is God made-manifestÑ
Christ, and the humanÕs proximity to the Eucharist makes known to the human 
who she is.  The human subject is identified by her object of worshipÐÐGod, 
specifically known in her active participation in the movements of liturgy.  
Liturgy comports the human to bodily perceive all things in its christic 
relation.30 
This liturgical identification of subject identified by object exudes 
from the pages of scripture.  Abram, the subject, receives his new name 
Abraham and is reckoned as righteous by God, the object, who makes him to 
be the father of many nations.  Saul is made Paul and becomes the missionary 
                                                            
29 Alexander Schmemann, For the Life of the World: Sacraments and Orthodoxy (Crestwood: 
St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1973), 125. 
30 Maximus, ÒAd Thalassium 60,Ó in Paul M. Blowers and Robert Louis Wilken, trans., On 
the Cosmic Mystery of Jesus Christ: Selected Writings from St. Maximus the 
Confessor (Crestwood: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 2003). 
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to the Gentles.  Simon, now Peter, receives his identity as the churchÕs first 
bishop, despite his whimsical nature.  Consider even the gospel narratives of 
Jesus, the Son of Man (subject), is known in his being identified by God the 
Son (object), wherein the divine and human natures are united in an 
unconfused way such that the two natures mutually identify one another.31  
Hereby does the Triune God insist on knowing and being-known in eternal 
exchange of love with humanity.  The second hypostasis is this mutual 
identification who identifies divine ousia with humanity. 
Subject-Object identification is made even more explicit in the Old 
Testament accounts of worship as well.  Sukkot is the Jewish festival that 
marks the deliverance of the Israelites from the hands of Pharaoh by God.  
Prior to the TempleÕs destruction in 70 AD, it is celebrated with a pilgrimage 
to Jerusalem.  The pilgrimage entails a gathering of first fruits of the harvest to 
be an offering of thanks for GodÕs liberating the Israelites from the hands of 
Pharaoh.  The pilgrimage and taking temporary residence in booths, still 
practiced by many Jews today, is a commemoration of the Israelites time in 
the desert following the Exodus from Egypt.  The wilderness wanderingÑlife 
in the desertÑis a restorative purging for the ancient Hebrews, which, judging 
by the making of a golden calf while Moses is atop the mountain, needed to 
take place.  The Hebrews had been too long in PharaohÕs land that they had 
not only forgotten their liturgical identity but had also had begun to order their 
lives by the disciplines of PharaohÑthe false liturgy of the world.  The Law 
given to Moses hereby serves not as GodÕs giving of ethical principles or a 
codified morality, as is commonly misunderstood; it is the giving of a new 
order.  The Commandments serve as the new economy for GodÕs ChosenÑthe 
governance of the household of Israel. 
The Law becomes the identifier for the Israelite, thenceforth to be 
known as a people of Torah.  God gives the Law; the Israelites become a 
people of the Law, which describes the economic order for those who reside in 
the house of Israel and how Israel is to relate to those outside.  One could 
argue that the books of Torah are the first economic text books.  They declare 
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GodÕs sovereign administration (οικονοµη) over the earth and identify Israel 
as a people of the Sovereign. 
Feudalism in the Middle Ages is exemplary of this holistic 
identification.  The peasants, lords, vassals, all, in a real sense, worshipped the 
king.  He is not a deity, but it is he who informs their identity as a people of 
reciprocity in common-union with the crownÑhis kingship informs their 
participation in the kingdom.32  In this way was the king inseparable from the 
peasants.  The peasants worked the land of the king, who had given them the 
land.  The peasants supplied crops for the king and his court, which was their 
reasonable offering to the king for his protection and sharing of the land.  The 
king gives the land; the people give back to the king the fruits of the land in 
thanksgiving, both continuing in ceaseless reciprocity.33  The land is the 
kingÕs, which means that the peasants have nothing of their own to give.  
Their living within the bounds of the kingdom is a complete dispossession of 
anything they might call their own.  Yet the dispossession is mutual.  The 
king, in gathering the fruits of the land, obliges himself to sustaining and 
protecting the lives of the peasants as a landed people. 
It is easy for the modern reader to impose a logic of slavery here, but 
what must be acknowledge is that it is an imposition.  While there have been 
disasters for kings and queens throughout history, the monarch still found his 
or her crown to be derived from the people.  Just as a personÕs identity is given 
her by the crown in whose land she resides, likewise is the monarchÕs identity 
given by the people in the land, closely related to the nature of a bishop as 
seen previously with Ignatius and Cyprian.  Unlike a modern democracy 
where all are sovereign, which makes freedom at best improbable, with 
monarch and kingdom reciprocity is requisite.  Mutual identificationÑa 
                                                            
32 See Susan Reynolds, Kingdoms and Communities in Western Europe, 900-1300 (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1997), especially 42-66, 219-331; Ernst Hartwig Kantorowicz, The King's 
Two Bodies: A Study in Mediaeval Political Theology (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1957), especially 87-93; and Marc Bloch, Land and Work in Mediaeval Europe (Berkley: 
University of California Press, 1967). 
33 Mervyn James describes this reciprocal relation through the feast of Corpus Christi, 
whereby the celebration of ChristÕs mystical body modeled for the medieval community what 
it meant to be a social body. ÒIt suggested in the first place the intimacy and naturalness of the 
social bond, since it was presented as a kind of extension of the psychosomatic self.Ó Mervyn 
James, Society, Politics, and Culture: Studies in Early Modern England (Cambridge: 
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shared identityÑis possible only where the active lordship of Christ is 
paradigmatic, the non-compulsory compulsion of the cross. 
 Worship as identity is made explicit in the initiatory rites of the early 
churchÑthe catechumenate.  This process of incorporation into the church 
often took place over the course of several years, especially if the catechumen 
fell into some grievous sin along the way, extending her period of 
preparation.34  It is impossible to locate an official norm in each locale as to 
how the catechumen entered into the realm of the faithful.  Three years could 
be said to be typical, but even this is disputable.  Historically, however, there 
are three stages for the catechumen: seeker, hearer, kneeler.35  The initial stage 
as seeker is as it sounds, one seeking the faith of the church.  It involves a 
genuine period of discernment by the seeker, but also for the church and 
whether it is willing to grant the seeker access to the liturgy of the 
catechumens.  Once the seeker is admitted into liturgy the church obliges itself 
to the seekerÕs becoming one of the faithfulÑthe baptized.  The second stage 
as hearer, which is better understood as the beginning for the catechumen, is 
for those who are present during for the liturgy of the catechumen, now 
Liturgy of the Word, and were able to remain during the reading of the 
scripture and preaching of the sermon.  The hearers were escorted out of the 
church at The Peace before the beginning of the Communion Rite.  The 
kneelers were those who were permitted to remain in the church during the 
Eucharistic rite, to kneel and pray with the baptizedÑthe faithful, but could 
not receive Eucharist, though they were to receive a blessing from the 
bishop/priest.36  The early church catechumenate varied slightly from place to 
place; however, the essence of this preparation for baptism rests in its 
intentional incorporation of persons into the body of Christ. 
 The formative process for the catechumen was designed to make way 
for her active-learning of the holy mysteries.  There is a didactic element that 
goes along with the catechumenate, but the true learning is visceral and occurs 
                                                            
34 Charles Joseph Hefele, A History of the Councils of the Church: From the Original 
Documents, to the Close of the Council of Nicaea, A.D. 325 (New York: AMS Press, 1894), 
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35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid., 421. 
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when the catechumen has through baptism become one of the faithful, which 
is at once a final stage of the catechumenate and the beginning of the life of 
the baptized.  As found in Ambrose, knowledge of the mysteries (sacraments) 
is possible only after one has passed through the mysteries.  Teaching on the 
mysteries does not occur prior to the catechumenÕs participation in the 
liturgical rites.  Ambrose understands his teaching on the mystery to be 
receptive only because of the what the liturgical habituation in the mysteries 
have now opened the catechumen to comprehend. 
Now time warns us to speak of the mysteries and to set forth 
the very purpose of the sacraments.  If we had thought that this 
should have been taught those not yet initiated before baptism, 
we would be considered to have betrayed rather than to have 
portrayed the mysteriesÉ  So open your ears and enjoy the 
good odor of eternal life which has been breathed upon you by 
the grace of the sacraments.37 
Participation in the mysteries, says Ambrose, makes knowledge of the 
mysteries possible.  It is the responsorial nature of theology here that leads 
Schmemann and others to label theology as a descriptive endeavor, with just 
cause, as it is a particular way of remembering through articulation the grace 
at work in the world.38  The whole of the catechumenate, from its invitation 
and participation to its theological articulation, refuses to treat the wisdom or 
faith as objectified (abstract) knowledge.  There is, accordingly, no objective 
knowledge, whereby a cognitive subject can understand without participating 
in that which is knownÑwithout being assimilated to that which knows and 
makes-known.  There is only a mutual participation in knowledge, whereby 
the engagement between knower and known is a reciprocal relation.  Water, 
bread, and wine are not inconsequential to communion with and knowledge of 
                                                            
37 Ambrose, ÒDe Mysterii,Ó in Theological and Dogmatic Works, trans. Roy J. Deferrari, vol. 
44, The Fathers of the Church (Washington: Catholic University of American Press, 1963), 
i.2-3. 
38 It is important to maintain, however, the full force of theology as liturgy and liturgy as 
theology, to avoid the pitfall of dividing what can only be distinguished for the sake of further 
understanding the fullness of what it means for Christ to be Liturgy.  Distinct not separate; 
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liturgy ÒdescribesÓ theology.  Even here is the force of each lacking.  Liturgy as participation 
in the Liturgy-Christ refuses any kind of removal from the eternal act-being relation of God. 
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God and others.  Bathing, eating, and drinking, habituate the bodyÐÐposture 
the bodyÐÐto enter into the realm to which one is aiming.  It is here that the 
mind goes with the body and not vice versa.39  The mind can only go with the 
body.  Plainly, form is content and there is no content without form.  The body 
is the form of meaning, and while one can intellectually assent to alter its form 
it can only do so as body.  The liturgical body, thenÐÐthe church, means not 
by doctrinal or canonical articulation, for these are "principles" that recall 
meaning, but its movements; the movement of the ecclesial body is its 
meaning.  Meaning is in the making, and any "truth" revealed is only revealed 
in the act or re-membered in act. 
How this formative knowing works itself out in the early church is of 
crucial importance.  The move from contemplation to theologia or restÑrest 
being a state of equilibrium not a cease in movement, for this would nullify 
the Creator-creature distinctionÑis the ultimate goal of the human.40  
Contemplation is not a flight from the body; it is, rather, a bodily conditioning 
that orders human desire to attend bodily to him who transcends the body 
through bodyÑChrist. 
Next we will explore how Maximus Confessor divulges this bodily 
comportment, showing how it is only in the body that the human can realize 
her true nature as body-soul.  For Maximus, it is the formation of desire that 
opens the human to knowledge.  All things are hereby knowable only through 
virtuous habituation, which constitute human perceiving first as movement 
and then as contemplation, yet neither as separable one from the other.41 
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II 
With Maximus, the mind subsists in human action.42  Action forms character, 
which manifests to each person a particular way of perceiving43 who they are, 
which informs desire/will giving way to a particular understanding of "who I 
am."  It is here that movement is fundamental to human nature, whereby rest is 
not a cessation action but co-operation of movement according to oneÕs 
natural willÐÐhuman nature, which is life in God, communion with God, i.e. 
freedom. 
We find in Maximus a corrective of the Origenist paradigm for 
attaining this freedom, this rest.  Origen sets out three stages as to how this 
knowing occurs: ethike, physike, and enoptike.  It is this that Maximus seeks 
to salvage in his own adaptation; a formulation adhered to faithfully in the 
early monasteries.  For Maximus, the three stages of virtue, knowledge, and 
theology44 name an entering into Knowledge, wherein Knower and known 
become one in the act of knowing.45 
The Word of God is a door, because he leads on to knowledge 
those who have rightly accomplished the way of the virtues in a 
blameless course of asceticism, and show them, as a light, the 
brilliant treasures of wisdom.  For he is alike way and door and 
key and kingdom; a way as guide; a key as the one who opens 
and who is opened for those who are worthy of divine 
treasures; a door as the one who gives entry; a kingdom as the 
one who is inherited and who comes to be present in all 
through participation.46 
                                                            
42 Maximus, ÒAd Thalassium 17,Ó in Paul M. Blowers and Robert Louis Wilken, trans., On 
the Cosmic Mystery of Jesus Christ: Selected Writings from St. Maximus the 
Confessor (Crestwood: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 2003). 
43 It is important here to understand perception not as an ideological "reframing," but as 
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absolute Creator-creation distinction without division. 
46 Maximus, Chapters on Knowledge, II.69. 
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Virtuous activity and a right ordering of the material world dispose the human 
to knowledge.  This activity is not so much the efficient cause of human 
knowing; rather, it is the formal cause.  Because this knowing is a 
participatory knowing, knowledge is always there, as it were, waiting to be 
discovered.47  The human is predisposed by grace to knowledge, yet 
knowledge isÑespecially knowledge of God or oneself in GodÑ
Òunnecessary.Ó  That is, knowledge of God is not compulsory.  The bodily 
comportment through active participation in knowing opens the human to 
know herself not as an object of the love of God, but as God, drawn into 
divine erotic-knowing.  The discipline and obedience exercised Ôin us by the 
WordÕÑgraceÑillumines the human to know all things only in accordance 
with who God in Christ is.48  One hereby becomes God through participation, 
unclouded by the material, knowing the material only by divine illumination.49 
Whoever by his choices cultivates the good natural seed shows 
the end to be the same as the beginning and the beginning to be 
the same as the end.  Indeed the beginning and the end are one.  
As a result, he is in genuine harmony with God, since the goal 
of everything is given in its beginning and the end of 
everything is given in its ultimate goal.  As to the beginning, in 
addition to receiving being itself, one receives the natural good 
by participation: as to the end, one zealously traverses oneÕs 
                                                            
47 It is here that the Socratic midwifery is important. See Frederick Copleston, A History of 
Philosophy: Greece and Rome, vol. I (New Jersey: Paulist Press, 1946), 107. All that is 
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48 Maximus, Chapters on Knowledge, II.84. 
49 Ibid., II.84-90.  For Maximus, moving beyond Origen, the fullness of this process ends in 
complete knowledge of the Good, seeing everything with clarity and entering into a 
changeless state.  Full illumination is eschatological, rendering knowledge in the temporal 
realm incomplete, though proportionate to a personÕs progress in virtue.  Knowledge, then, is 
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course toward the beginning and source without deviation by 
means of oneÕs good will and choice.  And through this course 
one becomes God, being made God by God.  To the inherent 
goodness of the image is added the likeness acquired by the 
practice of virtue and the exercise of the will.50 
Maximus is expounding here on human identity as an acquisition of 
knowledge, as a coming Òto know as we are known.Ó51  And it is the voluntary 
movement of humans, Òeither in accord with the will and word of God or 
against the will and word of God,Ó that prepares or hinders each person to hear 
the divine voice and know.52 
So long as I am imperfect and insubordinate in not obeying 
God through the keeping of the commandments, and have not 
reached the interior perfection of knowledge, the Christ also 
must be considered imperfect and insubordinate as related to 
me and in me.  In this case I diminish him and cut him down 
and fail to grow up with him spiritually, since we are ChristÕs 
body, each one a member of it.  ÒThe sun rises and the sun goes 
down,Ó says Scripture.  Thus it is also with the Word who is 
sometimes regarded as up and sometimes as down obviously 
depending on the dignity and nature and character of those who 
practice virtue and who are moved toward divine knowledge.53 
It is by the practice of the virtues that the human gains familiarity with God,54 
for it is only when the body has been rightly disposed that the truth of human 
identity as divine is made knowable. Being rightly formed in character does 
not causally effect true knowledge in the human.  Character formation opens 
the human to knowledge of the truth, but is not determinative.  With Maximus, 
it is a virtuous or non-virtuous habitude and way of life that enables or 
compromises the humanÕs ability to know the truth of her human nature.  
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Volitive participation in being rightly formed and thereby choosing the good is 
essential. 
The economic ordering that disposes the human to faith for 
understanding, the fashioning of humans into the likeness of the particular 
image in which humankind is createdÑthe imago Dei, is liturgy.  Liturgy is 
the form of the church.  Likeness to the image is borne through willed, active 
participation in the making of Eucharist through a personÕs liturgy-role, be 
they bishop, priest, deacon, or layperson.  Through participation in liturgy the 
human becomes the action she enacts.  She enters into the eternal union of 
Thought, Word, and Deed.  The image that she is by nature is made known to 
her through her willed participation, liturgically, in the body of Christ.  
Following Irenaeus, Maximus makes an image-likeness distinction.  As 
created, the human is endowed with the image of her CreatorÑthe good, 
natural seed.55  To be like God, however, exacts a particular mode (tropos) of 
existence made possible only through willed participation.  Knowledge of the 
truth is hereby inseparable from oneÕs participation in truth56Ñcharacter and 
cognition co-inhere with one another.57  The essential nature of humanity is 
made present to the human through her unnecessary participation in grace, 
which is a becoming in likeness what she is by nature. 
Irenaeus speaks of this participation in terms of a Eucharistic knowing 
in his arguments against the immaterial Gnostics: ÒOur manner of thinking is 
conformed to the Eucharist, and the Eucharist confirms our manner of 
thinking.Ó58  Conformity to the Eucharist cannot be couched in modern terms.  
The Eucharist and the liturgical rite are inseparable for Irenaeus and the early 
church with him.59  To speak of the Eucharist is to speak of the whole 
economy the Eucharist is, for, as discussed above, the administrator and the 
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economy administrated are one in the sameÑpriest and victim are 
inseparable,60 which is to say, to borrow that great and oft repeated line from 
Henri De Lubac, Òthe Eucharist makes the church,Ó because in the making of 
Eucharist is the life of him in whom all persons live and move and have their 
being.  In many ways, we can see in this the problematic of any sort of 
Òsubstance-accidentÓ division.  It is not the tangible/intangible 
elements/essence involved in Eucharist; rather, it is the functional nature of 
the sacrament that relieves any division between the action, the giver, and the 
recipients involved.  The sacrament is not static or substance-oriented, but 
functionalÐÐthe creative act of God to be participated in by the human.  That 
is, the Eucharist is an incarnate movement from God to God, whereby the 
human is assimilated to the Son and returned to its creator by the Spirit.  This 
is the force behind MaximusÕ understanding of volition.  It is an alignment of 
desire or will, which does not imply oneÕs ability to ÒchooseÓ and act; rather, 
it the natural participation in the principle of oneÕs being hidden in Christ, 
such that participation is freely willing the will of God and freely doing what 
God has already done.  It is volitive participation in becoming who the human 
eschatologically is, eternally recapitulated in Christ. 
 The sacramental assimilation of God to creation and creation to God 
hereby moves beyond what might be called a Òsubstance-orientedÓ ontology to 
a Òfunction-orientedÓ ontology.61  The locus of human nature hereby ÒresidesÓ 
in movement, a movement that is absolutely participatory.  God in Christ 
moves toward and into creation, recapitulating human nature in himself, 
gathering the human into triune reciprocity.  The early Christian martyr stands 
as paradigmatic for how the human is gathered into the perichoresis.  As 
shown in the martyrology of Felicitas, who was with child when she was taken 
captive in 203 AD, during the reign of the Emperor Severus, it is the 
singularity of ChristÕs suffering that precedes and incorporates all Christian 
suffering.  Felicitas was eight months pregnant when she was imprisoned for 
being a catechumen.  At the time, due to the obvious anxiety of being pregnant 
and facing a public death in the coliseum among the beasts, Felicitas was in 
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much pain.  She was asked, given her struggle with birth pangs and being in 
prison, how she would be able to handle the torments of the wild beasts.  
Felicitas responded, saying: ÒI myself now suffer that which I suffer, but then 
another shall be in me who shall suffer for me, because I am to suffer for 
him.Ó 
In the days of the early church it was ChristÕs singularity as suffering 
servant, high priest, liturgist, martyr, and so on that makes all suffering, all 
liturgical action, all martyrdoms, and the priestly office itself intelligible.  All 
is participation.  It is this that Eusebius describes in his church history. 
To such an extent were they emulators and imitators of Christ, 
Òwho being in the form of God, thought it not robbery to be 
equal with God,Ó that, although they had attained such glory 
and not once or twice but many times had given testimony, and 
had been taken back from the beasts with burns and scars and 
wounds all over them, they neither proclaimed themselves as 
martyrs nor did they permit us to address them with the name, 
but if ever anyone of us by letter or by word addressed them as 
martyrs, they rebuked sharply. For they gladly conceded the 
name of martyrdom to Christ, the faithful and true witness and 
first-begotten of the dead and author of the life of God, and 
they recalled the martyrs who already passed on and said: 
ÒThey are already witnesses, whom Christ has deemed worthy 
to be taken up at their confession, having sealed their 
martyrdom by their departure, but we are lowly and humble 
confessors,Ó and with tears they besought the brethren, begging 
that earnest prayers be offered that they might be made 
perfect.62 
As Eusebius recounts, there is for the early church but One MartyrÑChrist.  
All suffering is a bearing of ChristÕs own sufferingÑa participation in his 
unequivocal martyrdom.  One might think that this evacuates meaning from 
human suffering or makes such suffering inconsequential; however, the SonÕs 
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becoming man is the singular event that makes all human encounters, be they 
joy or suffering, intelligible and meaningful.  Were this not true, the Gnostic 
would have a case.  Without the death and resurrection of the Christ, human 
suffering is inconsequential, which is PaulÕs point in his first letter to the 
Corinthians;63 human suffering in itself has no meaning except as one of many 
occurrences in the vicious cycle of violence.  For the martyrÕs suffering and 
death to have meaning, it must participate in the martyrdom of the Christ; it 
must be Christ who suffers in her, for her.  For the circumstances of human 
life to be intelligible at all it must be known only in the particular and peculiar 
relation of the Divine and Human natures in Christ. 
 The early Christian martyr, through bearing the passion of Christ in her 
body, becomes known as a vessel, if not the vessel, of the holy.  The 
transcendent God who is come in Jesus of Nazareth makes his home in the 
very bones of the saint as the body of the martyr becomes the dwelling place 
of the Lord.  Her body is the witness of the unseen eternal reality.  
Spiritualism in the early church is anything but abstract.  As fully embodying 
the passion and death of Christ, the martyr bridges the gap between past and 
future, in the present material state of her body.  We are reminded in all of this 
of PaulÕs own account of his march towards martyrdom, ÒFor me, to live is 
Christ and to die is gainÓ (Philippians 1:21).  Paul is not setting forth a new 
platitude to meditate upon, but is, rather, giving words to his active 
participation in the via crucis, made possible by the indwelling Christ.  It is 
only through participation in the way of the cross that one can know the truth 
of their being and what it means to bear witness to this reality.  To know the 
Lord of heaven is to know him through his sufferings, by becoming like him 
in his death (Philippians 3:10).  Yet the term martyr, as Eusebius reminds us, 
is reserved for Christ himself.  By reserving this term solely for Christ, the 
early saints deny martyrdom as a category of Christian action, confessing that 
the life, death and resurrection of the Christ are not mere historical events in 
time, as though linear reality makes God intelligible; rather, they are 
inseparable from the person, in whom the whole of past and future come 
together in the fullness of time as GodÕs self-declaration.  GodÕs entering into 
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creation is simultaneously a gathering of creation into himself, and while the 
essence of God lies beyond human cognition, the actions of God in Christ 
make known the truth of human nature. 
 Ignatius may be the best example of the early martyrÕs understanding 
of cruciform participation.  As aforesaid, Ignatius presses the Christian to 
understand all suffering only within the context of the suffering Christ 
himself.  In his letter to the Romans, Ignatius states that the death of Christ is 
Òthe suffering of my God,Ó64 and it is the reality of the LordÕs sufferingsÑthe 
reality of God crucified on the crossÑwherein human suffering participates in 
the ontological reality God is.  ÒTo be near the sword is to be near God; to be 
in the claws of wild beasts is to be in the hands of God.Ó65  IgnatiusÕ 
participation in the singular martyrdom of Christ, then, likewise manifests the 
grace that rests upon the churches.  As Christ is the offering to the Father for 
the life of the world, being the singular capable offerer, likewise does God 
make-manifest and mediate grace through Ignatius, who, by his analogous 
participation in the self-emptying of God in Christ, becomes a cross of 
redemptionÑa type of the Archetype.  Ignatius becomes what he  mediatesÐÐ
Christ.  It is his participation in the Liturgy-ChristÑthe saintÕs body as 
anamnesis (re-membering).  As the Virgin serves to be the gate of heaven, 
through which the Second Person of the Holy Trinity enters into human 
history, likewise is martyrdom a gate, through which the human enters into the 
future of GodÕs eternal presentÑparadise.  It is for this reason that martyrdom 
is understood to be a baptizing of the human.  Ignatius knows that the wild 
beasts are the waters by which the Spirit will devour him.  Baptized by the 
beast, the martyr becomes Eucharist, (re)memberedÐÐassimilatedÐÐto the One 
in whom she has been recapitulated.  Martyrdom is hereby a binding together 
of the bodily order and spiritual order, the two orders that are united in the 
Christ of God, for the life of the world.  By taking into her body the sufferings 
of Christ, the martyr, through the Spirit, is taken into the offering of the Son to 
the Father.  It is for this reason that these saints of the church serve as the 
paradigm for Christian living.  The actual death of the Christian because of her 
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witness is not necessary, even if highly probable during the earliest days of the 
church.  But it is clear for Paul, as with Ignatius who followed after, that 
knowledge comes by way of participation, not  primarily by way of study.  
Knowledge comes by being disposed to receive knowledge.66  To know is to 
be re-constituted by the Liturgy-Christ, so to become liturgy. 
 IgnatiusÕ Christology, however, is already becoming more and more 
refined by Paul in the middle of the first century.  His letter to the Colossians 
is a primary example of what is articulated in the martyrology of Felicitas and 
others, as well as IgnatiusÕ own description. 
It is now my joy to suffer for you; for the sake of ChristÕs body, 
the church, I am completing what still remains for Christ to 
suffer in my own personÉ.  Let every word and action, 
everything you do, be in the name of the Lord Jesus, and give 
thanks through him to God the Father.67 
Paul clearly expresses the agency of Christ operative in the Christian.  PaulÕs 
suffering is not his own; rather, it is Christ who suffers in him and it is Christ 
who alone bears the churchÕs thanksgiving to the Father. 
 Returning now to Maximus, we find that knowledge subsists in actionÐ
Ðthe mind subsists in habit.68  It is human action that determines oneÕs 
perceptive capacity, and inasmuch as these actions run analogous to ChristÕs 
they manifest the truth of human nature, which is matched with illumination 
by God according to the ability of the recipient.69  Such active knowing is a 
knowledge through experience, specifically regarding how these actions shape 
the human will.70  Activity produces, not knowledge itself, but the framework 
of understandingÐÐconditions of possibility, such that all things are knowable 
to a person through her participation in particular habits and practices.  Take 
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for instance the person who tastes wine for the first time.  Regardless the 
quality of the wine it will be difficult to enjoy.  The palate must form a habit 
of drinking wine to find it enjoyable.  Likewise, she who has only experienced 
drinking fine wines will struggle to enjoy a wine that has not been properly 
aged or crafted.  Drinking wine is a coming to know through experience.  The 
well-trained palate will be able to enjoy a wide-variety, and will come to know 
for herself the wine that is of greatest aroma and depth, which will be 
preferred and held as the standard for all others.  It is this that Maximus is 
setting forth with regard to the sun.  Once youÕve seen the sun and know it to 
be the sun, you will never mistake it for a mere star or moon.  The Good and 
the Beautiful cannot be mistaken.  Those who mistake evil and sin as the good 
and beautiful are those whose wills are not aligned with the divine will and 
unwillingly will, rather than willingly will.  The will bent toward sin is an 
unwilling willÐÐa will enslaved to the passions of the flesh, still attached71 to 
what is pleasurable.  The will that has been detached from the false pleasures 
of the flesh is the willing will, a will disciplined by the sacramental life of the 
body, holding the Good ever before the human through active participation. 
 The activities of a person form their particular character.  The human 
knows, then, who she is in relation to her active-character.72  To be the Òimage 
ofÓ is to stand in a particular relation.73  Human actions hereby make manifest 
personhood.  Through activity, then, the human is either enslaved to or freed 
from attachments acquired by misaligned passions and knows to be true that 
which is consistent with her freedom for or slavery to desire.  It is a construal 
of the imaginary, giving way to a particular form of relating to God, oneself, 
and all others.  Beyond this, however, virtuous action disposes the human to 
the Òthe full power of knowing the divine nature insofar as this is possible.Ó74  
Knowledge is hereby the kenotic life of God coming into being in the human.  
By virtuous habituation is Christ mysteriously born in the human, Òbecoming 
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incarnateÉÓ causing Òthe soul which begets him to be a virgin-mother.Ó75  
The humanÕs participation in the ascetic struggle is an entering into this 
kenotic knowing.76 
 Found here in Maximus is a clear assertion of the platonic principle 
that virtue is knowledge.77  ÒBy practicing the virtues the body gains 
familiarity with God and becomes a fellow servant with the soul.Ó78  It is in 
the soul that God dwells,79 and, following Aristotle, it is the soul that animates 
the body,80 virtuous activity removes the fictional divide between body and 
soul that sinful action, not a sinful nature, reifies.  Crucial to MaximusÕ 
understanding of human activity is the inherent goodness of human nature.81 
To the inherent goodness of the image is added the likeness 
acquired by the practice of virtue and exercise of the will.  The 
inclination to ascend to see oneÕs proper beginning was 
implanted in man by nature.82 
As seen earlier with Irenaeus and Gregory of Nyssa, Maximus presses the 
image-likeness distinction of human nature.  Human nature is naturally good, 
naturally endowed with the Òlogos of wisdom.Ó83  Indeed, says Maximus, the 
human is a Òportion of God.Ó84  This logos or image is the secret disposition of 
the soul that lay hidden without the forging through virtuous activity a 
Òtenacious habit of contemplation.Ó85  Likeness, then, is the virtuous ordering 
of human perception.86  Likeness equals virtue; image equals a kind of divine 
endowment, sustained by absolute generosity.  The human moves from grace 
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to virtue, from virtue to knowledge, from knowledge to contemplation, and 
from contemplation back to the grace operative in her at the outset.  Reason 
and the ascetic struggle are hereby inextricably linked, which provide the 
ÒbackgroundÓ for contemplation.87  The Word is operative in the soul.  
Nevertheless, divine action refuses coercion.  Volitive participation is essential 
for Maximus, whereby likeness to oneÕs image is attained. 
 This likeness acquired through embodied virtue, therefore, is in no way 
coercive nor is it accidental, Òfor the word of God and God wills always and in 
all things to accomplish the mystery of his embodiment.Ó88  Humans are 
created for incarnation.  The incarnation of the Son is a natural event of GodÕs 
eternal creative action, which the human receivesÐÐbecomesÐÐby 
participation.89 
When we learn the essential nature of living things, in what 
respect, how, and out of what they exist, we will not be driven 
by desire to know more.  For if we know God our knowledge 
of each and everything will be brought to perfection, and, 
insofar as humanly possible, the infinite, divine and ineffable 
dwelling place will be ours to enjoy.  For this is what our 
sainted teacher said in his philosophical aphorism: ÔFor we 
shall know as we are known,Õ when we mingle our god-formed 
mind and divine reason to what is properly its own and the 
image returns to the archetype for which it now longs.90 
This mingling of the god-formed mind and divine reason depends on the 
humanÕs volitive nature.  Created in the image of God the human is 
predisposed to virtueÐÐthe Good, as a logos of the Logos.  Yet this natural 
being has unnaturally fallen.91  Sinful nature for Maximus is inbred, not 
innate.92  There is no room for human depravity in MaximusÕ anthropology.93  
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The human is separated from herself by her actions, not by nature, which has 
divided body (likeness) and soul (image) that GodÕs becoming Man has 
restored, recapitulating all things in the eternal Logos.94  Body and soul are 
inseparable; image exacts likeness.95  The two are distinguishable only in 
thought but never in reality. 
 The importance of the virtues is that it is only Òby practicing the 
virtues [that] the body gains familiarity with God and becomes a fellow 
servant with the soul.Ó96  Additionally, without this bodily comportment, the 
disciplining of human sensibilities to the Good, contemplation cannot be 
attained.  True knowledge is only Òacquired through exertion.Ó97  Exertion 
here names the movement toward deification, the entering into the being-
known of God.  Knowledge for the human is always a manifest knowing.  
Only God knows.98  The only knowledge available to the human is a 
knowledge of participation, and this occurs either positively or negatively. 
Voluntary movement, either in accord with the will and word 
of God, or against the will and word of God, prepares each 
person to hear the divine voice.99 
This hearing, however, is a mingling of the divine voice imbedded in the soul.  
It is entering into GodÕs self-knowing, the mingling of the divine voice 
internal and external to the soul. 
God becomes to the soul (and through the soul to the body) 
what the soul is to the body, as God alone knows, so that the 
soul receives changelessness and the body immortality; hence 
the whole man, as the object of divine action, is divinized by 
being made God by the grace of God who became man.  He 
remains wholly man in soul and body by nature, and becomes 
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wholly God in body and soul by grace and by the unparalleled 
divine radiance of blessed glory appropriate to him.100 
The divine nature of humanity, then, is manifest to the extent that the soul 
moves the bodyÐÐto the extent that the body and soul are a single movement, 
for the soul is to the body as God is to the soul, the end of which is 
divinization.  The goal for Maximus is that the body would be so disciplined 
by virtue that deliberation would be absent from the soul.  It is a movement 
beyond Òreason and ideas,Ó in terms of an intellectual deliberation where 
thought precedes action.   
 There is but one true and authentic knowledge for Maximus, which is 
gained only by a particular perceiving of the known object.  Such knowledge 
is an engagement with the object, akin to a cohabitation with that which is 
known.  Maximus describes something like a phenomenology of perception 
akin to that of Merleau-Ponty.  For Merleau-Ponty, perceiving an object is to 
inhabit it, to plunge oneself into it.101  It is a ÒseeingÓ that is conditioned by 
oneÕs bodily habituation out of which one is assimilated to the object.  In his 
criticism of intellectualism, Merleau-Ponty states that its failure lies in a 
removal of the intellect from the ÒstuffÓ in which knowledge is realized, i.e. 
the body and the totality of its background, environment, etc.102  For Merleau-
Ponty, there is no thought that exists independent of the movements and 
circumstances whereby and wherein the subject makes her way in the world.  
Thinking is non-existent before and without the subjectÕs habituation and 
inhabiting of her particular environment.  What is known is known through the 
body-mindÕs engagement with the world, whose actions manifest to the 
subject what it means for her to be (human).  Maximus offers a strikingly 
similar critique in Ad Thalassium 60. 
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...there is that truly authentic knowledge, gained only by actual 
experience, apart from reason and ideas, which provides a total 
perception of the known object through a participation by 
graceÉ  this active, experiential knowledge which, by 
participation, furnishes the direct perception of the object 
known, can supplant the relative knowledge based on reason 
and ideas.103 
For Maximus, it is proximity to the known whereby that which knows and is 
known co-inhere though remain unconfused.  Such proximate knowledge 
supplants relative knowledge because it is a knowing that refuses a body-soul 
division, just as is seen with Merleau-PontyÕs rejection of a body-mind 
separation. 
 Merleau-PontyÕs and MaximusÕ projects are obviously not the same 
and do not address equivocal concerns.  Nevertheless, Merleau-PontyÕs 
insistence on the whole Òbody-schemaÓ involved in knowing is helpful to 
draw out the implications of MaximusÕ articulation as to how the human gains 
knowledge of God and all of reality.  Maximus is explicit in human knowing 
as conditioned by the body. 
All the intelligible thoughts that derive from his goodness we 
shall know as a body, and all the things made perceived 
through the sense as a garment.104 
This full perceiving Òas a bodyÓ is for Maximus a spiritual body; however, it is 
not a spiritual body in the abstract, even if only fully realized in the celestial 
realm.  Rather, through inhabiting the virtues this spiritual body is made 
present in this life.  It is, says MaximusÕ the fleshÕs participation in the flesh of 
Christ that is met with knowledge.105  There is a permeation without 
confusion, and through such participation one acquires Òthe entire fullness of 
grace.Ó106  The virtues hereby illumine the image within.  This illumination 
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occurs by the humanÕs giving herself over to the virtuous disposition, which 
the Logos meets with grace.  It is not 
by losing our own bodies and becoming his, nor because he 
passes into us in his person or is divided up in our members.  
Rather, it is because the corruption of sin is shaken off in a 
likeness to the LordÕs flesh.107 
Maximus here follows Gregory of Nyssa who states that, Òit is the function of 
our free will to have the power to take on the form of whatever it choses.Ó108  
Whether or not to share in the knowledge of GodÕs knowing Òdepends on the 
will of rational beings.Ó109  It is a spiritual knowing deeply entrenched in the 
flesh.  All knowing is a knowing in the flesh, either ordered by the flesh of 
God in Christ or according to an irrational love of the body.110 
 The saint is paradigmatic for this exemplary knowing, for the saint is 
she who has through the ascetic struggle become worthy of who she isÐÐa 
portion of God.  Through the ascetic struggle the saint makes manifest in her 
body Òthe virtuous disposition that is hidden in the depth of the soulÓ111ÐÐthe 
image of God.  The saint reveals the reciprocal life that God has established 
with his creation in her body, in her virtuous action that manifests God.  ÒFor a 
work is proof of a disposition.Ó112 
God and man are paradigms one of anotherÉ, and as much as 
man is caught up by God to what is known in his mind, so 
much does man manifest God, who is invisible by nature, 
through the virtues.113 
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For this reason, God makes himself manifest by grace proportionately to her 
who makes God manifest in the flesh.114  This proportionate revelation is 
MaximusÕ phenomenological departure, as it were, though there is no 
divisiveness between the ontological and phenomenological for him.  The 
experiential manifesting is always an ontological manifesting of a personÕs 
contingent relation to the Eternal. 
 Virtuous activity is always met by the presence of the Spirit, Òwho 
directly transfigures the body and soul altogether into something more 
divine.Ó115  Again, operative in the human subject is the Word, and it is this 
Word that is met by the presence of the Spirit to transform the human, having 
voluntarily entered into herself in God through virtuous habituation and 
contemplation, thereby receiving in a mystical possession the Holy Trinity.116  
This possessing is the humansÕ assimilation to the Word, thereby rendering the 
human subject one with the Son in his return to the Father.  As evidenced in 
the patristic articulation of the perichoresis, likewise is there with Maximus a 
clear sense of how the human participates in her assimilation and enters into 
the being-known of God. 
 Knowledge is not to be understood as a conceptual grappling of a 
subject with an object; rather, it is a sharing in who God is.117  This is directly 
related in AristotleÕs understanding of knowledge, in terms of being and 
becoming.  The human knows what it is to be just by doing just acts, by which 
she becomes just.118  To know the Good is to become good.  The human does 
not enter into the subject-object relation of modernity; rather, with Aristotle 
knowledge and action are fused together in such a way that the two co-inhere 
in the actor.  When the actor-knower, having been formed by the virtues, does 
the good act because it is good it is then that she can be said to be good.  It is 
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in this way that St. Paul clearly employs Aristotle in his articulation of doing 
good apart from love. 
If I speak in the tongues of mortals and of angels, but do not 
have love, I am a noisy gong or a clanging cymbal.  And if I 
have prophetic powers, and understand all mysteries and all 
knowledge, and if I have all faith, so as to remove mountains, 
but do not have love, I am nothing.  If I give away all my 
possessions, and if I hand over my body so that I may boast, 
but do not have love, I gain nothing.119 
As with Aristotle and in the ancient world, crucial to human action is the 
manner in which that action is carried out.120  It is this passage in PaulÕs letter 
to the Corinthians that Maximus picks up to stage knowing as an incarnate 
relation to that which is known.121  Knower and the manner of her engagement 
with that which is known and the person, place or thing that is known can only 
be separated intellectually.  There is no subject-object divide, nor is there a 
Hegelian conflation of the two.  Rather, the particular form of engagement that 
the subject engages her object establishes a particular relation between the 
two.  With regard to relationships between persons, explicitly for Maximus 
that relationship between God and the human, the movement is always 
reciprocal and conditioned reciprocally.  God has established in the soul the 
human capacity to engage God reciprocally, but God only moves upon the 
human according to her ability to receive.  This proportionality, as aforesaid, 
is that which is made possible by a voluntary conditioning of human 
perception by which one comes to possess this love.  For, says Maximus, 
Òdirect experience suspends rational knowledge of a thing and direct 
ÔperceptionÕ of it renders the Ôconceptual knowledgeÕ of it useless.Ó122  The 
acquisition of knowledge is hereby best understood as the deification of the 
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human, becoming in likeness through virtue what she is in truthÐÐthe image of 
God.123 
 AristotleÕs articulation as to how one acquires knowledge of the Good 
is important for following this line with Maximus.  ÒEach man,Ó says 
Aristotle, Òjudges correctly those matters with which he is acquainted.Ó124  The 
question then is how does one gain such an acquaintance?  Is it through 
Socratic discourse?  Is it an endowed feature of human existence, individual 
pursuit, independent study, a matter of phronesis?  By what means is this right 
judgment available to a person?  It is certainly the case that, like all animals, 
humans are capable of a certain level of intuition, especially that which is 
gained through experience, and that education can form the mind in the truth, 
but Aristotle ensures that it is not that simple.  An all around education is 
necessary for the attainment of knowledge.  Education and phronesis 
(practical wisdom) are lost, however, on those led by feeling, those carried 
away by passion.  Such persons will study to no purpose or advantage.125  Age 
is not a factor here; it is character that is essential to the acquisition of 
knowledge.  Educating persons who have not been formed by virtuous habits 
is of no use.126  You can teach a person what the Good is, but to those who 
have not been rightly formed for judgment such teaching will, in the end, 
remain incomprehensible. 
 Aristotle is chiefly concerned with the ultimate Good, participation in 
which brings about eudaimoniaÐÐhappiness, but more akin to something like 
human flourishing.  Happiness for the human, then, is a matter of becoming 
the end to which she is movedÐÐthe Good, Òthat at which all things aim.Ó127  
Knowledge of the Supreme Good or ultimate end, is participatory and 
acquired only when a personÕs thinking and doing are harmoniously aligned 
and aimed at her true end.  A personÕs true self, for AristotleÐÐIntellectÐÐis 
made known to her to the extent of her participation in knowing all things in 
relation to the Supreme Good.  For Aristotle, knowledge is not merely a matter 
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of cognition.  It is intentional and voluntary activity directed toward the 
ultimate end that is rightly understood as knowledge.  Knowledge is also 
natural.  That is, the human has a predisposition to knowledge.  Knowledge is, 
therefore, essential to human nature, though it is not said to be a necessary 
activity.  One can choose to remain ignorant. 
 MaximusÕ understanding of how one gains knowledge is closely 
aligned to that of AristotleÕs.  Virtue makes God to condescend to be human 
by the humanÕs assumption of divine properties (logoi).128  It is in this way 
that the Unmoved is moved, not by any other than himself, but by the portion 
of God within each.  The human cannot affect God; rather, God affects God 
by his movement upon the soul that also moves the body in virtue.  It is in this 
particular way that the human is made to permeate divinity.  Accordingly, 
when Christ is moved with pity by the widow whose only son has died (Luke 
7.11-16), his being-moved is not to be understood as external to himself.  It is 
the logos within each that meets the Logos.  Only God affects God. 
 It has been necessary to trace in Maximus how the human acquires the 
necessary disposition to know God, and thereby knows all things in their 
contingent relation to the Eternal, in order to show how Maximus relates this 
knowing to the liturgy in his Mystagogy.  All habituation in virtue that enjoins 
Òthe various essences of beingsÓ to their creator occurs only in the ChurchÕs 
imitative, liturgical activity.129 
 
III 
Crucial to MaximusÕ understanding of how the human gains awareness of her 
being-in-God is the churchÕs liturgy. 
The holy Church of God is an image of God because it realizes 
the same union of the faithful with God.  As different as thy are 
by language, places, and customs, they are made one by it 
through faith.  God realizes this union among the natures of 
things without confusing them but in lessening and bringing 
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together their distinction, as was shown, in a relationship and 
union with himself as cause, principle, and end.130 
Liturgy, for Maximus, is the imprint and image of God.131  Knowledge, 
therefore, is gained solely through an active encounter with God in, by, and 
through the movements of holy synaxis.  It is this direct and proportionate 
encounter with God that fuses particular natures (heavenly and earthly) 
together in an unconfused union with God and consequentially with all others.  
This is the ÒspecialÓ grace that is given at the time of holy synaxis. 
This grace  transforms and changes each person who is found 
there and in fact remolds him in proportion to what is more 
divine in him and leads him to what is revealed through the 
mysteries which are celebratedÉ.132 
The ascetic struggle, in this light, is the bodily comportment that opens the 
human to receive a greater portion of this special grace that God bestows upon 
her in liturgy, so to realize this inseparability of all things.  All things are 
bound together by the singular force of their relationship to God as origin.133  
The human, therefore, is most fully herself, with all her distinctive 
peculiarities, when and only when she knows herself properly in her being-
known with the Son in his eternal divine-human permeation.  For Maximus, 
the incarnation manifests the absolute and unconfused union, not simply 
between the Son and an individual human nature, but of all things in Christ 
who incarnates himself proportionately in all who willingly participate in his 
kenosis.  This emptying of oneself for ChristÕs sake is an emptying that makes 
manifest the true, divine portion within a person.  In this way does the human 
know herself in the exclusive relation to her CauseÐÐGod.  By this voluntary 
emptying of oneself God restores the human in a marvelous way to herself, 
which is a returning of the human back to her originÐÐGod.134 
 The human bears a communal relation to all things by virtue of her 
relation to the divine community that is the Trinity, in whom all are naturally 
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bound.  There is no relation between particular natures apart from eachÕs 
particular relation to its Cause.  The church of God hereby serves as the 
working out of the divine-human and human-human relation.  Through its 
worshipÐÐits participation in and imitation of the SonÕs worship of the Father 
in the SpiritÐÐthe human receives her identity as leitourgon (liturgist) of the 
Leitourgon (Liturgist).  Left to her own, the human is but individual, tamed 
only by the passions of the flesh; through active participation in perichoretic 
reciprocity, made available through GodÕs holy vessel the church, the human 
receives her identity as a truly communal being, one who has been adopted 
through Christ into the perichoresis. 
 The church is an archetype of the Archetype, wherein each person 
receives the deifying grace, so to at once remain distinct, all the while being 
permeated by divinity.  The human comes to know herself by knowing herself 
in relation to God, being incorporated into God, becoming God through 
participation.135  It is this, says Maximus, that occurs in holy synaxis. 
By holy communion of the spotless and life-giving mysteries 
we are given fellowship and identity with him by participation 
in likeness, by which man is deemed worthy from man to 
become God.136 
In other words, to have the ascetic struggle without receiving the mysteries 
communicated to humanity by God through the church is insufficient.  Grace, 
while proportionately received, is always given and never achieved.  It is this 
that relieves MaximusÕ praktike of any hint of an Evagrian soteriology.  This 
form of asceticism is a participation in the singular kenosis of the Son.  All is 
participation!  Therefore, there can be no ascetic action of a person that is not 
initiated and completed in Christ. 
 The force here is the consistent drawing out of an image-likeness 
distinction.  This distinction comes full circle in MaximusÕ description of the 
relationship between the nave and the sanctuary of the church as an image of 
man.  The church is an Òimage and figure of God;Ó just as image is to the soul 
and likeness (figure) is to the body, likewise is the image/soul to the sanctuary 
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and likeness/body to the nave.137  The reciprocal movements that take place 
between sanctuary and nave are analogous to those that occur between soul 
and body.  It is this reciprocity that has been restored in ChristÕs unconfused 
union, which is manifest in the entrance of the bishop and people into the 
church for liturgy.  The seventh century liturgy in which Maximus would have 
engaged began with an entrance of the bishop and the people.  The bishopÕs 
entrance is a Òfigure and image of the first appearance in the flesh of Jesus 
Christ the son of God and our Savior in this world.Ó138  The peopleÕs entrance 
behind the bishop Òrepresents the conversion of the unfaithful from 
faithlessness to faithÉ, from vice and ignorance to virtue and knowledge.Ó139  
Inasmuch as one is entering into the church as having shed the old man, to this 
proportionate extent is the participant Òproperly and truly considered and 
spoken of as entering with God our God and High Priest into virtue.Ó140  In the 
Byzantine church especially is it understood that the faithful, in stepping into 
the church, the believer has one foot firmly planted on earth and the other in 
heaven.  Further, the bishopÕs entrance into the sanctuary and ascent to the 
priestly throne is likewise a figure and image of the SonÕs ascension into 
heaven and his return to the heavenly throne.141 
 The scripture readings that follow express the Òdivine wishes and 
intentions in accordance with which everyone should conform and conduct 
himself.Ó142  These readings instruct the faithful in conduct, teaching them to 
progress in all virtue by submitting to the divine law and commandments.  It 
also signifies the contemplative habits of those who have knowledge through 
virtue, whereby the faithful are borne to the truth.143  The Gospel reading itself 
symbolizes the fulfillment of this world.144  It is the movement of error into 
truth, a move from multiplicity into unity. 
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 After the Gospel and preaching, the catechumens are exited from the 
church by the bishop, which signifies ChristÕs separation of sinners and saints 
and a perfect detachment from misaligned passions and desires of the material 
or flesh.  Upon closing the doors of the church, leaving only within its walls 
the faithful, what is signified here is the progress of the faithful from praktike, 
to theoria, to theologia.145  One must first be formed by the virtues, as 
explored above, and thereby enter into contemplation where all is seen in its 
contingent relation to divinity.  Theologia is made available only to those who 
have been so formed and disciplined, and is received only through the 
mystical service that is the liturgy.  In the liturgy is the cause, logic and end of 
the progression from praktike, to theoria, to theologia.  This progression is a 
return to the principle and intent of God in human nature.  The churchÕs intent 
is hereby to bestow upon each person the singular divine form of the Liturgy-
Christ.  It is the manifesting of the inherent potency for theologia within the 
human, making available the life of virtue and the habits of contemplation, 
and to communicate through the sacraments the grace of God that raises one 
into theologia, the knowledge that occurs only in the experience of consuming 
God in the Eucharist so to receive deification. 
 Deification, then, exists in the human in potency, which is drawn out 
by virtuous action (praktike), ordered by contemplation of the natural world 
(theoria), fulfilled when met by the grace of God and the human contemplates 
God in himself (theologia).  ÒThis marks a perpetual and unceasing movement 
toward the knowable which transcends knowledge,Ó146 whereby rational 
knowledge is suspended in its direct perception through Christ. 
The knowledge of all that has come to be through Him is 
naturally and properly made known together with Him.  For 
just as with the rising of the sensible sun all bodies are made 
known, so it is with God, the intelligible sun of righteousness, 
rising in the mind: although He is known to be separate from 
the created order, He wishes the true meanings of everything, 
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whether intelligible or sensible, to be made known together 
with Himself.147 
Having recapitulated all things in himself, Christ at once reveals the inherent 
goodness of human nature and GodÕs insistence to fulfill the original intent of 
creation.  All of this is comprehensible only through the sacred order of the 
mysteries available in the holy church of God.148 
 What I seek to show here with Maximus is how the church, at least 
through the seventh century, is intent to show clearly that the constituting of 
human identity occurs in its virtuous habituation of the faithful in knowledge 
and contemplation, brought to completion by the manifesting grace of God 
through the mysteries.  It is a distinctly sacramental and participatory ontology 
that is found throughout the writings of the early fathers, clearly evidenced in 
the writings of Maximus.  Knowledge is action; contemplation is habit; 
deification is the perpetual movement made possible by each, met with grace, 
that reconstitutes the human to her original constitution as logos of the Logos.  
All occurs in, by, and through Christ.  God as cause is the ultimate 
ÒbackgroundÓ for the human, which lies hidden to her apart from the bodily 
comportment of liturgical participation.  This is the being, well being and 
eternal being of which Maximus speaks in Difficulty 10.  Being and eternal 
being are GodÕs alone, whereas well-being names the bodily comportment 
through virtue and contemplation covered in this chapter.  Through volitive 
participation the human comes to exist in the extremes, being and eternal 
being, made free from any relationship to anything other than God, thereby 
enabled to relate to all things as God.149  The reason or logic of this total 
relating to God, and only thereby consequentially relating to all others, is 
manifest and available only through the liturgy of holy church. 
 
Conclusion 
The true knowledge of which Maximus speaks is gained only by participation, 
that is, only through participation in the mysteries that moves, by contact with 
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what is known, the human beyond all conceptualization.150  Because 
knowledge and knowing solely exists within the Trinity,151 access is granted 
only through participatory manifesting in liturgy.  Liturgy hereby instructs and 
makes sense of all human activity.  The being, well-being, eternal being 
paradigm set forth by Maximus describes the portion of God within the human 
(being) and the intent of God for the human (eternal being), leaving in the 
middle a personÕs volitional activity (well-being) that brings together in 
herself the two extremes, consummated by the ÒSpiritÕs bearing witness with 
our spirit that we are children of GodÓ by adoption (Romans 8.16).152  
Adoption is key for Maximus, as act and habitÐÐknowledge and 
contemplationÐÐmoves one beyond a terrestrial genealogy, entering into 
theologia where one knows him/herself only in relation to God.153  Again, this 
is the transfiguring of the human made available only through the churchÕs 
mysteries, proportionately received by each through oneÕs bodily 
comportment in virtue and contemplation. 
 The intention of the church rests in its liturgical movement from, in 
and toward God.  It is a particular sort of gaze.  The liturgical action is to gaze; 
it is a comportment of the body whereby vision is a vision by proximity. It is a 
construal of the human imaginary that works upon the body to know oneself 
as more than the air one breathes or the blood that courses through the veins, 
so that the human realizes herself as the life of one wholly infused with the 
fullness of God that transcends any body-soul divide, being made God by the 
kenotic giving of the Son.154  Akin to Merleau-PontyÕs articulation of the gaze 
as a modality of movement,155 Maximus presses how knowledge is a gaze 
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upon Christ, which is the force of proportional receiving of knowledge.156  
That is, inasmuch as one engages in her well-being through participation is the 
extent to which God meets her with grace, not because God is limited by 
human conditioning, rather because God will not make a slave of the human 
but a friend. 
 The bodily intending of the human in the churchÕs liturgy is the 
constituting of human understanding in her relation to God, self, others, 
things, and so on.  Any and all knowledge, therefore, arises and is made 
manifest to the subject by virtue of this liturgical intending of the body.  As 
found in Merleau-Ponty, there is no abstract knowledge available to the 
human because of the inseparability of the body and mind, the body provides 
the background and conditions of knowing.157  Likewise is there found in 
Maximus the same relation to how one knows and is known.158  The human is 
a body-soul union, and in the reciprocal movement between the two is 
knowledge made manifest.  One can only know God in the flesh, which is the 
whole thrust of the incarnation.  Knowledge for the human then has as its 
paradigm the incarnation of the Son, which also manifests the rising 
incarnation within each person that occurs universally by the singular act of 
God in Christ. 
 Liturgy, then, is the total experience of the faith of the church, which 
constitutes and conditions oneÕs perception of God and all things.159  Liturgy 
is always more than conditioning perception, however, as is clearly expressed 
in Maximus.  It could be said that for Maximus, liturgy is the absolute 
unconfused union of phenomenology and ontology.  The divine-human 
destiny that God established in his very creating of humanity in his image is 
an ontological conditioning to reciprocity with God.160  Because Christ is 
himself the Liturgy, and because only God can love God,161 the humanÕs 
being-in-God is constitutive of her being-in-the-liturgy.  It is in the churchÕs 
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liturgical action that God brings together the extremes of being and eternal 
being with the churchÕs volitive participation in the Liturgy-Christ.  What is 
made manifest in this experience of liturgical participation is the true 
ontological nature of the human as recapitulated and assimilated to the Son, 
residing now within the perichoretic life of Holy Trinity. 
 It is the particularity and peculiarity of its ascetic struggle, prayer, and 
thanksgiving that the church is enabled by the Spirit to condition the human to 
manifest this truth of her contingent reality.  Crucial, here, is proportionality.  
Proportionality has to do with oneÕs active struggle in a holy detachment from 
the flesh, not a flight from the flesh, and an active participating in the 
liturgical movements themselves.  Presence in liturgy is key, but the active 
hearing, praying to, and ultimately eating God is the crux of liturgical 
conditioning.  Only through a full participation of this sort is the human 
capable of knowing herself in the divine-human relation of reciprocity.  Again, 
knowledge is act, and apart from the liturgical action knowledge of oneÕs 
ontological nature is unavailable. 
 The churchÕs liturgy as a participation in the Liturgy Christ is is key, 
for knowledge of God only comes as knowledge of the Son,162 who is able to 
be perceived only through the liturgical manifesting of the logos within each 
person.  One could speak of the churchÕs liturgy as a midwife, but not 
completely in the Socratic sense, for what lies within must be known from the 
outside, i.e. through the mysteries.  Human identity is consummated in the 
mysteries, and while virtue and habit open one to this awareness, the truth of 
being comes through contact with God in the mysteries and only then does one 
know. 
 What is made-manifest in the ascetic struggle, prayer, and participation 
in the cosmic mystery of Christ the Liturgy is a remolding and restructuring of 
human sensibilities so to perceive the world as a body-soul unity, eternally 
existent in its relation to God, manifest in the present tension of this fulfilled-
potency.  It is in becoming what she is in liturgy that the human knows her 
divine potency and assimilation to the Son, having already been recapitulated 
and gathered into divine reciprocity.  Participation in liturgy, once again, is 
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crucial to the humanÕs acquisition of knowing herself utterly contingent upon 
God in his own being-known, realizing her true self as known with the Son in 
the community of Holy Trinity.  Without participating in this embodied 
construal of human sensibilities to the Liturgy-Christ, knowledge of self, 
others, or Truth remains distant and unachievable.163  It is only liturgy that 
makes knowledge of the self in its exclusive relation to God available, which 
renders all other relations contingent upon this singular relation of the subject 
with God.  It is an acquisition that comes from being Òravished by divine 
knowledge.Ó164 
                                                            
163 One can see this most explicitly in Cyril of Alexandria: ÒFor those who do not receive 
Jesus through the sacrament will continue to remain utterly bereft of any share in the life of 
holiness and blessedness without any taste of it whatsoeverÓ (Commentary on John, 4.2, 
361b).  As with Ambrose, and in a real sense Aristotle, Cyril is clear that there is no 
knowledge available and no point to investigation without first coming to the faith in liturgy 
(Commentary on John, 4.2, 360b-e). 
164 Maximus, Chapters on Love, I.12. 
  
4 Deranging the Senses 
 
ÒIn the seventeenth century a dissociation of sensibility set in, from which we 
have never recovered.Ó   
Ð T. S. Eliot 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
As I have shown above, what is normative for the early church, especially as 
highlighted by Maximus Confessor, is that the liturgy is a distinctly 
participatory action that creates time and space to be inhabited as a sensible 
and sensing world or cosmos.  Liturgy hereby illuminates human nature in its 
contingent reality in God by making possible the self-illumination of this 
reality for its participants.  The manifesting of human nature through the 
churchÕs liturgical action is hereby inseparable from the ontological self-
mediation of God in the Eucharist.  Knowledge of God is inseparable from 
this liturgical activity.  Likewise, the humanÕs true self is illuminated or made-
manifest in proportion to her participation in the ontological encounter with 
God in the liturgical action. 
This understanding of active self-illuminating is not new with the 
church and its liturgical formation.  Who a person understands herself to be is 
inseparable from the activities in which a person engages and through which a 
person relates to the social body.  This is attested to as early as the fifth 
century BC by Heraclitus.1  How one participates in the common manifests or 
illuminates a certain selfhood through the disciplines of the social body.  A 
person becomes just, says Aristotle, by doing just acts.  In like manner, a 
person knows they are just by doing just acts.  However, what is just is not an 
independent reality apart from the relations involved in a society or 
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community that uses the word ÒjustÓ in particular ways.2  What is complicated 
in terms of oneÕs awareness is that knowledge is always a shared knowledge.  
ÒIÓ do not know anything; only ÒWeÓ can know.  What is ÒjustÓ is socially 
construed, which means that Òjustice,Ó like everything else, refuses 
universality.  Defining ÒjusticeÓ is not the concern here; however, 
understanding the social construal of the meaning of words is.  As Merleau-
Ponty states, ÒAll knowledge takes its place within the horizons opened up by 
perception,Ó3 opened by all the environmental factors that have been shaping 
the human imaginary up to that point, whether known to her or notÐÐmost 
often not.  It is what Pierre Bourdieu refers to as habitus, a kind of 
subconscious bodily comportment that gives rise to a particular way of 
perceiving the world, or making meaning in and of the world.4 
As argued in the previous chapter, it is oneÕs participation in this 
liturgical comportment of the body that conditions the humanÕs knowledge of 
herself as an exclusive relation to God and a consequential relation to all 
things in their contingent reality by the same. The very form of knowing is a 
knowledge, is that which provides the possibility to know whatever enters the 
perceptive gaze of the subject.5  Without a form of participation that opens the 
subject to such an active bodily perceiving, whereby all are formatively aware 
of eachÕs assimilation to the Eternal Logos, all that is left is an autonomous, 
sovereign individual, i.e. secular humanism, one capable only of relating to the 
other as wholly other or completely identicalÐÐeither absolutely separable or 
lacking difference altogether.  This will be teased out further later. 
What I seek to press in the following section is the point introduced in 
the last chapter regarding a substance-oriented and function-oriented ontology, 
which will become more explicit in dealing with the Eucharist in the following 
chapter.  It is important first to show how signs, symbols, and the various 
movements of and on the body create what Merleau-Ponty calls horizons of 
                                                            
2 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Culture and Value, trans. G. H. Von Wright and Heikki Nyman 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), 85e. 
3 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, 241. 
4 Bourdieu, The Logic of Practice, 53. 
5 As with Merleau-Ponty and Maximus, the ÒgazeÓ and ÒperceptionÓ are the (social) 
conditionings carried about in the body that, even unconsciously, postures the subject to 
inhabit the world in particular ways. 
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expectation, and to relate this specifically to liturgy.  I will introduce this 
firstly by engaging with Ivan IllichÕs description of tools and how they limit 
and extend the range of human knowing, i.e. how they give way to particular 
horizons of expectation.  Illich's description of socially construed tools relates 
directly to the "tools" of liturgy.  With Illich, tools are socially constituted for 
constricting and extending the range of human freedom.  They most always 
serve either to extend the range of human capabilities or transform the human 
into a mere user of tools.  Most often, the humanÕs creative agency is 
transfigured into a tool for consumptive ends.  As the machinery of industrial 
society predestines the human to an intellectual stagnation proportionate to her 
bodily tooling, whereby the human is alienated from the end of production by 
her inverted relation to the product as its means; likewise, the late Medieval 
Christian is reconditioned by a similar retooling that suspends the divine-
human relation in its delimiting of signs and symbols in the liturgical action.  
The liturgical participant ceases to have a functionÐÐan active roleÐÐsevering 
act from actor and what is created by the coherence of both. 
IllichÕs crucial insight is that tools are intrinsic to human relations 
within a social body.6  As such, the human relates herself in action to society 
through the use of her tools, which she either masters or is passively acted 
upon.7  To the degree that a person masters a tool is the degree to which that 
person can invest her world with meaning; however, inasmuch as she is 
mastered by her tools who she knows herself to be will be determined by the 
form of the tool itself.  As the formative means of human relating, tools will 
be formed to suit the relational structures of the dominant culture, which will 
ÒnaturallyÓ assimilate its users to that culture.  Think of the credit card in 
modern society.  The credit card is a tool for purchasing; however, it is a tool 
that relates individuals to consumer institutions, and limits relations between 
individuals and institutions or persons who do not receive credit card 
payments.  I cannot go to the farmerÕs market in my home town and use a 
credit card to purchase fruits and vegetables; I must have cashÐÐanother tool 
for human relating.  Those who are so accustomed to using a credit card for all 
                                                            
6 Ivan Illich, Tools for Conviviality (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1973), 21. 
7 Ibid. 
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their purchases, especially to the extent that they no longer carry cash in their 
wallet, are less likely to go to a farmerÕs market where this form of payment 
will not be received, even if they in theory would prefer to purchase local 
produce.  The credit card can and does limit the human imaginary, not just 
because it enables many not to carry cash, but because it is a tool of relating, 
limiting relations to mutual users, but primarily between human individuals 
and institutions.  This is very much evidenced by the ATM or gas stations that 
have Òpay at the pump.Ó  No human contact is necessary for your banking 
transaction or fuel.  In this way, the credit card actually prevents its user from 
getting to know the teller or attendant.  As a relational tool, it selects who one 
should and should not enter into relation. 
This is along the same vein that I seek to show how liturgical 
restructuring delimits human relations by constricting who is able to relate to 
God in the liturgyÐÐwho is able to invest the liturgy with meaning.  Just as 
tools with industrial and capitalist societies delimit human relations to 
spectator-consumers, so also does medieval liturgical practices reconstitute the 
common Christian as a passive and autonomous subject whose relation to God 
is suspended by the tool that once made her relation to God possible. 
 
I 
In his ÒTools for Conviviality,Ó Ivan Illich seeks to reconstruct the human 
imaginary to comprehend tools as intrinsic to how one relates to others within 
the social body.8  Tools have a way of bringing the social body together in 
closer proximity; however, they can also serve to distance the social body in 
ways unforeseen.  Take for instance the automobile, to use one of IllichÕs 
examples.  The purpose of the automobile was to decrease the space and time 
between two points; however, the ÒwatershedÓ of transportation served only to 
create more distance and use more time both in production and traffic, 
reducing society to a virtual enslavement to the car.9  The greater issue, 
however, as Illich points out, is how tools of industry have ceased to be an 
extension of the human, enhancing each personÕs range of freedom, but now 
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ÒworkÓ for them, as money ÒworksÓ in capitalism, reducing the human to a 
spectator or at best manipulator of machines, limiting the human to a mere 
consumer-slave.10 
Kurt VonnegutÕs ÒPlayer PianoÓ is a fascinating exploration of this 
very occurrence.  In the ÒPlayer Piano,Ó society is divided essentially into two 
classes: engineers and ÒReeks and Wrecks.Ó  Paul, an engineer in this 
industrial, machine-governed society, becomes involved in a pseudo-
revolution with the usual suspects.  Coming to realize the all pervasiveness of 
machines in society that sustain class divisions and limit the range of human 
freedom, Paul enlists those who have been abused by machinery.  Paul is in 
turmoil, however, because it may mean the end of his marriage.  His life as an 
engineer, from a family of engineers, is profitable and Paul is in line for the 
top posts in the country, a beautiful home, family, everything a bourgeois man 
could ever want.  Consistently wrestling with what he has to lose, Paul goes 
on to sacrifice all for the ideal of a human flourishing that involves living a 
life where work is done with his own bare hands, perhaps even farming and 
growing plants of all things.  The revolution takes place; all the machines are 
smashed.  But what happens next leaves Paul in utter turmoil.  The people 
have risen up and knocked down the reigning powers of the machine.  
However, when the machines that worked for, not with, individuals have been 
broken into pieces, because of their all pervasive impact on the human 
imaginary the only thing the revolutionaries can think to do is to repair the 
machines.  The force of the machine on perceived human flourishing has been 
too overwhelming to overturn, and once shattered the only thing left to do is to 
put the pieces of the machine back together.  The revolution fails because 
there is no alternative tool or retooling, only the destruction of tools, which 
only mimics what the tools of the machine have done to its users. 
John RuskinÕs imperative rings true, ÒYou must either make a tool of 
the creature, or a man of him.  You cannot make both.Ó11  That is, either the 
human will be a slave to do the work of another or she will be an artist who 
makes her way in the world as a creator.  IllichÕs argument is not to hereby do 
                                                            
10 Illich, Tools For Conviviality, 10-11. 
11 John Ruskin, The Stones of Venice (London: Smith, Elder and Company, 1867), 161. 
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away with tools or machines or to demonize them in any way.  He realizes that 
tools are essential to social relations.  Nevertheless, the meaning of a tool does 
not simply reside in its use; rather, the tool itself bears a sort of implicit 
imaginary.12  It is something along the lines of the adage, ÒTo a man with a 
hammer everything is a nail.Ó  While the hammer can be used for many things, 
it nevertheless desires, in the Aristotelian sense, to pound and be used for 
pounding, whether it is a nail or the head of an enemy.  It is simple enough to 
say that while a toolÕs function can be reoriented, as in the case of turning 
swords into plowshares or spears into pruning hooks (Isaiah 2.4); however, 
without the reconstituting of certain tools, the sword and spear can only be 
imagined as weapons of death and destruction. 
A convivial reconstruction is necessary, then, a Òre-toolingÓ if you 
will.  Illich contrasts conviviality with industrial productivity.  Whereas 
industrialism enslaves the human to machinery, reducing the individual to a 
consumer of goods over which she has no control in fashioning or producing, 
conviviality promotes a social freedom of interdependence for each, which 
seeks to satisfy the needs of human flourishing in society while enjoining the 
individual to its governance.13  That is, conviviality will free the human to 
fashion goods reciprocally with the whole of society, binding differing 
cultures together in an economy akin to a gift economy, though Illich does not 
make this explicit reference.  What is key for a convivial restructuring of 
human society is contingent upon a reconstituting of tools whereby each 
person is able to defend their liberty and offer a careful analysis of the 
inherent nature of tools as means.14  The convivial tool, then, will be an 
extension of the humanÐÐespecially in the sense of tools as intrinsic to social 
relations, in such a way that increases human flourishing on the whole and 
does not remove the productive action from the energy of its user.  A convivial 
tool will often reduce the amount of human energy needed for creating; 
however, it must not eliminate human action.  For instance, a standard vacuum 
cleaner enables a person to clean the carpets with minimal human energy; 
                                                            
12 Marshall McLuhan, Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man (Cambridge: MIT Press, 
1994), 41-47. 
13 Illich, Tools For Conviviality, 11. 
14 Ibid., 24-25. 
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however, a robotic vacuum requires one only to push the button to turn it on.  
The robotic vacuum hereby promotes the uncleanliness it is designed to 
remove, for the cleaning process is removed from human action. Cleaning is 
transformed by the robotic tool to be something machines do, not humans.  
Analogies will forever breakdown in this regard, for carpet itself may not 
promote conviviality, as it creates a further dependency on electricity and 
more machines to maintain it.  Nevertheless, the point is that convivial tools 
must increase the dignity of human activity, even if it lightens the exertion of 
human energy.  Inasmuch as a tool reduces the human to a passive spectator or 
eliminates her involvement in creative actions, the human ceases to have a 
telos. By becoming a means she ceases to mean anything.  To state the matter 
plainly, a convivial tool gives life by enhancing human action, a non-convivial 
tool takes life away by eliminating human action.  Movement itself does not 
imply life, however; rather, it is volitive movement toward that manifests life.  
It is aiming at and an increasing awareness both of oneÕs aiming and that at 
which one is aiming. 
Certain tools may be inherently destructive, says Illich, inasmuch as 
they increase human exploitation, dependence, or impotence, robbing rich and 
poor of conviviality.15  Take a gun, for instance.  The inherent logic of the gun 
is to inflict violence, even if not to kill.  It is designed to penetrate its object 
with a violent force.  Even if used for defense or skeet shooting one cannot 
escape its inherent logic.  Not all tools used violently, however, bear this 
necessary logic.  One may recall Orville WrightÕs comment about the airplane 
he and his brother were constructing, a flying tool. 
When my brother and I built and flew the first man-carrying 
flying machine, we thought that we were introducing into the 
world an invention which would make further wars practically 
impossible....16 
This is obviously not what the airplane provided for modern warfare.  It did 
not eliminate war but has and continues to make war more and more possible.  
It is for this reason that a careful analysis of the basic structure of tools is 
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requisite.  What are the Òstructuring structuresÓ that lie within the social body 
that constitute the tool as?17  The logic of capital and industry construe the 
tool as an end rather than a meansÐÐas modern warfare did with the man-
carrying flying machine, which inverts the relation of tool and user such that 
the human becomes the meansÐÐthe medium between consumable objects.  
That is, the human becomes a tool.  Tools become ends when they begin to 
work, as Illich notes this transition in the English language at least since 
1600.18  The human thus transitions from a fashioner of tools for her work, 
whereby her exertion and what she produces are situated within the logic of 
herself as end, to become the means to the end that is the tool, separating the 
human from both action and product.  This exploitation of the individual 
renders the human impotent and utterly dependent on the tool, the work of 
which eternally suspends her from its product. 
The efficient tooling of society leads the human into a whole new set 
of relations between her tools and others.  Men and women go from working 
with their tools to powering their tools with human energy, and then begin 
operating tools with ÒabstractÓ power.  Human action has since nearly been 
replaced altogether by the machine.  Engineers, as seen in VonnegutÕs ÒPlayer 
Piano,Ó have developed machines that increasingly reduce the number of 
operators needed for its production.  Greater mechanical power reduced the 
need for human power, which comports human labor to jobs within cubicles 
that serve primarily to analyze the working of the machines and how to 
develop newer machines that require less and less operators and fewer 
analysts.  This continuous move toward greater efficiency, whereby efficiency 
means increased speed and greater productivity apart from human touch, 
reduces the individual to the tool of which Ruskin prophesied (of course by his 
time it was already too late). 
The freedoms that individuals once had have largely been reduced with 
the rise of technologies designed to create greater freedom.  Illich discusses 
the everyday peasant in Mexico during the early twentieth century, and how 
he would earn a living by walking his pig to the market to attain the necessary 
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sustenance for daily life.  No transport or packaging was needed, just a man 
and his pig and perhaps a rope around its neck.  The automobile could not 
compete with the bicycle or foot within the city.19 In the 1940Õs and 50Õs, 
however, funds were pumped into building new roads to create swifter means 
of commerce.  The consequence was that it created a new economy where the 
peasant could no longer bring his pig to market, thereby becoming reliant on 
industrially packaged commodities and bus transport to get him to and fro.  
The peasant now pays taxes for the roads that have eliminated his means of 
money making, all the while supporting and sustaining monopolies that 
promise to one day bring those same benefits of progress home to him. 
IllichÕs point here has little to do with the particular peasant with his 
piggy going to market in Mexico; rather, it is a matter of the material forces 
that reconstitute human society, limiting human freedoms and forcing the 
individual into a labor force that she serves only for the sake of consuming the 
goods of the same market that enslaves her, all with the promise that her 
cooperation will be met with the fruits of this market.  What we find in IllichÕs 
description is a particular construal of language, space and time.  Language, 
space, and time cease to be tools in the convivial sense of their use toward 
human ends; rather, the linguistic shift occurs with the transition from space 
and time as creative human activities to become products for consumptionÐÐ
space and time as that within which products are produced and consumed.  
Human labor situated within the new categories of space and time can only be 
abstracted from individuals for the sake of buying and selling in the system of 
production. 
The logic of production is the linguistic evacuation of time and space 
from human action that situates human action within abstract time and space, 
at once for the commodification of human action as purchasable labor as well 
as the commodification of time and space for the same.  Time and space 
abstracted from human creative action reduces each, and everything within 
both, to something that can be measured universally, specifically measured by 
monetary valuation.  Time and space cease to be bound up together with 
human action as that which measures and creates life and now serves to house 
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human creativity as productivity, construing human action as measurable only 
within the body-schema of the marketplace.20  This, however, is the linguistic 
fictionalization of how the human subject relates to her world.  To exist as 
body-mind, means that the human inhabits time and space, not that she is in 
time or space.21  The linguistic dislocation of human action from time and 
space proffered by the logic of production, by alienating human action from 
time and space also severs the mind from the body.  The body does not inhabit 
space and time in a permeable relation with the whole of human society; 
rather, the body becomes productively measured within time and space, 
separating thought from action, suspending both from the present by removing 
each from its history or future.  This is an ontological reduction of the human 
to a being in-itself, and likewise that of time and space.  This fragmenting 
disassociates the multitude of relations that exist in-the-between of human 
existence.  It is a radical division between subjectivity and objectivity, such 
that there is only absolute polarity between all things, lacking any sense of 
interdependency or Òintervolvement,Ó to use Merleau-PontyÕs language. 
What then does this make of the man and his pig in the market?  The 
pig, once a means of relating man and market, now packaged as bacon in the 
refrigerator section of the grocery store, has been removed from the peasant 
and no longer connects him to the plethora of relations once shared.  The man 
is now a consumer in-himself, relating only to packaged goods on the shelf, 
but not to those who once bargained and bartered for his pig.  He exists 
autonomously, relating only to the market as consumer, abstracted from all 
relations that do not involve the consumption of like products.22  He is a tool 
(means) of the market (end).  He now possesses market-time that he sells to 
the market as body labor, which he exchanges in the market for the 
consumption of goods that he, in many cases, has produced.  The abstraction 
of time and space from human action nevertheless works on the bodyÕs 
                                                            
20 I am nuancing here Merleau-PontyÕs use of Òbody schemaÓ to show that the conditions of 
reality, materially imposed on the human as a body-soul, construe the human imaginary to 
comprehend their particular Òbeing-in-the-worldÓ as existing in an intemporal time and 
abstract space to which they remain eternally detached.  See Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology 
of Perception, 112-170; Bourdieu, 80-111. 
21 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, 117. 
22 Below it will be shown how this directly relates to the liturgical participant and her 
extraction from baking bread for Eucharist and participating in its procession in the offertory. 
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practical sense of its inhabiting the world.  The human is disciplined neither to 
inhabit space nor time, but to remain in-herselfÐÐautonomous, which leads to 
a schizophrenic relation to herself as a mind who has a body and not as a 
body-mind whole.  The only possible shared relation with the other, here, is as 
a non-involved, non-permeable, self-enclosed entity who relates to the other as 
a mutual consumer of identical products.  This particular state of mind as that 
which transcends its body is only possible within a social order that disposes 
the body to relate to its mind in this particularly abstract way.23  The body is 
conditioned by social mechanisms to recall certain ideas and thoughts that the 
subject is no less conditioned to think of as mere thoughts, capable of 
abstracting from the conditions at work on the body.  Perception, here, is not 
the totality of perceiving found in Maximus or Merleau-Ponty; rather, 
perception according to the logic of production has to do with the mind 
stepping outside of the bodily experience to Òre-frameÓ people, situations, 
events, etc., as affecting only oneÕs disembodied thought processes which can 
be overcome by simply ÒthinkingÓ of the matter differently.  Thinking is here 
reduced to a sort of transcendental cognition, not as inhabiting time and space 
in a mutually permeating relation of being and becoming. 
Returning once again to the man and his pig, the product-construed 
imaginary that now conditions his being-in-the-world limits the freedom of his 
abstract mind to the habitus of the market that delimits his actions.24  He is 
forced to buy back his body by a period of enslavement if he wishes to reunite 
it to his mind.  Such a reunion remains unimaginable, however, or at best 
infinitely suspended.  This is very much akin to MarxÕs critique of capitalism.   
The consumer market system of the bourgeoisie is an economic enslavement 
that isolates the human from herself by the commodification of the end of her 
labor.  The humanÕs productive actions cease to relate to her as its producer 
when the product is exchanged in the market with no regard for the person as 
                                                            
23 Bourdieu, 66-79. 
24 Ibid: ÒEverything takes place as if the habitus forged coherence and necessity out of 
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properties and a biological re-use of social propertiesÓ (79). 
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its producer.  The producer has become a laborer; she works but she does not 
create.  This alienation of the producer from her product nullifies the 
production as a transubstantiating force that endows the completed product 
with the life-energy of its producer.  It is a sort of isolation of both the 
producer and the thing produced, which serves also to abstract the very actions 
involved in the production from their actor. 
A personÕs actions, as purchasable, are not oneÕs own but are owned 
by the one who pays for the actions to be enacted, and because the actions are 
bought and sold in the market that which is produced by the actions bear no 
attachment to their producer and are commodified in kind.  When the human 
(producer) is separated from her actions (production) she becomes, as Marx 
contends, less than human.  Marx understands production to be that which 
makes humans human.25  It is the fundamental activity whereby the human 
comes to realize her selfhood.  Self-illumination is in the act of creating, for 
what is created by her action retains a residue of her nature to such an extent 
that the products of human action are Ômirrors from which [human] essence 
shines forth.Õ  The reciprocal relation between producer, production, and 
product is essential for the sort of self-actualization of the human that Marx 
tirelessly presses toward.  It is this self-actualization that remains suspended 
from the man and his pig.  The habitus of consumerism only makes possible 
the free production of thought, perception and action inherent to the particular 
conditions of its own production and none others.26  A man with one pig is 
forced to domesticate it as a pet, or at best slaughter it himself for his own 
consumption.  If he is to sustain himself through the consumer market he must 
manufacture his pig in bulk, contract with the grocer to purchase his bacon 
and ham only as packaged goods for resale, but not his whole pig, and 
certainly not with the establishment of a relationship apart from contractual 
obligation, which renders any return specified in time and space lest the reified 
relation be severed. 
 
II 
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The conditions for a convivial retooling of society would require a distinctly 
different articulation and practice of time and space.  Convivially construed, 
time is the how of the humanÕs inhabiting of space, space being the parameters 
within which this how is conditioned.  Such a social space is what makes free 
actions possible, while at the same time excluding other forms of activity, 
especially those that distort human relationality.27  Time and space are hereby 
bound up together with human action as speech-acts that extend the range of 
human freedoms rather than limit, insofar as freedoms for the actions are 
socially constitutive and constituting, which will also construct and 
reconstruct certain spaces to this end.  The key is the manner of relating that 
must exist between the subject and his or her space and time, which proffers 
norms and customs of interdependency and mutual permeation of those within 
this socially conditioned space. 
Crucial here is the realization that the subject will relate to his or her 
environment on the basis of some socially conditioned time and space, and 
will do so by inhabiting both according to a particular habitus.  This habitus, 
conditioned by the given parameters, will naturally breed conflict if the 
practices and forms of engagement do not free the subject to make his or her 
way in the world through creative and relational participation, i.e. actively.  In 
other words, one can deceive the mind much more readily than one can 
deceive the body.  As convincing as productivity may be to the Ôrational mindÕ 
the body knows that something is lacking in its sense of eudaimonia.  It comes 
as no surprise that Aristotle saw no way for slaves to achieve any real sense of 
human flourishing.  Their bodies do not offer these sorts of freedoms to the 
intellect.  Their socially constructed reality bears not just their body in slavery, 
but the whole body-mind synthesis that is the human.  Likewise, the consumer 
market no less enslaves the mind through its conditioning of the body.  One 
has time, accrues time, buys and saves time, which is articulable only because 
the body is measured in time for its resale at hourly rates.28 
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The systems of dispositionÐÐhabitus29, IllichÕs tools of conviviality, are 
those social mechanisms that construe the human imaginary.  This imaginary 
does not come through a system of ideas; rather, it rises or is made-manifest to 
each person proportionate to their participation in the particular habitus of a 
given social order.  Human creativity, i.e. arts and cultural norms that 
circumscribe them, are something of a portal through which one can enter to 
better understand how the body-mind is being socially conditioned and 
habituated.  The artist always says more than she knows she is saying and 
never knows the full extent of what her words, painting, sculpture, etc., mean, 
not to mention what they will mean in another age.  Cubism is an interesting 
example of how artwork makes manifest the social imaginary inscribed in the 
"structuring structures" of society.  Modernity's move to particularity, 
specialization, and autonomous isolation is readily visible in Picasso's 
paintings in the early nineteen hundreds.  Cubism of the early twentieth 
century reveals the decentralized, fragmentary existence of the modern 
subject.  The human is not a whole but a series of particulars that need not 
cohere as a whole, or rather, cannot through the social conditionings and 
habitus of modernity's global village exist holistically.  The painting in 
modernity, as a kind of socially constructed space exists without a past or 
future referent.  Each aspect is a series of lines or points that do not come 
together or permeate the other.  Space now exists without past or future and 
time is become a spatial context that measures and construes human activity in 
the same fashion that constructed or social spaceÐÐarchitecture and works of 
artÐÐonce did. 
Further, the artist inhabits the space of the canvas with her habitus-
comported body.  In the case of Cubism, the canvas is inhabited by Picasso's 
fragmented body, revealing his own implicit assumptions about the "essence" 
of the world.30  The body is carried along in the artist's creations such that 
one's existence is taken up and made-manifest in what is created by human 
action.31  The artist cannot help but reveal, even to herself, the social 
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comportment of her body.  Art, as a human creative act, by always carrying in 
it the social forces at work on the artist has a way of seeing more than the 
artist herself can see apart from her art.  Art is the product of a particular 
gaze.32  Just as the artist's work of art comes out of a particular "gaze," a 
particular comportment of the body whereby one inhabits the social space, 
likewise does the viewer "gaze" upon the work of art by a similar, if not 
identical, bodily comportment.  Within this socially constructed space, the 
artist, by making manifest her own socially construed gaze and habitus, 
reveals also to the viewer the manner of her own social conditioning and 
habitus.  In this sense, the artist carries more than herself along with her in her 
art; she carries all the social forces at work on her body.  The artist is never 
alone in her art, therefore, but is perhaps the exemplary social being by 
manifesting the socially construed identity she is, even if this identity is 
fictionalized as autonomous. 
Such material forces at work on the body remain largely unconscious 
to the subject.  As the artist reveals more than she knows, more than she is 
consciously aware, likewise does each person's activities manifest their 
identity through the particularities of one's bodily comportment.  The habitus 
of the social body, however, reinforces the validity of the social conditioning, 
in the same way that the use of a credit card reinforces the fragmentary nature 
of the capitalist system.  Each movement within the framework of a society 
creates a further watershed for the intellect that lends the body more and more 
to the construal of one's social conditioning.  Art in modernity reveals the 
inversion of the human as a producer of products, or better, the creator of art 
to a produced product proportionate to her proximity and participation in the 
habitus of the market.  Without the artist, however, this bodily comportment is 
suspended from the intellect, which is perhaps why art remains largely hidden 
from those who are not the "engineers" or the masters of society. 
Returning briefly to the understanding of the gaze noted above, there is 
a mimetic draw exacted from the individual by a given society, as each 
society, for good or ill, habituates the human to act and respond in certain 
ways to its social conditionings.  The gaze is best understood as inhabiting that 
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upon which it is cast, which means that she who gazes, the mimetic act of 
gazing, the whole of one's "background," and the object upon which one's 
gaze is cast are all inseparable, though not conflated into either.  In other 
words, to cast one's gaze is to cast one's world upon the object of gaze, such 
that the social-body of the individual permeates the social-body of the object.  
This gaze is operative regardless of the intellectual negation of the human as a 
pure rational subject proffered by modernity.  The problematic as this relates 
to time and space in their social constitution is that their commodification has 
restructured the human experience as existing within a vacuum.  This 
disenfranchisement of the body inverts the time-space relation.  It is the 
temporalization of space and the spatialization of time.33  Space now exists 
without a past or future and time has become the spatial context that measures 
and construes human activity in the same way that constructed space (social 
space)ÐÐarchitectureÐÐwas once the liberating or confining of time.  Time is 
no longer linked to human action and space no longer the permeable "stuff" 
that is continually reconstituted by human activity.  The ironic implications of 
the chasm created between time and space conflates each into the other, which 
simultaneously negates any reciprocal relation between human action with 
either space or time.  The very use of machine-made materials, argues Juhani 
Pallasmaa, inhibits the porous relation that once existed between the human 
and her architectural environment.34  The modern skyscraper towers over the 
subject as a timeless and seemingly spaceless entity, which bears down upon 
the individual his or her own mortality that can have no relation to the 
towering eternity.  Such architecture refuses the human an entry into its 
timelessness, making her incapable of a participation in that which lies beyond 
herself.  She is stuck in the ageless presence of windowless glass, always 
aware of the threat of her demise, not as one who exists beyond herself with a 
pliable structure of natural materials. 
The separability of space and time from human action accordingly 
distances each human from the other, making each person incapable of a 
relation apart from disinterested love.  All relations are unilateral.  "I" relate to 
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"you" and "you" to "me" but there is no relation of "we."  This is the notion of 
the sovereign individual.  The African mantra that, "I am because we are," is 
an affront to imperialist ideology.  Love in a convivial society must be 
intensely interested, in the specific sense of proliferating reciprocity.  Just as 
the non-porous imposition of modern architecture (space) and economics 
(time) upon the human subject proffers an abstract or disinterested, non-
reciprocal relation to the other, likewise is the coherence of human action to 
time and space necessary for reciprocity with and interested love for the other.  
It will involve an intensely material and holistic engagement with time and 
space by the human in ways that enable her to inhabit time and space as 
convivial tools that extend her liberties and relations with others within and 
outside her social body. 
 
III 
What is involved in the reconstruction of time and space as inhabitable first 
entails a recognition of the failure of abstract time and space to make possible 
any sense of eudaimonia.  Industrialism, built on the hypothesis that machines 
can replace slavery, believed that machines could ÒworkÓ for people.35  The 
tools of industry do not make the most of human energy and imagination, but 
rather create well-programmed energy slaves who can imagine no other form 
of energy use.36  Rather than eliminating slavery the tools of industrialism 
enslave its users and reconstitute those within the society of production as 
mere consumers.  Within such a society, those who enjoy a sense of 
fulfillment do so largely at the expense of others.  Competition becomes the 
only means of human flourishing. 
Tools are hereby to be understood more broadly than simple hardware 
or machines.  The key insight by Illich is to show in like manner as above how 
institutions, be they factories that produce tangible commodities or systems of 
intangible commodities, are themselves tools.37  Whether an institution 
produces crackers or software, curriculum or laws, it remains a device that 
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shapes and constitutes a given social order.  The tools of society are 
inescapable; they are intrinsic to social relations, as individuals relate to others 
through their mastery of tools or by their manner of being acted upon 
passively.38  To the degree of each will determine the extent to which a person 
understands who they are as Òmeaning-makersÓ or mere consumers.  In other 
words, the self-illumination is limited or expanded by the tools of a social 
body.  Human creativity or enslavement is decidedly systemic, which is to say 
that individual freedom is capable only through institutional relations 
constituted by interdependent relations within the institution, making possible 
analogous interdependency between institutions.  Competition, therefore, 
cannot be hailed as a virtue, as it is in industrial and capitalist societies.39  
Individual freedom and creative energy is available and made possible only 
through institutional mediums that constitute and reconstitute the human as 
free, creative, and (inter)dependent, rather than as an autonomous consumer of 
market goods. 
Integral to such a recognition to how tools Òwork on usÓ in modern 
society is the realization that a tool, be it a machine or institution, is 
inseparable from that which it produces.  Every tool used by or acted upon an 
individual or society construes what a person or body of people perceives to 
be real.  There is no abstract meaning or objectivity; all is conditioned and 
conditioning, shaping the human imaginary to relate to all things as illumined 
by the tools of engagement.  Tools cannot simply be used differently to give 
them a new meaning, although this does help.  Rather, the very design of the 
tool must be transformed to suit its new function in order to reconstitute the 
imagination no longer to see the tool as its former self.  The sword cannot 
simply be stuck in the ground to make it a plowshare.  It must be beaten out 
into a new shape (Isaiah 2.4), reconstituting both its function and design, 
ensuring the sustainability of its new function.  It is crucial to convivial 
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reconstruction that the medium (tool) and the mediated and those from whom 
and to whom a thing or information is mediated are understood as 
differentiated parts of an inseparable whole of interdependent relations.40 
Something that may help bring this retooling into greater light is the 
story, perhaps legend, of missionaries who went to Papua New Guinea to 
convert the natives.  The greatest difficulty faced by the missionaries was the 
practice of headhunting common to the natives, for which they used stone 
axes.  The stone axes were also used by the people of New Guinea to dig up 
tubers.  The missionaries saw the stone axe as a point of entry to evangelize 
the people of New Guinea.  They sought to make a connection with the natives 
by finding a way to help them with their farming while also deterring them 
from chopping off heads.  In order to do so, the missionaries introduced steal 
axes to the natives that would replace their stone axes.  The natives were 
grateful for the new axes, which made gathering tubers much easier; however, 
they also realized the many benefits of the new metal axes for headhunting.  
The retooling attempt by the missionaries failed because they only updated a 
preexistent tool but did not replace it with another.  Having learned their 
lesson, the missionaries made a second attempt at reform.  This time they 
exchanged the metal axes for machetes.  The machete still served the purpose 
of agricultural needs but was also distinctly different in size and shape from 
the stone and metal axes that the natives did not relate it to headhunting.   
The convivial reconstruction of tools that will relate humans to humans 
as humans, will necessarily involve a complete transformation of the tool, 
which will entail that the tool no longer resemble the former medium of 
Òheadhunting,Ó but will make available a stronger sense of interdependency 
and eudaimonia.  A simple updating of a tool will not bring about an 
alternative use, nor will the use of a tool remove its history of former uses; 
rather, it must entail an entire restructuring of the form (structure) itself.  It is 
also important to realize that there is no Òmagic machete.Ó  That is, there is no 
miracle tool that will simply cause interdependency or bring about a just 
society.41  Convivial reconstruction will result only from a new relationship 
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between individuals and their tools.  This means that everything must be 
understood in its relation to the common, which has everything to do with the 
intricate bounded union between persons and their tools as extensions of 
themselves to others. 
A helpful paradigm is that of Ferdinand Tnnies, as outlined in 
ÒCommunity and Society.Ó  Tnnies contrasts gemeinschaft (community) with 
gesellschaft (society) in a similar manner that Illich does with convivial and 
non-convivial.  In a gemeinschaft, what is taken for granted is the relationship 
itself.42  Relating to others, along with all resulting associations among family 
members or groups, is taken as normative, an organic aspect of human nature.  
In the gesellschaft, however, any and all relations are fictional and temporary, 
externally imposed by social mechanisms of particular durations.43  
Gemeinschaft bears the mark of interdependency among those of the 
community; individuals are mutually permeating, naturally linked together 
through complex bonds of kith and kin.  This mutually permeating relation 
extends beyond the range of a local community, but only as an extension of 
the community.  An ancient example of this is found in HomerÕs Iliad, with 
the encounter between Diomedes and Glaucus.  The two warriors meet on the 
road and prepare to battle one another.  However, before engaging in combat, 
Diomedes asks Glaucus who he is.  Glaucus is confused but answers him with 
a full lineage of his family heritage.  After GlaucusÕ account of his family line, 
Diomedes realizes that GlaucusÕ grandfather was none other than Bellerophon, 
a friend of DiomedesÕ grandfather Oeneus.  Diomedes then changes his 
posture and lowers his voice from his previous war cry and speaks gently to 
Glaucus: 
Verily now art thou a friend of my fatherÕs house from of old: 
for goodly Oeneus on a time entertained peerless Bellerophon 
in his halls, and kept him twenty days; and moreover they gave 
one to the other fair gifts of friendship.  Oeneus gave a belt 
bright with scarlet, and Bellerophon a double cup of gold which 
I left in my palace as I came hitherÉ So let us shun one 
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anotherÕs spears even amid the throng; full many there be for 
me to slayÉ  And let us make exchange of amour, each with 
the other, that these men too may know that we declare 
ourselves to be friends from our fathersÕ days.44 
This is the same manner of the relational extension described as gemeinschaft 
by Tnnies.  The relation between Diomedes and Glaucus, which at first 
appears to be Òunnatural,Ó is actually an extension of the organic nature of 
friendship within a community, and when one member of the community 
becomes friends with another he or she brings together the whole of his or her 
community in the relation, and likewise with the other party involved.  It is a 
real and organic relation because the individual relation is conceived within 
the totality of relations and associations of the community as a whole.45 
Such an understanding of human relations and friendship must be 
understood in light of the habits and dispositions of a community.  The 
gemeinschaft is a form of relating that conditions and constitutes a direct 
interestedness for each person as an extension of oneÕs own life, and 
proportionate to this actualization is the extent to which any social body can 
properly be called a gemeinschaft.46  Further, the greater oneÕs participation in 
the habitus of the common will be the greater likelihood for sensus communis, 
for each person will be shaped and formedÐÐdisposedÐÐto perceive all things 
as gemeinschaft or its extension, giving way to organic, even accidental, 
interdependency.  Inseparable for the gemeinschaft is consensus and concordÐ
Ðunderstanding and action.47  The totality of the gemeinschaft, in its particular 
form of life, provides the necessary hermeneutic for knowing all things in a 
contingent relation through the mediating tools of the community.  All 
relations to people, places, and things are understood in, by and through the 
gemeinschaft and as inseparable from it.  The social body and its forms of 
relatingÐÐtools, are inseparable.  Institutions within the social body serve 
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either as tools that proliferate the overarching social structure or give way to 
an alternative community within the wider social body. 
There is a vast gulf between the form of human relations within a 
gemeinschaft and a gesellschaft.  Primary for Tnnies is that the gemeinschaft 
is a living body that is not a mere aggregation of parts, but an interdependent 
totality of mutual intent.48  It begins from the premise of perfect unity of wills 
as a natural condition, preserved even in the midst of actual separation.49  
Tnnies sees this natural condition as basic to the human condition who has a 
definite physical body, linked together through this body, whether by blood 
relations or marital relations, and the relations forged between communities by 
such bonds.  The degree of natural affiliation has largely to do with proximity, 
both in terms of the relational bond and geography.  Following, everything 
that conforms to this natural condition is understood to be of a single will, 
mutually bound together as gemeinschaft not by choosing or willing to be so 
but by realizing the relations as a natural consequence of various bonds of 
unity that accords with the reality of what it means to be human.50  What is 
inseparable from the gemeinschaft is any understanding of thought, word, and 
deed from that which is the gemeinschaft itself.  That is, the gemeinschaft is 
the persons of the social body and all the tools and structures that form such 
interdependent relations.  To the extent of interdependency among those 
within the social body is the extent to which it can be properly called a 
gemeinschaftÐÐthe more each relation functions as a familial blood relation. 
Whereas in the gemeinschaft all people remain essentially united in 
spite of various separating factors, in a gesellschaft all people are essentially 
separated, despite any unitive factors.51  All actions are, therefore, separated 
from the whole as isolated acts of autonomous individuals.52  Each person and 
their actions bear no essential relation to the whole, which renders all tools not 
as relation creating or sustaining means, but likewise isolated and isolating 
extensions human action that sustain, rather than alleviate, division.  There is 
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no common value in a gesellschaft; it is the Cartesian city of the subject, 
whereby what exists does so only in relation to the Cogito.  In a gesellschaft 
there is no common good; there is no common at all.  All is exclusive to the 
individual subject as autonomous.53  All relations within the gesellschaft, 
therefore, are as means to individual ends.  A person does not relate to other 
persons or tools within the structure with a common telos; rather, ÒIÓ have 
ÒmyÓ end; ÒyouÓ have ÒyourÓ end; ÒweÓ do not share this end, except as a 
common ideal achieved in isolation from eachÕs attainment of it. 
Nevertheless, as Tnnies shows, even within the gesellschaft is the 
unavoidable natural relatedness of each person.  People within the gesellschaft 
cannot escape their human nature, and the gesellschaft assumes that the human 
is a relational being but attempts only to sustain this relation through the 
fictional structure of the contract.  Implicit, however, to the contractual system 
is a Òsocial will.Ó54  The distinction is teleological.  The contractual relation 
assumes a point of termination, whereas in the gemeinschaft the relation is 
interminable.  The bond is not between two abstract wills but between organs 
of the same body.  This understanding of contractual relation runs in direct 
opposition to human community.  Value within the gesellschaft is contingent 
upon a singular fact: that the object in question is possessed by one at the 
exclusion of another and that the object is desired by another, not as a 
common good, but as an exclusive object of desire.55  The gesellschaft, in 
other words, creates a fictional, social bond that atomizes each individual, 
such that each person relates to the other, not as people conditioned by the 
customs and norms of reciprocity, which is the implicit nature of the 
gemeinschaft, but rather only relate in the momentary exchange of goods that 
establish and sunder the relationship in the exchange of goods or following 
periods of contractual obligation.  There is only a conglomeration of atomized 
persons in the gesellschaft, but there is no inherent or implicit relation beyond 
the establishment and limits of specified returns and contractual obligation.56 
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What is shown in Tnnies account of the gesellschaft is a particular 
construal of desire that bears no communal intent.  That is, desire is a 
unilateral movement of individual will, blinding oneself to all relations 
involved in what is desired.  The object of desire is objectified, abstracted 
from all implicit social relations involved in its creating or any bonds created 
by its attainment.  All in the gesellschaft is consumable and non-binding.  The 
gesellschaft is a non-inhabitable space and abstract time within which 
unilateral relations are transacted, just as seen in IllichÕs description of 
industrial capitalism.  Clearly expressed in both Illich and Tnnies is an 
account of human relations that are sustained by particular tools that mediate 
each one to another as inseparable from those they mediate.  The nature of the 
relationship is determined largely by the nature of the tool.  For the sustaining 
of a gemeinschaft or convivial society, where the relationships between those 
within are taken as a priori, the tools or mediums of relating, be they 
institutional or otherwise, must be designed such that the a priori relation is 
reinforced and constituted in the very architecture of the tool itself, not simply 
used to that end.  It is important to remember that tools are inextricable from 
the community or society that produces them.  All tools develop out of the 
structuring structures of any social body.57  If these structures are not designed 
for the good of the common, but for the good of a select few of the social body 
for mastering others, tools created in compliance with this dominating 
structure will only invert the relation of its users to the ends of the freedom-
limiting structureÐÐgesellschaft, which will only serve to enslave the human to 
those tools, be they institutional, mechanical or electronic.58 
Neither Illich nor Tnnies would claim that there will ever be an 
ideological city on a hill where gemeinschaft is exemplified absolutely.  This 
is the not the point at all.  Rather, each shows the importance and absolute 
necessity of understanding human relations as mutually contingent and 
sustained by the various systems of relations within the body polis, which 
requires an ongoing interrogation of these systemic relations in light of an 
implicit relation of interdependency.  This will involve first and foremost the 
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recognition that tools are relational extensions of the human that forge 
particular bonds that either assume or reject the a priori nature of the 
community as a body of living organs, mutually dependent and responsible for 
the body as a whole.  The inseparability of signs and symbols (tools), action, 
and individuals from the social body itself cannot be stressed enough.  This is 
so as much in the gesellschaft as in the gemeinschaft, even though the nature 
of tools and action are distinctly different and give way to divergent relations.  
In the gemeinschaft the tools, actions and each person is the social body, 
where time and space are inhabited.  For the gesellschaft, time and space are 
abstract; therefore, tools, actions and people exist within its totality but do not 
inhabit it in any way; all is rendered autonomous to varying degrees.  Essence 
and existence in the gemeinschaft are differentiated aspects of a single whole, 
whereas in the gesellschaft the two bear no necessary relationÐÐact and being 
are ontologically separable. 
This distancing of essence and existence (being and action) has a long 
history in the liturgical practice of the church.  In his ÒCorpus Mysticum,Ó 
Henri de Lubac illustrates this in terms of how the Eucharist is understood and 
articulated throughout the churchÕs history.  The corpus mysticum once 
entailed an indivisible whole of what would later be divided: historical body, 
sacramental body and ecclesial body.  Throughout the early church, the reality 
of the Eucharistic mystery is the reality of the church.59  The body and blood 
of the risen Christ, the bread and wine of the Eucharist, the liturgical mystery 
of God made man, and the liturgical acts of the gathered body are all 
inseparable parts of a differentiated, assimilated whole of the SonÕs sacrificial 
offering to the Father.  There is no essential difference between Christ and his 
body the church, made real by his real presence in the Eucharist.60  This union 
necessitates that the idea of the church and that of the Eucharist be mutually 
supporting and manifest the truth of each other.61  Even if the existential 
reality of the ecclesial body appears to negate the reality of Christ present in, 
by, and through the Eucharist, it must be understood to be bringing this 
eschatological reality into the present, not as a perfect unity but as a perfecting 
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unity.  That is, there can be no articulation of a ÒvisibleÓ and ÒinvisibleÓ 
reality of the church, one imperfect here on earth and another perfect in the 
heavenly realmÐÐexcept in the sense of that the invisible is eternally becoming 
visible in the present life of the church that is inseparable from its 
eschatological reality.  Accordingly, the church is always becoming the 
church; it is always being-assimilated to the offering of the Son to the Father, 
who is eternally being given and received through the proceeding of the Spirit.  
Any articulation of the church, then, must assume this natural union 
recapitulated in Christ, in spite of any visible divisions. 
This can only be understood ontologically as all things in their 
preexistent relation to the Eternal Logos, the natural nature of the human as 
developed by Maximus Confessor.  The liturgical practice of the church, 
therefore, must show forth this natural nature, not in its dividing of sacred 
from profane, but in its assimilating of the divine and human natures in, by, 
and through its liturgical tools and actions, materially manifesting its 
eschatological realization in Christ, historically, sacramentally, and 
ecclesiologically. 
 
IV 
Understanding tools as intrinsic to human relations helps to unmask the 
apparent navet of those who might think of tools, institutions, or economic 
norms as morally neutral or as mere communicative means to separable ends.  
Again, tools are not abstract from the social body within which they are 
created and used or create and use.  They are extensions of the human, as 
Marshall McLuhan rightly discloses.62  Tools relationally extendÐÐmediateÐÐ
persons to particular ends, which intend a particular relation to others within 
the social body.  Throughout the whole of church history this relational tool 
that mediates the body is none other than the Eucharist; however, it is the 
Eucharist, not as a substance mediated from one subject to another, but the 
Eucharist (sacrament) as that which it mediates and creates (ecclesia) as an 
extension of its mediator (Christ).  To the degree that this form of mediation is 
existentially manifest is the degree to which the ecclesia can be properly 
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called the body of Christ.  Nevertheless, this is not to separate the invisible 
from the visible because of an imperfect actualization of ecclesial form; rather, 
it is to suggest, following Illich, Tnnies, and de Lubac with them, that the 
invisible and visible, action and being, eschatological and temporal are 
inseparable differentiations that disclose the unfolding nature of the church, 
whose telos is deificationÐÐthe eternal event of GodÕs creating and 
assimilating nature to grace. 
To say, then, that Christ is the Liturgy is to say that the Church is 
Liturgy.  Neither of these statements should sound new or surprising; 
however, each have been ontologically separated in various ways.  Act and 
being (Christ and Liturgy) are separated by Duns Scotus in the thirteenth 
century, which is the result, as I will later argue, of the separation of the 
Eucharistic presence from the liturgical action, giving way to an understanding 
of the church, not as an existential participation in its eschatological 
realization, but as the space within which a ÒcontractualÓ moment of ChristÕs 
presence simultaneously begins and ends.  This contractual moment of divine 
presence construes the relational bond between God and the human, and 
therefore between all within the ecclesial body, not as naturally contingent 
upon God who is actus purus, but as a movement beyond nature toward an 
unnatural relation of sovereign willsÐÐcovenant.  God and the human relate to 
one another within the abstract space of Being (gesellschaft) but neither are 
contingent upon the other, which likewise renders all other relations as 
contractual exchanges among sovereign wills.  Knowledge of this contingent 
reality of human nature and human identity in its contingent relation to God is 
available only by a liturgical ÒtoolingÓ that inebriates the senses in such a way 
that draws the human beyond her own temporal construal of life and meaning.  
This intoxication is a movement beyond text and ritual habit; it is a permeation 
of the human as homo liturgicus, a mutually permeating actor who becomes 
text and ritual in the act of liturgy.  The liturgy itself is a sort of dramatic 
event, an epistemological formation of its participants that is always a 
movement beyond phenomenology.  That is, as a participation in the liturgy 
Christ is, the epistemological manifesting is always simultaneously an 
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ontological mediation of the body of Christ, neither capable of being rendered 
abstract from the other. 
The meaning of liturgy is imbibed by the participant through the tools 
and movements that constitute the liturgical action.  It is what is made both by 
the actions of liturgy and the tools of mediating the relation between God and 
the human, and therefore between all within the ecclesia.  What is made, 
therefore, is inseparable from these tools and actions, which is intended to 
make the church.63  What the church is is inseparable from its action and what 
is made by its actionÐÐthe church is in the making.  Christ, however, is the 
sole actor in the church.64  The liturgy of the church, therefore, participates in 
the singular Liturgy of GodÐÐChrist, who is the unconfused assimilating of 
human nature to divinity, gathering humanity into triune reciprocity.  
Therefore, the liturgy of the church must be a mimetic manifesting of its 
embodied nature as divine-human permeation and assimilation in Christ.  In 
other words, the Liturgy is a Person, whose name is Jesus.  The mimetic 
movements of the church makes ChristÐÐ(re)creates divine-human permeation 
and reciprocity, not in-itself but through participation, by the Spirit, in the 
Liturgy of God who incarnates himself in the material for the life of the world. 
There are a variety of ways the church has made this mimetic relation 
available, but throughout its history the mysteries, especially the Eucharist, 
stand apart as exceptional.  The sacraments are the primary tools by which 
Christ makes available volitive participation in his assimilating of human 
nature to the divine nature.  To say that the sacrament is a tool is at once to say 
that it is a vessel of the Holy and an extension of the Holy.  It carries with it 
the grace of GodÕs creative and redeeming act, but it is much more than a 
material vessel for the immaterial grace of God.  By extending the grace of 
God, the sacraments extend or manifest God.  This understanding of extension 
is very much in line with MaximusÕ understanding of the logoi mentioned 
earlier, as well as that development by Ivan Illich shown above.  Again, it is 
not the mediation of a substance from God to humanity, except in the sense 
that the Eucharist is the self-mediation of ChristÐÐit is that which it mediates; 
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the sacramental tool is to be understood as a relational extension of God that 
manifests the radical assimilation of the divine-human natures in Christ, which 
comports the body-soul to perceive Christ within the human subject as image 
and by likeness of virtue, made possible by the churchÕs habitus, to gaze upon 
all things as they exist within God.65  The logoi or principle of each created 
essence is its normative or natural existence as a measure of the eternal 
Logos.66  It is what Maximus refers to as its Ònatural nature,Ó its originally 
intended function as a manifesting agent of God.67  This, however, has been 
hidden or covered over by sin, such that one is only capable of seeing an 
entityÕs true function or nature in proportion to oneÕs volitive participation in 
the sacramental life of holy church.   
Some are wont to say that the sacrament is an "intensification" of the 
presence of God at work in the world, yet this intensification has more to do 
with the communicative reality of the material than the material as a vehicle of 
intensifying God.  The material elements of water, bread, wine, oil, hands, and 
so forth are tools that find their telos in the liturgical movement of God toward 
the world and the church toward God, each extending one to the other.  These 
tools receive their true purpose by being incorporated into the liturgical action, 
and by each tool and its function in liturgy does the human become aware of 
each material's natural nature as an extension of God that manifests his truth 
and life.  The transubstantiation that occurs is a change in nature by a change 
in function.  But the change in nature is a return to each material's natural 
natureÐÐlogos.  Remember, as it is with the early fathers of the church, when 
Jesus descends into the Jordan it is not the sinless One who is baptized; rather, 
ChristÕs baptism is the baptism of the whole world.  Yes, Jesus is baptized; 
however, as in the Gospel account the pivotal moment of JesusÕ baptism is 
who is made-manifest.  ChristÕs presence is intensified in the river Jordan by 
the descent of the Spirit and the speaking of the Father.  The intensity, 
however, is the manifestation of ChristÕs assimilating the world to himself in 
baptism and by the Spirit returning the world back to the Father as a holy 
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offering with the Son.  The true function of water is made-manifest in the 
baptism of Christ, which is continually made-manifest in each baptism of the 
church.  The child who is baptized does not become something she was not 
before baptism; rather, she becomes what she already is in Christ.  Likewise, 
the Eucharistic bread becomes more than the bread on a bourgeois dinner 
table, not because it becomes something other than bread but because the 
function of each loaf is transformed.  The intensity, then, is not a matter of a 
"substantial" change in the elements; rather, the intensity is located in the 
breadÕs functional becoming what it always wasÐÐthe fullness of GodÕs life 
that gathers humanity into the assimilating act of God in Christ through the 
everyday sustenance of GodÕs creative goodness.68  The material bread and 
wine, gathered into triune reciprocity through the liturgical action, is given a 
new name and purpose; it is now body and blood that deifies body and soul. 
This articulation of function and substance is not to deny the ontological 
transformation of the bread and wine where, following Aquinas, the Eucharist 
does not simply communicate something by its application but is what it 
communicatesÐÐÒnamely, ChristÕs own body.Ó69 What this functional 
orienting is meant to emphasize is the refusal of any binary between the 
substance of God and the action of God. As seen above with Maximus, the 
accomplishment of the mystery of GodÕs embodiment alters the condition of 
the human by ChristÕs self-mediation in the bread, which thereby transforms 
the substance of (we might even say substantiates) what it is to be human. This 
Eucharistic action, inseparable from the Eucharistic materials, is the incarnate 
reality70 that Òelevates man to God through his love for God and brings God 
down to man because of his love for man.Ó71 
This account of the Eucharistic table, which is not the exact concern of 
Ferdinand Tnnies, nevertheless bears an intimate likeness to the table within 
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the gemeinschaft.  The life of mutual possession and enjoyment is exemplified 
by the dinner table, for the table is the house itself in the gemeinschaft, the two 
are inseparable.  The economy of the house within a gemeinschaft is manifest 
by the return of its members, after their daily separation and dispersement in 
labor, to the table for sharing the very fruits of the labor of each.72  Within the 
gemeinschaft, as it is to be within the corpus mysticum, all forms of relating 
are constituted and understood by how each person is conditioned by the 
habitus of the Table. 
This is no doubt the case in the early church.  The food and drink of 
the LordÕs Table is that which gathers the community in the bond of Christ.  
The Eucharistic bread and wine are the food and drink of the eschatological 
community, for the bread and wine on which they dine is Christ.73  Ingesting 
Christ is to participate in ChristÕs assimilating human nature to divinity, which 
is to be gathered into the body of Christ, even consumed by God.  Ambrose 
makes the bold claim that the human becomes the dinner table of God. 
Christ dines on such food in us, He drinks such drink in us; 
with the intoxication of this drink, He challenges us to make a 
departure from worse things to those that are better and best.74 
The Eucharistic participant feasts and is feasted upon; she consumes and is 
consumed; she approaches the table of the Lord and becomes GodÕs dinner 
table.  Participating in Eucharist is to become EucharistÐÐto become Christ 
through volitive participation in the eternal act of the SonÕs assimilating 
human nature to himself, being gathered into the reciprocal life of Holy 
Trinity. 
The theological description of what takes place when the Christian 
participates in the Eucharistic celebration is of little dispute in the early 
church.  What is not always clear is how one participates in the celebration.  
The basic structure is mostly agreed upon, although the extent of participation 
by non-clerics is not always clear.  This is not altogether important for this 
particular investigation, as the particular movements of and materials for 
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Eucharistic celebration that are of concern here are largely evidenced if not 
clearly articulated.  What is of concern in this section as it relates to the 
Eucharist itself, is how the lay person participated in the offertory, the 
preparation of bread and wine, the reception of Eucharist, and the pietistic 
development that increasingly surrounded the consecrated bread and wine. 
As shown in chapter one, making offering has a lengthy history in 
Judaism that is in many ways handed down to the church.  In Romans 12, Paul 
offers a commentary on the Jewish oblation, the solemn procession with gifts 
toward the table, taking up the Greek prosphoraÑÒto bring forwardÓÑto 
invoke the offertory procession of gifts by Christians as their self-sacrificeÑ
their imitation of ChristÕs own immolation.75  The offertory procession of the 
church included the whole of the faithful gathered for liturgy, which was 
identified with ChristÕs death.  By bringing forward the bread and wine to be 
used in the Eucharistic celebration, the Christian brings herself forward with 
Christ as hisÐÐChristÕsÐÐoffering to the Father.  The bread is the liturgical tool 
that relationally extends the human toward God.  She is her bread; she is on 
the table.  Keeping with PaulÕs articulation of Òliving sacrificeÓ in Romans 12, 
the prayer in the liturgy of the Syrian Jacobites exemplifies this relation.  
...who offered to his father an acceptable offering for the 
expiation and redemption of the whole world: vouchsafe us, to 
offer ourselves to thee a living sacrificeÉ and like unto thy 
sacrifice which was for us, O Christ our Lord, forever.  
Amen.76 
What the liturgical procession and the oblation of bread make available to the 
early Christian is a means of participating in the self-emptying of God on the 
cross without undergoing a martyrs death, which is especially important in a 
Post-Constantinian world of relative peace for the church.  To be a martyr is to 
"guarantee" participation in the sacrifice of Christ, thereby confirming the 
promise of one's entrance into the heavenly realm, which many sought to do 
during various times of persecution throughout the Empire, often leading to 
their denial of Christ for fear of the same persecution.  This is frequent enough 
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that instructions are given not to seek martyrdom, for fear that one would end 
up rejecting Christ.  Martyrdom is never to be sought ought; martyrdom is a 
gift.  This exemplary witness to the truth of Christ was something that moved 
well beyond mere human forms of courage and endurance.77  Martyrdom is 
more like a seal of faithfulness.78  As an entrance into the faithfulness of 
Christ, participating in a death like his, the martyr becomes with every fiber of 
her beingÐÐmaterially and spiritually, truly human, one whose functional 
identity is an extension of Christ himselfÐÐthe martyr as the primary 
evangelical tool of God.  The individual martyr is not the primary agent 
involved in her martyrdom.  Christ alone is operative, as expressed in the 
martyrology of Felicitas above.  Each particular martyrdom is participatory, 
but is nevertheless done by none other save Christ.79  To ÒchooseÓ or to run 
after martyrdom, is to negate the truth of the embodied witness as ChristÕs 
own action and gift to the martyr, not something that can be sought after or 
chosen.80  Even Christ does not seek out his martyrdom, often hiding or 
running away, finally reaching the point of timeÕs fullness where there is only 
to give himself over to the will of the Father.  What is clearly evidenced in the 
early church's account of martyrdom is that it is one way to ensure that the 
faithful is participating in the way of crucifixion, undoubtedly baptized into 
Christ's death and resurrection. 
Therefore we have been buried with him by baptism into death, 
so that, just as Christ was raised from the dead by the glory of 
the Father, so we too might walk in newness of life.  For if we 
have been united with him in a death like his, we will certainly 
be united with him in a resurrection like his.81 
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Even though Paul is articulating baptism as the ChristianÕs union with ChristÕs 
death and resurrection, it is abundantly clear that the mimetic relation of 
baptism with death, which is clearly picked up in the early church and carried 
on to current day, is materially connected with PaulÕs physical witness of 
bearing in his flesh the sufferings of Christ.  Paul sees suffering as both a gift 
from Christ to the faithful and the participatory means that gives the faithful to 
Christ, for the attainment of salvation. 
I want to know Christ and the power of his resurrection and the 
sharing of his sufferings by becoming like him in his death, if 
somehow I may attain the resurrection from the dead.  Not that 
I have already obtained this or have already reached the goal; 
but I press on to make it my own, because Christ Jesus has 
made me his own.  Beloved, I do not consider that I have made 
it my own; but this one thing I do: forgetting what lies behind 
and straining forward to what lies ahead, I press on toward the 
goal for the prize of the heavenly call of God in Christ Jesus.82 
It is not the concern of this work to argue justification issues, although Paul is 
abundantly clear that it is a participation in the singular redemptive act of God 
in Christ that saves.  What is key for the purposes here is to show how oneÕs 
participation in a bodily witness to the death and resurrection of Christ is key 
for the early churchÕs understanding of human awareness as one assimilated to 
ChristÕs redeeming offering to the Father. 
 To be a martyr is to be one of the faithful who abandon all for the sake 
of Christ, Òforgetting what lies behind and straining forward to what lies 
ahead.Ó  With Constantine in the early fourth century, however, Christians 
begin to enjoy relative peace throughout the Empire, which alters greatly how 
the Christian would come to understand her life as a witness (martyr) to the 
faithfulness of Christ.  A new form of witness becomes necessary, what 
becomes known as "white martyrdom," which is directly associated with the 
monastic life.  This is clearly evidenced in ÒThe Rule of Saint Benedict,Ó 
where Saint Benedict links the life of the monastic with PaulÕs own words 
from his letter to the Philippians. 
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But as we progress in this way of life and faith, we shall run on 
the path of GodÕs commandments,É faithfully observing his 
teaching in the monastery until death, we shall through patience 
share in the sufferings of Christ that we may deserve also to 
share in his kingdom.83 
Not everyone had the luxury or ability to live in seclusion from the world.  
Another means of laying down oneÕs life for Christ would be requisite if the 
Christian was to know her life as one who participates in the via crucis.  One 
of the primary ways lay persons are incorporated into a new form of 
martyrdom is the offertory procession.  Just as the martyr lays down her crown 
by laying down her life, likewise does the offertory participant lay down her 
life by laying her bread upon the table of the Lord.84  This assimilation of the 
offertory procession to the martyrÕs procession, each bearing a mimetic 
relation to ChristÕs own procession to Golgotha, transfigures the Jewish 
offertory and procession.  The offertory now serves as the entrance into the 
incarnate life of God, whereby placing oneÕs bread upon the table is to empty 
oneself to be incarnated by God, becoming the bread of heaven received in 
liturgy.  The offertory procession is the churchÕs becoming in likeness the 
image of God she is in Christ, becoming like God in ChristÕs death and 
resurrection made available through bread and wine.  This proceeding is 
analogical, a symbolic proceeding that incorporates the participant into the 
fullness of ChristÕs entering the world.  What the offertory and the bread 
oblation make available to the liturgical participant is the ability to inhabit the 
space and time of liturgy.   
 It may at first seem a stretch to make the connection between the 
martyr's procession and the offertory procession; however, as Von Simson 
points out, the offertory prayer for the feast of the protomartyr St. Stephen 
evidences this point well: "Receive O Lord our offerings in commemoration 
of thy saints: that, as their sufferings rendered them glorious, so our devotion 
may render us innocent."85  The key to the ancient use of "devotion."  The 
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ancient usage of devotio bears the meaning of something like a "death vow.Ó86  
Aquinas recalls this same usage of devovere. 
Devotion is derived from devote; wherefore those person are 
said to be devout who, in a way, devote themselves to God, so 
as to subject themselves wholly to Him... it follows that 
devotion prescribes the mode of human acts, whether they be 
acts of the will itself about things directed to the end or acts of 
the other powers that are moved by the will.87 
Aquinas goes on to relate martyrdom to "external" offerings, because the 
offering and the vow are bound up together with human action.  What makes 
the offering "a sacrifice, properly speaking, requires that something be done to 
the thing which is offered."88  In the case of martyrdom it is the ÒbreakingÓ of 
the body, the destruction of the life because of the saintÕs witness to the truth 
of Christ.  Following this same paradigm, bringing bread to the Eucharistic 
table in procession is not itself a sacrifice; it is an oblation, for it has not yet 
been "broken, eaten, blessed," which would make it a sacrifice.89  The 
sacrificial aspect of one's offering occurs within the liturgical movement of 
consecration, which is the whole of the liturgy.  What is important to make 
plain is that the oblation of bread is a self-oblation.  It is to place oneself upon 
the table of the Lord, so to become sacrifice. 
 As seen in both Ambrose and Augustine there is an 
indistinguishableness of the Eucharistic action from the ChristianÕs 
participation in the offertory procession.90  The consecratory rite involving the 
bread and wine of communion is inseparable from the consecration of the 
faithful who participate in it.  It is a Òtwofold sacrificeÓ that one findÕs in early 
articulations of Eucharistic theology; God sanctifies the materials of bread and 
wine for  and as the sanctification of the recipient.  The bread and wine 
become operative in the work of GodÕs reconciling the world to himself in 
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order that the human would become likewise operative.  The oblation becomes 
a sacrifice with ChristÕs own sacrifice.  Just as the ÒtoolsÓ of bread and wine 
are extensions of GodÐÐChristÕs body and blood, so also does she who feasts 
on them become extensions of this same Logos, being memberedÐÐ
assimilatedÐÐto the Son through an active participation in the oblation, 
consecration and reception of the transubstantiated bread and wine.  To speak 
of transubstantiation is not to invoke a substance-accident argument, even 
though such a description is already present in the writings of Ambrose, 
Augustine and others; rather, it is again to manifest the truth of bread, wine, 
and all of humanity as icons of the IconÐÐChrist, tools created for manifesting 
the grandeur of God.  Participating in the offertory procession is an entering 
into divine reciprocity.  By her self-oblation, signified by the bread and wine 
brought forward,91 the Christian participates in being-assimilated to JesusÕ 
offering of himself to the Father.  Being so bound, the Christian is gathered 
into the Godhead with the Son through her participation in ChristÕs offering 
and, in receiving the bread and wine, she receives the very Spirit of God.    
That is, she receives by the Spirit her sanctified selfÑher true reality, for she 
is received into RealityÐÐthe Logos.  As aforesaid, it is the functional 
transformation of the material bread and wine that the Eucharist 
communicates or manifests, which intends a functional transformation of 
human action altogether.  Again, what mediates (Eucharist) is what is 
mediated (Christ), so that the recipient likewise becomes both mediator 
(Christ) and what is mediated (Eucharist). 
The particular expression of Eucharistic participation, especially the 
inseparability of the offertory from the whole of the Eucharistic rite, is a 
theology that arises out of the habitus of the early church and is formalized in 
the early medieval liturgies.  As Jungmann shows, the liturgical stakes are 
high in the early church, especially as it relates early on to the uprising of 
Gnosticism.  While the emphasis may have been ÒspiritualÓ for the nascent 
church in the first century, it becomes increasingly ÒmaterialÓ by the turn of 
                                                            
91 It must be remembered that symbol here is not abstract from the thing-symbolized.  The 
bread and wine offering of the Christian is her self-offering.  See also Williams, Eucharistic 
Sacrifice. 
Christ the Liturgy 
 168 
the third century.92  This ÒmaterialÓ sense is unnecessary to explicate before 
the new Gnosticism is faced by Irenaeus and the early church with him.  
ÒSpiritualÓ in the early church does not mean that which is contrary or 
opposed to the material;93 rather, it is nearly always a return or realization of 
the truth of materiality.  Ireneaus, as already discussed, perhaps better than 
anyone before or after his time, is able to hold together the true spiritual reality 
of human nature (image) with that which manifests this very truthÐÐ
participatory human action (likeness). 
The development of the offertory rite that occurs with the development 
of the liturgy on the whole is significant for its theological articulation to 
follow.  Ambrose and Augustine would not be able to speak of a Òtwo-foldÓ 
sacrifice had there not been the general rule of presenting gifts of bread and 
wine for liturgy, which is normative at least by the time of Cyprian in the mid-
third century.94  It is not universal how the offerings of bread and wine made it 
to the table for Eucharist, but it is abundantly clear that the faithful brought 
gifts of bread and wine for this purpose.  It is primarily in the West that 
bringing offerings up to the table was something done by lay people, 
something built into the very structure of the liturgy.95  This form of 
participation may not have been universally practiced in the church, though 
there is at least much evidence for generalizing.  What is of greatest concern 
here is that prior to the papal stational service in seventh century Rome, there 
is consistently an offering of bread and wine by the people and some form of 
bringing gifts to the table in procession by the people.96  In order to do liturgy 
everyone needed to participate in the offering, regardless of their ability.  
Cyprian is especially harsh in this regard, especially on those who had much 
to offer, saying to a rich woman:  Òdominicum celebrare te credisÉ quae in 
dominicum sine sacrificio venis, quae partem de sacrificio quod pauper obtulit 
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sumis.Ó97  Cyprian essentially accuses the rich woman of stealing because she 
brings nothing to offer and yet receives the Eucharistic gifts.  Cyprian is clear 
that to receive implies having oneÕs offering assimilated to the offering of 
Christ, which in turn, after consecration, (re)assimilates one to the body and 
blood of Christ.  The logic inherent to the offering and offertory rite of the 
early medieval church is an ontology of participation, specifically a 
participation in the sufferings of Christ, becoming one with him in his singular 
offering to the Father, for the life of the world, through a mimetic procession 
to the table of God.  The connectedness between the human and her bread is 
essential to the realization of the liturgical participantÕs martyrdom by 
procession.  The procession is inseparable from the act of consecration, but it 
remains at a different stage in the liturgical progression.  The bread oblation, 
however, does not fall from the sky and it is important to remember that the 
offerings of bread come from the homes of those participating in liturgy.98  
The people baked the bread that would be used for the Eucharistic feast. 
In the ancient and medieval world, as evidenced above in Aquinas, 
although in a different vain, human action transforms that which is acted upon.  
What is made by human hands is inseparable from those hands; it is a 
relational extension of a person, endowed with oneÕs character.  Bread is no 
less endowed, especially when one considers the human energy used in 
making bread in a non-electric world.  There is also bread that requires an 
extraordinary commitment by those who prepare it, take for instance Mexican 
mole, which contains 33 ingredients and takes approximately 12 hours to 
make.99  The exercise of human energy upon materials transforms the 
everyday into something more.  This more is human.  It comes to bear the 
spirit or energy of its creator, as she who creates always leaves a residue of 
herself in that which is created.  It is the human act of baking bread that 
endows the bread with the spirit of the baker.  As noted above in the case of 
works of art as being inhabited by the artist,100 likewise does the baker inhabit 
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her bread.  It is this interrelatedness of the human and her bread that manifests 
the fullness of the Òtwo-foldÓ sacrifice.  A person is an oblate, an offering, 
because she brings herself before God.  This is what occurs in the offertory 
procession.  It is a procession of the oblates, of those who have come to make 
and to be made an offering to God.  Processing and placing oneÕs bread upon 
the table of offering is made intelligible by the oblates preparing the bread to 
be an offering for sacrificial assimilation. 
The baking of bread and the liturgical procession are each bound up in 
the mystery, as the baking is a means of binding the baker to the sacrifice.  
The bread is not abstract from the baker; she is her bread; the oblation is the 
oblate.  Aquinas goes on to say that a sacrifice is an oblation that has been 
"offered to be destroyed in worship of God."101  If the offering remains in tact, 
that is, if it is not broken and no longer useful except as offering, then it is not 
a sacrifice.  Just as the Hebrew would cut his ram in two, so that it can no 
longer serve the purposes of the home but only be an offering, likewise is the 
bread of Eucharist broken, so that it cannot return to the dinner table nor be 
preserved; it must be consumed.  For this particular study, what is important to 
understand is the interrelation of bread, body, and the offertory procession, as 
well as sacrifice with the act of breaking.  What the medieval participant in 
liturgy would have "felt to be true," to borrow a phrase from Basil Willey, is 
that her procession with bread to the Lord's table was the "tool" by which she 
laid herself upon the table of Christ, to be immolatedÐÐmartyredÐÐin the 
breaking of bread, thereby becoming a martyr with Christ, receiving the 
fullness of her true self in consecrated return as bread from heaven, so to be 
incarnated by the Lord of Glory.  Through the offertory the human knows 
herself as one crucified with Christ; by receiving the sanctified bread, she 
knows herself as one who is likewise resurrected with Christ.  While baptism 
is a participation in the death and resurrection of God in Christ, there remains 
an inseparability of Baptism and Eucharist.  One might say that in the 
Eucharist the human receives her baptized (crucified) self, recapitulated in 
Christ.  Eucharist informs baptism, not vice versa, although the two are 
inseparable and even though baptism precedes Eucharist chronologically.  It is 
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in the Eucharist that Christ incarnates himself, giving life to mortal flesh.102  
This embodiment occurs when the human has devoted herself to Christ, 
broken in Divine worship by the breaking of her oblation-become-sacrifice, 
which returns to her in the Eucharistic feast endowed with the grace of God 
made manifest in the bread's true, functional reality as an extension (tool) of 
Christ, assimilating humanity to divinity and divinity to humanity. 
Eucharistic reception is the climax to this baking, processing, and 
sanctifying action.  Not to receive the Òremedy of the soulÓ103 is to stop short 
in the liturgical procession.  It is to deny reciprocity with God.  Augustine and 
Chyrsostom are already concerned by their congregationsÕ staying away from 
receiving the spiritual food, and Caesarius of Arles in the 6th century speaks to 
those who wear the sacrament around their neck that, Ôif it is beneficial to 
wear the sacrament how much greater benefit it is to actually feast on it.Õ  For 
Augustine, receiving the Eucharistic bread and wine is the consummation of 
the sacrificial offering.  Not to receive the gift that God has so graciously 
reciprocated by the consecratory action is to impose a unilateral, disinterested 
framing on the sacrament of absolute reciprocity.  Unilateral giving does not 
exist in the Divine Economy.  God gives that the human might give.  God 
receives that the human might be received.  Not to receive nullifies the 
offeringÑdenies the contingency of the recipient to the Giver, God.  To 
participate in the offertory is the first assent to this contingency; to receive the 
consecrated bread and wine is the second assent, which completes the first.  If 
the human does not receive the reciprocal gift of God in communion, by her 
non-involvement she denies (or in many cases is denied) her contingency upon 
God for fullness of life.104  To deny reciprocity, or to be denied the Eucharistic 
gift, is to deny or be denied the fullness of oneÕs being-known with the Son in 
the reciprocal life of God.  It is to be dislocated from oneÕs selfhood as 
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identified in the being-known of Father, Spirit, Son.  Justin Martyr in the early 
second century is already clear on this transformation of reception of one's 
true self in the intensification of the bread and wine made flesh and blood.  
There is a kind of fusion that occurs such that the assimilating of the Son to 
the human subject in liturgy is as material as a blood transfusion, but more in 
the sense of making the human's blood more itself by the body's consuming 
and being consumed by flesh and blood that is more than the human in herself. 
And this food is called among us Eucharist, of which no one is 
allowed to partake except one who believes that the things 
which we teach are true, and has received the washing that is 
for the remission of sins and for rebirth, and who so lives as 
Christ handed down. For we do not receive these things as 
common bread nor common drink; but in like manner as Jesus 
Christ our Savior having been incarnate by GodÕs logos took 
both flesh and blood for our salvation, so also we have been 
taught that the food eucharistized through the word of prayer is 
from Him, from which our blood and flesh are nourished by 
transformation, is the flesh and blood of that Jesus who became 
incarnate.105 
This ÒeucharistizationÓ is an enjoining of flesh and bloodÐÐhuman flesh with 
divine flesh, human blood with divine blood.106  Irenaeus is even more explicit 
as to how this blood-flesh (trans)fusion occurs. 
By His own blood he redeems us...  He has acknowledged the 
cup as his own blood, from which He bedews our blood; and 
the bread He has established as His own body, from which he 
gives increase to our bodies.107 
Justin and Irenaeus appear to read Paul quite literally, in terms of becoming 
flesh of Christ's flesh and bone of his bone (Ephesians 5.30), but it is Gregory 
of Nyssa who expresses this link most clearly, especially as it relates to the fall 
of Adam and how this occurred through consumption. 
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For it is necessary that the antidote should enter the human 
vitals in the same way as the deadly poison, in order to secure, 
through them, that the effect of the remedy may be distributed 
through the entire system...  What, then, is this remedy to be?  
Nothing else than that very Body which has been shown to be 
superior to death, and has been the First-fruits of our life."108 
If the human is to be enjoined to God in Christ, assimilated and sustained in, 
by, and through triune reciprocity, it is necessary that this occur through 
consuming the remedy that permeates the Òentire systemÓ of the body-soul.  
God disseminates himself in this meal.109  Cyril turns the notch further in 
articulating that Christ's re-creating and inhabiting the bread and wine is, 
through consuming this bread and wine, a re-creating and an inhabiting of the 
recipient. 
With perfect confidence, then, we partake as of the Body and 
Blood of Christ. For in the figure of bread His body is given to 
you, and in the figure of wine His blood, that by partaking of 
the Body and Blood of Christ you may become of one body 
and blood with Him. For when His Body and Blood become 
the tissue of our members, we become Christ-bearers and as the 
blessed Peter said, Òpartakers of the divine nature.Ó110 
The emphasis on the ontological ÒintensificationÓ that occurs by receiving the 
Eucharist cannot be pressed too far.  'You are what you eat,' says Augustine,111 
which is as with Leo the Great to say that, "we pass into the flesh of Him."112  
The Eucharistic recipient is adopted by God in, by, and through the bread and 
wine, completely consumed and overwhelmed by God.  This is what takes 
place as one approaches the holy food and drink, says Maximus. 
[The Eucharist] transforms into itself and renders similar to the 
causal good by grace and participation those who worthily 
                                                            
108 Gregory of Nyssa, The Great Catechism, XXXVII (NPNF). 
109
 Gregory of Nyssa, Commentary on the Song of Songs, Sermon 13. 
110 Cyril of Jerusalem, ÒThe Mystagogical Lectures,Ó IV.3, The Works of Saint Cyril of 
Jerusalem., trans. Leo P. McCauley and Anthony A. Stephenson, vol. II (Washington: 
Catholic University of America Press, 1970). 
111 Augustine, Sermons on the New Testament Lessons, VII.7 (NPNF). 
112
 Leo the Great, Letter LIX.II (NFPF). 
Christ the Liturgy 
 174 
share in it.  To them there is lacking nothing of this good that is 
possible and attainable for me, so that they also can be and be 
called gods by adoption through grace because all of God 
entirely fills them and leaves no part of them empty of his 
presence.113 
Not to receive, then, is not to enter into divine-human permeation.  If one of 
these aspects of participation is amiss, there is a notable lack in the human's 
relation to God, but primarily as it relates to the human's own understanding 
of her proximity to God. 
  
Conclusion 
The Eucharistic table is be understood as inseparable from the church itself. 
The church is the church because it makes and is made by Eucharist.  The 
tools and movements (liturgy) that surround it are to bear witness to the 
essential nature of the church as the extension of Christ.  The church as 
Eucharist means that the church is the self-mediation of Christ, who is 
manifest to the extent that the church exists as a community of reciprocity 
conditioned by the life, death, and resurrection of its Lord.  The church exists 
hereby to incorporate humanity into the action (labor) of the liturgy and so to 
be a recipient of the divine fruits of the table (Eucharist) that constitute the 
corpus mysticum.  This liturgical constituting of human nature as mysteryÐÐ
one who is Eucharistically assimilated to the Eternal Logos, is inseparable 
from the realization of the ecclesial body as a community of reciprocity and of 
the individual as a mutually intending participant within the body.  The 
liturgy, therefore, must resist any separation from the very being of the 
church.114 
The church, therefore, is to exist as a body who actively inhabits time 
and space as constituted by liturgy, as evidenced early on in the offertory rite 
and bread and wine oblation of the people.   In order for self-illumination as a 
being naturally contingent upon God to occur for the individual, there must be 
available a bodily engagement in the liturgical actions that constitute and 
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incorporate the human into this reality.  This bodily engagement will 
manifests the permeable nature of the human subject with the signs, symbols, 
texts, architecture, and all other tools and actions that and who mutually 
constitute time and space as porous with the Liturgy Christ is, so to become 
aware of the reciprocal and dynamic participatory nature of the human as 
liturgy, which consequentially mediates all human relations.  It is this form of 
mediation, as I will argue in the following section, that the late medieval 
reforms in liturgical practice loose from the laity, rendering non-clerics and 
non-elites in society impotent from realizing their full stature in Christ.  
Instead, the lay participant is severed from the liturgical action and becomes a 
spectator; the tool of the Eucharist that was instituted to free each for divine 
permeation is abstracted from the liturgy and its mystical body, alienating the 
lay person from the truth of her being-in-participation.  The lay person is left 
speechless, conditioned to become autonomously pious. That is, her loss of 
function gives way to a phenomenological loss of substance. 
  
5 Invoking the Secular 
 
ÒThe abolition of private property is the complete emancipation of all human 
senses and properties.Ó   
Ð Karl Marx 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
The relationship between humans and their tools, as I have argued in the 
previous chapter, is a relationship that is not always easy to discern; it is a 
complex relation that mediates the human to her world and the world to the 
human. Tools are in no way neutral to this mediating activity and often have a 
way of inverting the creator-created relation, such that the tool becomes the 
master of the human rather than an extension of her. This inversion is rarely 
purposed by the toolÕs creator and can occur so seamlessly that the relation 
may not problematized prior to the inversion, if ever problematized at all. 
Understanding the relationship of humans to their tools is, therefore, crucial 
for human flourishing and self-understanding, because tools mediate the 
relation between humans and their environment, others, and God. There is, as 
it were, no unmitigated relation; in order to comprehend the relation one must 
understand how the relation is mediated by the mediating tool, for what is 
mediated is inseparable from its medium. 
 Working with Ivan Illich, I have shown how an inverted relation of the 
human to her tool suspends the actual relation between subject and object, 
creating an unbridgeable gap between the two. Following Ferdinand Tnnies, 
I have argued that these tools are socially constituted and constituting, which 
either extend the range of human flourishing or constrict the nature of freedom 
by delimiting human sensibility to perceive oneself as a competitor for limited 
resourcesÑthe modern capitalist. Additionally, I have shown how the 
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Christian liturgical act of making Eucharist offers a convivial re-tooling that 
eliminates the fictional divide between subject and object through an act of 
self-mediation between the human and her Creator. Implicit to this convivial 
re-tooling is the realization that Christ is in his own Person the eternal 
assimilation of divine-human action, epistemologically made manifest in the 
liturgy of the church catholic; and the liturgical action a microcosm of God's 
act of creating the universeÑa calling into being a new creation that is always 
being created. 
Creation is understood here as an eternal action, and as such there is 
never a point at which creation is either complete or incomplete.  It is in its 
becomingÐÐeternally becoming what it already is.  Difference, here, lies in 
participation, and the eternal distinction between Creator and creation is an 
eternal volition of love by both Creator and created.  The created difference is 
a freedom to love without coercive return.  There is no obligatory love for the 
Creator by the created, nor by Creator for creation.  Love is, however, 
compulsory, a sort of non-compulsory compulsionÐÐan irresistible desire to 
love that which alone is lovable.  Only Love can be loved,1 for only Love can 
be loved for itself as it is the very return it demands.  Love only obliges itself, 
and once it is given it "must" be returned, even though its return is, as Milbank 
describes the return of the gift, a non-identical repetition.2  Love is an eternally 
repeated event that manifests itself in differentiated energies.3 
Tracing late Medieval reforms in liturgy, whereby the lay person is 
continuously, even if not systematically or Òintentionally,Ó extracted from this 
particular bodily comportment, I seek to show in the following section how 
this distancing of the lay subject from the movements of liturgy serve to 
alienate her from knowing herself and all things in their contingent reality in 
the above exclusive relation.  This exclusive relation, as we have seen in 
Maximus and throughout the early medieval church, is the human relatedness 
to each person, place or thing as a byproduct of her relation to God and each 
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person's, place's, or thing's exclusive relational contingency in the church as 
liturgy.  This exclusive relation should not be mistaken as an evangelical 
appeal to a "personal relationship with Jesus."  Rather, because the origin of 
human identity and relationality is God, the capacity to relate to anything and 
everything exists as a consequence of the CreatorÕs relationship to creation in 
its multiplicity.  The extent to which the human relates to God as imago Dei is 
the extent to which she relates to all things.  Peter is not related to God 
because of his right relation to Paul; PeterÕs exclusive relation to God exacts 
his right relatedness to Paul who shares a common nature and reality as an 
image of the Eternal recapitulated in Christ, for which both are created.  The 
liturgical diminution of this exclusive relating to God and consequential 
relating to all things did not happen over night; rather, it happened over the 
course of several hundred years.  It should also be made clear at the outset that 
it is not being argued that the reforms to be discussed below were in any way 
an attempt to create this dislocation.  At best, they are efforts to heighten the 
humanÕs awareness of the awesomeness of God and at the very least 
accidental, each of which bear quite unforeseen consequences.  It will be 
argued that these liturgical transitions instigate and make sensible a human 
subjectivity apart from an exclusive relation to the Divine, i.e. secularism.  
Secularism, and its not so distant cousin humanism, is hereby understood as 
the flattened-out construal of human relationality whereby material bodies do 
not relate to other material bodies except as self-contingent, sovereign and 
autonomous material bodies.  There is no relating to the other except in the 
direct, unmitigated relation of mutually exclusive subjects or mutually 
inclusive subjects of like nature.  Again, this shift in human relationality is not 
to be causally linked; rather, it is the shaping of the human imaginary, the 
construal of desire that is to be emphasized, one that opens the subject to a sort 
of onto-theological construal of reality, which in the end creates an 
unbridgeable chasm between the celestial and the terrestrial. 
What will be evidenced below is how medieval liturgical reforms serve 
to substantiate liturgical signs and symbols, relieving them from their relation-
creating function in-the-between of human creative participation in God.  This 
move from a function-oriented ontology, in which all things exists in a 
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participatory relation, to a substance-oriented ontology, whereby existence in-
itself is purported, is a move from active manifesting and mediating toward a 
liturgy of spectacle that disassociates the liturgical action from the being of the 
church.  The church becomes the mediator of divine substance, divided from 
the Christ whose body it mediates, rendered the arena within which the 
spectacle of divine substance occurs, separable from the temporal reality of 
the ecclesial body.  The implications of liturgical spectacle as opposed to 
active manifesting implies the substantive communication of a wholly-other 
fixed reality that is always external to the one receiving that which is 
Òmediated.Ó  This mediated otherness only maintains the otherness of both 
parties involved in the exchange, as is the case within a gesellschaft.  To 
actively manifest, however, is to mediate or bring together what is at once 
inherent and transcendent to she who manifests by participation.  It is 
necessary to understand that the one who manifests, that which is made-
manifest, and the manifesting action are each inseparable differentiations of a 
whole economy of divine-human permeation.  Only in this sense can the 
church be understood to mediate God; that is, through its liturgy and the 
reciprocal life of its people formed and conditioned by it, the church becomes 
that which it mediatesÐÐChristÕs body. 
 The assimilation of humanity to divinity, if not "new" with the Christ-
event of God's becoming Human but the very act of God's creating as an 
eternal act exceptionally made-manifest in the fullness of time, is then to 
endow the created with divinity for its eternal manifesting by participating in 
God's eternal creative actÐÐan eternal state of becoming, i.e. deification.  The 
assimilation of human nature to the divine nature in Christ, which is the 
gathering of human nature into triune reciprocity, is a return of the human to 
her original function as she who manifests and mediates the truth of the eternal 
relation-of-participation all of creation is in God.  This relation-of-
participation names the absolute contingency of all things in their becoming 
assimilation to the Eternal Son in his own absolute relation of love with the 
Father and Spirit.  That which has been fully assimilated to God in Christ is 
eternally being assimilated to God in Christ, but this assimilation, as an act of 
God, is an eternal action that is always eschatologically complete in its 
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becoming.  It is never fixed; it is always moving toward completionÐÐ
deification.  If it were to cease in movement it would either be subsumed into 
divinity, negating the particularity of difference granted humanity at creation, 
or it would become a fixed entity in its own right, which is impossible.  The 
human is God only by participation, not in-herself.  That is, the human exists 
only in relation to God's own absolute self-contingency.  There is no existence 
apart from participation in God, even if participation is rendered negatively.4 
The focus of this interrogation will be on key elements in the 
development of liturgy throughout the late Medieval world, namely: 
Eucharistic controversies and practice in terms of its offering, baking, 
touching, receiving, and the pieties surrounding each; the condensing of the 
libelli (multiple liturgical books) into a single missal or sacramentary; church 
architecture and how it is fashioned by and fashions the movements of liturgy; 
as well as transitions in the ordination of priests from pastoral need to 
stipendiary demand, including rites involving the consecrating of the hands of 
the priest and how this relates to the consecration of the Eucharist and its 
preparation. 
 
I 
The liturgical habitus of the church throughout its history is hardly something 
that can be examined locally and universalized as normative for the church 
catholic.  There are many liturgical forms occurring in the various locales of 
the early and medieval church.  What will be highlighted below are a variety 
of practices that manifest both the brevity of human contingency on God and 
reforms that largely undermine the truth of human identity in the being-known 
of God.  Once again, it is not being argued that the various shifts or reforms in 
liturgy throughout the medieval era are an effort to create a secular, 
humanistic identityÐÐquiet the contrary; rather, it is to show how the logic of 
secularism, or the secular imaginary, is nevertheless embedded in the 
reformed practices that were meant to sustain the contingency they negate. 
What is crucial for this investigation is firstly that the church's 
articulation of how one comes into contact with divinity is through the 
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material, specifically through bread and wine.  Second, to prepare an oblation 
is to prepare oneself to receive; third, to process with oneÕs oblation is to 
participate in the procession of martyrs with Christ; fourth, to be broken as a 
sacrificial offering to God is to be assimilated to divinity through the 
Eucharistic rite; and fifth, to receive the consecrated bread is to be fused 
togetherÐÐassimilatedÐÐwith Christ, flesh of his flesh, bone of his bone, 
ontologically transubstantiated to be God by adoption.  What is at stake, 
therefore, is whether or not the teachings of the church with all the 
soteriological and ontological implications of oneÕs participation in Holy 
Eucharist match up with the participatory actions of the everyday lay person.5 
Eucharistic theology is not at issue, at least not directly; rather, the 
question this study is asking is: what is the theology embedded in Eucharistic 
practice in the late medieval church, primarily in the West?  Following 
Bourdieu, there is an inherent logic (an inherent theology) in the habitus of a 
social body.6  Character and cognition are inseparable and theory never comes 
before praxis; the two are distinct parts of a whole.  Even if a particular theory 
initiates a particular practice it can only do so congruent with or in opposition 
to a prior habitus inscribed on persons, what Bourdieu calls Òschemes of 
perception.Ó7  To reiterate the point IÕve been pressing: knowledge, especially 
knowledge of oneself as imago DeiÐÐthe human as utterly contingent upon the 
perichoretic life of Holy Trinity, is for the early and medieval church available 
only by way of participation in the liturgical drama that incorporates the 
human subject into absolute reciprocity of Love, i.e. deification, which is the 
becoming likeness through the churchÕs habitusÐÐliturgy.  Liturgy, therefore, 
is the habitus of the church inhabited through participatory movements 
proscribed by the Liturgy-Christ, in whom all liturgies find their intelligibility, 
either positively or negatively.  The accessibility of this liturgical inhabiting is 
how the human gains understanding of herself as liturgy (homo-liturgicus)ÐÐ
as one who participates in the Liturgy-Christ, assimilated to the Second Person 
of the Trinity in creation, revealed in the Incarnation, and continuously made-
manifest through oneÕs proportionate relation-of-participation.  Volition is 
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key; however, volitive participation arises out of non-conscious habituation; it 
does not precede incorporation in the habitus.8  Awareness is inessential to 
what one knows through the habitus of the community.  No one is ever 
completely aware of what they are doing, and what a person does always 
means more than they are capable of understanding or determining in the act.9  
In other words, one could be a Christian unawares, as it were, and this same 
person could ÒdecideÓ to become the Christian she is all the while remaining 
oblivious to the plethora of movements and conditionings that led her to the 
ÒdecisionÓ she was conditioned to make.  The habitus in which the human is 
disciplined construes her imagination to perceive all things in the particular 
way of the habitus, which will not determine the actions or awareness of the 
individual causally, but rather remains the perceptive parameters by which the 
subject will inhabit space and time. 
The Eucharistic transformation of the bread and wine is the Eucharistic 
transformation of the liturgical participant.  By the movement of God's 
descending upon the elements the participant is raised into God, assimilated to 
the flesh and blood of the Son to participate in absolute reciprocal Love.  To 
know this, is to know through participating in the liturgical action that 
habituates one to know that this is occurring in liturgy.  Speaking words to 
express, remember, understand or gain awareness of this truth is intelligible 
only by those who are engaged in the movements of liturgy.  This is the non-
translatability of the liturgical linguistic.  Only those who inhabit the liturgy 
are able to speak and listen to the language, for the language is in the actions 
of the liturgical body.  Liturgy is the speech-act of the church, and as speech-
act it makes possible and available a certain form of thinking: it is thought, 
word, and deed in all their inseparability.  This is what is meant by one's 
proportionate relation, such that the articulative capacity is determined by 
one's bodily comportment, much like speaking a foreign language.  To know 
the words is not to speak the language.  To speak the language is the be part of 
the culture in which the language is spoken and "makes sense."  The extent of 
enculturation will determine the mastery of the language, which does not 
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mean that one will necessarily be able to grammatically parse sentences well, 
only that he or she can speak sensibly with the mutually perceiving culture. 
It is clear, therefore, that the extent of engagement and the manner of 
participation in liturgy will give way to a particular understanding of hierarchy 
and ecclesiology.  The alienation of the lay person from her participatory role 
in liturgy is something already made abundantly clear by Jungmann, Dix, De 
Lubac, and others.  What has not been made explicit is that this is not only an 
issue of ecclesiology or clericalism; rather, it is the collateral damage on both 
the humanÕs own self-knowledge and, as a consequence, the rising of a social 
imaginary, which is no less liturgical, that ceases to have ontological 
reference.  This constricting of the bodyÕs movementÐÐthe alienation from 
liturgy, delimits oneÕs self-knowledge to a being that exists outside the divine 
economy, as opposed to a clergy person who does liturgy and is therefore 
assimilated to the Son in divine reciprocity. 
Jungmann masterfully outlines these various transitions throughout 
history; however, his focus is largely on the Òold grandmotherÓ who sits in 
church as a spectator fingering her rosary while liturgy takes place and the 
need for the communal celebration to be communal and not something ÒsaidÓ 
by priests.10  While this is crucial for any reasonable ecclesiology, it is 
necessary to realize that the old grandmotherÕs alienation from liturgy does not 
simply give way to ÒindividualismÓ or bad forms of piety.11  This dislocation 
from liturgical participation is an alienation from knowing oneÕs human nature 
as assimilated to the divine nature in Christ.  The human is existentially 
reduced to a nature that bears no ontological reference beyond being in-itself 
or being-in-the-world.  Human nature is knowable as immanent to the 
individual, or at best to the social body.  The liturgies of the early medieval 
church seem to be aware of this body-knowing of its participants.  There 
appears to be no explication of this among the fathers, although there is plenty 
of evidence that participation is crucial to the life of the faithful.  What is 
explicit, is that a person is who they are in liturgy, for only in liturgy do they 
become the image they are. 
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Since the inception of the church the need to participate in ChristÕs 
offering to the Father has been an essential aspect of what it means to be his 
follower.  Bringing an analogous offering of bread and wine to the Christian 
assembly was a normative practice, whether it was held in procession or 
placed on a side table without much ado.12  The ceremonial aspect of the 
offertory enters liturgical praxis by the mid-late second century, with 
processional norms in Rome, Milan and Northern Africa by the third and early 
fourth centuries.  The offertory procession became the demarcation of the 
liturgy of the catechumens and the liturgy of the faithful (now commonly 
known as the liturgy of the Word and the liturgy of the Eucharist).13  What is 
important about this is that the unbaptized were unable to participate in 
making offering or the offertory rite.  The importance of this cannot be 
underestimated.  Taking place in the Eucharistic rite, of which the offertory is 
its beginning, is the volitive participation in the assimilation of the church to 
the Son, by the power of the Spirit, to be a single offering to the Father.  The 
offerings of bread and wine are not accidental to this act.  The oblation and the 
oblate are inseparable.  The unbaptized cannot make offering because they 
have not yet intended their assimilation in Christ.  To receive the offering of 
the unbaptized would be to sever the oblate from her oblation and transform 
the oblation to an exchange of goods, for it is in the reception of the 
Eucharistic bread and wine, of which the unbaptized are unable, that makes 
sense of the oblation as an extension of the oblate.  To give and not receive 
places the dignity of the gift in human action or ability rather than the act of 
God in Christ who alone is able.  Not to receive is to deny (be denied) 
relational mediation with God in the Eucharist, whereby the recipient becomes 
Eucharist.  It is, therefore, expected that anyone who brings their offering for 
the liturgy would also receive.  This reciprocal relation is evidenced clearly in 
Walafrid Strabo who reproves those who bring their bread and wine as an 
offering but then leave before receiving.14  While Eucharistic reception 
                                                            
12 Theodor Klauser, A Short History of the Western Liturgy: An Account and Some 
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withers away throughout the early medieval era, it still appears that at least up 
through the 9th century, if a person brought bread and/or wine as an oblation 
for sacrificial offering they should likewise receive the fruits of the table. 
The theological, as well as phenomenological, importance of the whole 
church's active participation in the act of making bread for use in the liturgy of 
the Eucharist as well as participation in the offertory procession and then 
reception of the consecrated bread and wine cannot be stressed enough.  
Phenomenologically, knowledge is something that arises from a habitus.  A 
person's life and work is concretely expressed in bread and wine, that which is 
fashioned by the labor of their own body as well as being the everyday stuff of 
life.  The meaning of the bread is bound up together with its making and 
offering and the one making and offering; to bring bread and wine to offer 
grants to the bread and wine its sacrificial meaning.  As it is with Aquinas, if 
the oblation of bread and wine is not used for the Eucharistic celebration then 
it is not a sacrifice.  It is impossible, however, to think that all the bread and 
wine brought by the people would have been used for Eucharist.  
Nevertheless, to place the common bread and wine of all on a common paten 
and a common table is to gather the offerings together as one.  To use only 
some of the gathered bread is no longer to distinguish between any one 
person's offering.  Gathered together, it is now a single offering, and to divide 
is to separate one offering.  We see here in the earliest practices of the 
offertory that any sense of an offering and sacrifice is that of the whole people, 
not simply pope, bishop, priest or deacon.15  What is clearly evidenced in the 
practice of gathering the bread together as a single offering is the implicit 
nature of the Eucharistic tool (offertory) as a reciprocal action of 
interdependent relations.  This particular form of gathering the fruits of human 
labor as an oblation will eventually fade away, and the offertory rite will cease 
to image the interdependency of the ecclesial body. 
To give bread and wine is to give of one's own substance;16 therefore, 
to lay one's bread upon the table of the Lord is to participate in oneÕs 
eschatological recapitulation in Christ, uniting each to the whole of ChristÕs 
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body, the church.  The early church had no difficulty drawing this connection.  
Consistently, the Christian is referred to a grain of wheat ground together with 
the whole body of grains to make a single loaf.  Cyprian goes further to say 
that the body comes together both in bread and chalice, and with Christ by the 
same.   
And this we can plainly perceive to be contained in the sacred 
mystery of the cup. For Christ bore the burden of us all, having 
borne the burden of our sins. And so we can see that by water is 
meant GodÕs people, whereas Scripture reveals that by wine is 
signified the blood of Christ. When, therefore, water is mixed 
with wine in the cup, the people are made one with Christ and 
the multitude of believers are bonded and united with Him in 
whom they have come to believe. And this bonding and union 
between water and wine in the LordÕs cup is achieved in such a 
way that nothing can thereafter separate their interminglingÉ  
Hence, when we consecrate the cup of the Lord, water alone 
cannot be offered, no more than can wine alone. For should 
anyone offer up only wine, then the blood of Christ will be 
there, but without us, whereas if there is only water, the people 
will be there, but without Christ. So it is only when both are 
mingled, bonded, united, and fused one with the other that this 
spiritual and divine mystery is accomplished. And just as the 
LordÕs cup consists neither of water alone nor wine along but 
requires both to be intermingled together, so, too, the LordÕs 
body can neither be flour alone nor water alone but requires 
that both be united and fused together so as to form the 
structure of one loaf of bread. And under this same sacred 
image our people are represented as having been made one, for 
just as numerous grains are gathered, ground, and mixed all 
together to make into one loaf, so in Christ, who is the bread of 
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heaven, we know there is but one body and that every one of us 
has been fused together and made one with it.17 
CyprianÕs account expresses clearly that the offerer is her offering.18  As noted 
before, the ontology of a "thing" in the world of the early church is its 
function.19  The bread functions as a bodily offering, which is the same reason 
why Ignatius will refer to himself as wheat, ground by the teeth of the wild 
beasts.20  The offerer is an offerer inasmuch as she functions as such.  If she 
does not offer, her ontology is phenomenologically reduced to a substance 
orientation, no longer existing in a relation-of-participation.  Also emphasized 
by Cyprian is that union with the wineÐÐChristÐÐbrings together the 
differentiated elements of the bread and waterÐÐthe people.21  Just as common 
bread is made by mixing flour with water, likewise is heavenly breadÐÐthe 
body of ChristÐÐmade by each personÕs union with Christ. 
With the introduction of the papal stational mass in the seventh century 
the offertory is changed, perhaps only or at least largely due to matters of 
practicality.  It is no longer a procession of the entire gathered body; rather, 
the pope and his deacons come down among the people to gather their 
offerings.22  While the people are no longer participating in the procession 
itself, it remains that the gifts are gathered and the procession retains the 
original intent of gathering the body together and coming before God to 
participate in Christ's assimilating of human nature to himself.  By the eighth 
century, however, the bread and wine offered by the people are no longer 
placed on the altar table itself; rather, it is brought up by the deacon and 
placed post altare.23  Again, this development appears to be quite practical in 
nature.  For one reason or another, most of the people were no longer 
receiving communion, making the amount of bread needed for celebration less 
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and less.24  Rather than continue the practice of taking some bread and wine 
from the whole of the gathered bread-body and wine-blood of the people, 
however, the priest now uses only his own bread and wine offering from his 
own store.25  Understanding this practical shift theologically and how it is 
"felt" over time phenomenologically, shows that the oblation of the people, 
because it functions only as an oblation, suspends the lay people from their 
participation in the sacrifice of the church.  Lay people make an oblation 
offering, but it is only the clergy who make a sacrificial offering; therefore, it 
is only the clergy who "truly" participate in being assimilated to the Son, 
being likewise the only ones gathered into divine reciprocity. 
Habituation gives way to imagination, for a personÕs inclinations are 
shaped by the habitus in which he or she is engaged.  What constitutes truth 
and reality for a person will be determined by the wide-range of habitudes in 
which he or she is involved.26  This is not to say that what their actions 
manifest will be true in the sense of empirical verification; however, it does 
mean that what is ÒfeltÓ to be true is determined by how one is habituated to 
Òfeel.Ó  The saying, ÒHow can something so wrong feel so right?Ó is only able 
to be asked by one whose inclinations are disciplined to feel ÒrightÓ about that 
which is Òwrong.Ó  Intuition is learned through a particular habitus and is 
inseparable from the plethora of material factors, bodily and environmental, 
that shape a personÕs imagination throughout their lifetime.  This is no less 
true in liturgy, especially as it relates to the liturgical proximity of the 
Christian to her God.  Alienating the lay person from her participation in the 
procession itself and incorporation in the churchÕs sacrifice, even for the sake 
of practicality, displaces her imagination.  There remains an awareness of 
ChristÕs presence and communication in, by, and through the bread and wine; 
however, this communication no longer has anything to do with participation 
in the sacrificial oblation proper.  The presence of God is no longer bound up 
together with the participatory action with the whole of the body in the making 
of Eucharist. 
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The major shift in lay participation begins to be most visible in the 
ninth century, but it is no longer for reasons of feasibility.  The sanctity of the 
person and the oblation become the focal point of the liturgical action.  Of 
course this is nothing new, especially as it relates to the Eucharistic 
celebration.  Paul already warns of partaking of the bread and wine without 
having first examining oneÕs faithfulness in his first letter to the Corinthians. 
For as often as you eat this bread and drink this cup, you 
proclaim the LordÕs death until he comes.  Whoever, therefore, 
eats the bread or drinks the cup of the Lord in an unworthy 
manner will be answerable for the body and blood of the Lord.  
Examine yourselves, and only then eat of the bread and drink 
of the cup.  For all who eat and drink without discerning the 
body, eat and drink judgment against themselves.27 
This warning is carried on consistently throughout the writings of the fathers.  
Augustine and Chrysostom are careful to articulate that none should receive 
the sacrament without true repentance; however, both Augustine and 
Chrysostom are likewise mournful that many do not receive when they come 
to church.  Continuing their plea in the early ninth century, complemented 
with a sense of reasonable abstention, Jonas, bishop of Orleans, makes his 
own appeal. 
There are some, burdened by sin, who are rightly deprived of 
participation in so great a sacrament by the judgment of a 
priest.  What is even more perilous and worthy of correction, 
there are a good many who withdraw from this sacrament 
partly out of carelessness, partly out of sloth.  Such people 
hardly even [receive] in the course of a year, except on the 
three great feasts, and then, more out of custom that out of 
devotion.  These latter either do not know, or do not want to 
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know, that the soul deprived of spiritual food dies just as the 
body does if deprived of food and drink.28 
The tension is held together: if the people are among the baptized and are 
present in church they should receive; if they are in a state of sin, they should 
abstain.  What is most important to remember in conjunction with the 
Eucharist and the purity of the recipient, however, is that the holiness of the 
recipient is not understood to alter the truth of the Eucharist itself, but rather 
its effects.  Additionally, it is crucial to remember that life in the medieval 
world depends on this sacred food and drink.29  Not to receive is not a matter 
of little consequence for the medieval Christian, for those who decline to 
receive is a matter of faithful concern, a holy fear.  Additionally, the 
injunction not to receive is also out of concern for the whole of the body.  If 
there are those who unworthily receive communion, because the Eucharist is a 
unifying food and drink, it would contaminate the whole of the faithful body.  
The instruction to interrogate oneself before receiving communion, therefore, 
bears salvific concern for both the individual communicant and the whole of 
the gathered body.  This latter concern, however, will be picked up in the 
theological writings that surround the Eucharist in the late medieval era, 
beginning with Paschasius RadbertusÕ publication of his De Corpore et 
Sanguine Domini in 831. 
RadbertusÕ treatise on the Eucharist changes theology, at least in the 
West, what Alexander Schmemann often refers to as Òwestern captivity,Ó from 
which it has never quite recovered.30  Many before Radbertus have written on 
the sacraments, focusing on the Eucharist as the sacrament of sacraments, 
most notably Ambrose, Cyril of Jerusalem, Augustine, Maximus Confessor, et 
                                                            
28 Jonas of Orleans, De Institutione Laicali, II.18, cited in Nathan Mitchell, Cult and 
Controversy: The Worship of the Eucharist outside Mass (New York: Pueblo Publishing 
Company, 1982), 97. 
29 Caesarius, ÒSermon 187,Ó in Saint Caesarius of Arles: Sermons., trans. Mary Magdeleine 
Mueller, vol. III (Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 1973). 
30 This, I will argue, is due in large part to the church throughout history having placed the 
theological cart before the liturgical horse.  Rather than realizing and fully articulating the 
implicit theology in liturgical action, whereby theological articulation bears a "descriptive" 
nature, theological descriptors have become abstracted from the liturgical actions of the 
theological bodyÐÐthe church, and are no longer sensible or intelligible within the body 
schema of the church. Again, liturgy makes theology possibleÐÐeven necessary, and theology 
is in a sense convertible with liturgy, yet always as constituted by liturgy and not vice versa. 
Christ the Liturgy 
 192 
al; however, each of the fathers prior to Radbertus deal with the Eucharist in 
its liturgical context, within the action of its making.31  Radbertus, however, 
introduces a bifurcated dialogue that removes the Eucharist from the liturgical 
action of the offering body, thereby separating the sacred food from the sacred 
action.  This understanding of the mystery, while it remains the action of 
Christ that grants the Eucharist his presence, ceases to bear much if any 
relation to the participatory actions of the people involved in the making.  
Radbertus takes up Ambrose to argue that Christ's presence in the Eucharist 
occurs through the priestÕs repetition of the words of institution.  However, 
unlike Ambrose, Radbertus divides the words of institution from liturgy, such 
that one could repeat the words of institution only and still receive the "same 
results."  No longer bound up together with the liturgical action, the shift from 
a function-oriented ontology to a substance-oriented ontology is introduced, 
which will plague dialogues in Eucharistic theology to the present day. 
This theological bifurcation is already established in the liturgical 
action of the ninth century.  Before Radbertus writes his De Corpore, 
Charlemagne issues a liturgical legislation that alienates the lay person 
completely from the table of offering; lay persons are permitted only to make 
their offering outside the choir screen.32  It is also common at this time for the 
lay person to receive communion only in one kind or the wine through a straw, 
and to have the bread placed in the mouth and not in the hands.33  Many of 
these reforms are likely due to the uprising of the Medieval penitential laws, 
which have grave consequences for those who mishandle the bread and 
chalice of Eucharist.  In an eighth century penitential ascribed to Bede, there 
are numerous injunctions placed on those who drop, spill, or lose any part of 
the Eucharist. 
If a drop [from the chalice] falls upon the altar, he shall do 
penance for three days.  If on account of carelessness a mouse 
eats [the host], thirty or forty days.  He who has lost a small 
portion of it in the church and [who] does not find it shall do 
penance for twenty days or sing seventy psalms every day...  
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He who spills the chalice at the end of the service shall do 
penance for thirty days.34 
These rites of penance were of no small consequence.  During the time of 
penance, the individual would often be expected to live only on bread and 
water,35 but would have the greater consequence of not being able to receive 
communion during their period of penance, which could jeopardize one's 
salvation.  In the "So-called Roman Penitential" (ca. 830) the consecrated 
bread and wine are considered very dangerous elements. 
If the host falls to the ground from the hand of the officiant, 
and if any of it is found, every bit of what is found shall be 
burnt in the place in which it fell, and its ashes [shall be] 
concealed beneath the altar, and the priest shall do penance for 
half a year.  And if it is found, it shall be purified above, and he 
shall do penance for forty days.  If it only slipped to the altar, 
he shall perform a special fast.  If through negligence anything 
drips from the chalice to the ground, it shall be licked up with 
the tongue, the board shall be scraped, and [the scrapings] shall 
be burnt with fire; and he shall do penance for forty days.  If 
the chalice drips on the altar, the minister shall suck it up, and 
the linen which came in contact with the drop shall be washed 
[three?] times, and he shall do penance for three days.36 
If the abbot of Corbie was not familiar with this particular penitential, it would 
certainly have been easily understood, and the instructions for dealing with the 
sacrament certainly bears the mark of "real presence," and not merely 
"spiritual" in the modern sense of the word.  The above penitentials, however, 
provide insight as to how the Eucharist was "felt" and comprehended in the 
medieval world.  It is no great surprise that the chalice would be taken away 
nor that the bread would no longer be handled by the lay person.  Whose fault 
would it be if the bread or wine hit the ground?  Who would have to lick it up, 
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scrape it, and fast for half a year?  Danger doubly surrounded the Eucharist, 
but now, once again, this dangerous food is of a "substantial" matter.  It is not 
only the activities of the humanÐÐher sin or righteousness, that are of concern, 
but it is actually the materials of the bread and wine that are exclusively linked 
to the body and blood of Christ that if you spill it you have spilled God on the 
floor and must lick Christ up and suffer the consequences of one who has 
essentially thrown God on the ground.  In this light, the decline of lay 
participation throughout the medieval era becomes easy to comprehend.  Not 
only are legalities of offering and receiving on the rise, but there is a growing 
anxiety among the people who approach the veiled body and blood.  There is a 
"real damned if you do damned if you don't" tension that is only heightened 
with the Eucharistic controversies that rise up in the ninth century, which lead 
only to further controversies in the centuries to follow.  The ÒdangerousÓ 
nature of the Eucharist is something introduced early on by Cyril of Jerusalem, 
and gains increasing attention throughout the ritual developments of the 
medieval world.37 
The growing pietistic concerns and unholy anxieties that surround the 
bread and wine of communion increasingly distance the lay person from the 
sacred meal.  Thus far, however, this distancing has proved to be accidental 
and primarily a consequence of "organic" pieties and heightened concerns for 
the reality of ChristÕs body mediated by the bread and wine.  In other words, 
there is a faithful attempt to take seriously the truth of Christ's body and blood 
extended to humanity under the species of bread and wine.  It is, once again, 
impossible to universalize the experience of the whole church regarding its 
manner of offering and receiving; however, by the turn of ninth century there 
is clear evidence that Eucharistic praxis is giving way to a brave new 
Christendom. 
It has been shown how the alienation from making offering and 
participating in the offertory rite alters the capacity of the lay Christian to 
perceive her relation to God, whereby she ceases to relate to God in the 
liturgical economy through an active, functional role and now as a passive 
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spectator and, at best, recipient of a divine substance by unilateral donation.  
What will be shown below is how new material factors serve to complete this 
polarization of the liturgist from her liturgyÐÐand, therefore, from the 
eschatological reality of the church, which surrounds the elements of the 
Eucharistic feast, namely bread. 
 
II 
In the late thirteenth century, John Duns Scotus introduces the notion of a 
univocity of being, whereby God and humanity are subject to the metaphysical 
priority of Being.38  Scotus stresses a radical distance of the human from God 
that introduces, says Catherine Pickstock, an abandonment of participatory 
relating.39  God and humanity relate to one another not through manifesting 
encounters of the material world but by a contractual relation of divine and 
human willing or sovereign voluntarism.40  According to Pickstock, Scotus 
relativizes the material, creating a sharp division between matter and form, 
and form from any necessary attachments at all.  Objects are hereby defined as 
independent from the material, which means that an object can be known 
whether or not the object itself exists in actuality.41  Perhaps the most pressing 
consequence of this severing of form and content is the erasure of telos.  
ScotusÕ prioritizing of intellection and sovereign will, orchestrated by the 
forces of contractual obligation, asserts that the will of God is independent 
from the telos of the material world or its contingency upon the divine 
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energies that make this telos manifest.42  God and creation, each existing 
within Being, bear no necessary or contingent relation, except by divine 
decree.  This Òfiat of divine volitionÓ also displaces act and being within God, 
such that GodÕs actions and GodÕs essence and the material relating by God to 
creation are arbitrary and do not infer from one movement to the nextÐÐeach 
action connected only by divine, sovereign choice.43  God, in theory, could 
just as well relate to humanity in the flesh of Christ as he could in the metal of 
a modern dinner table.  The form no longer bears an inner logic nor does the 
content have an essential form.  ScotusÕ claim, as Pickstock shows, is that the 
material ÒthingÓ is inconsequential to human knowing.  Even if we are 
conditioned by the tangible it is not the tangible that is proper to our 
intellection.44 This runs diametrically opposed to that of John of Damascus 
and Thomas Aquinas, who each argue that GodÕs becoming manÑin the 
fleshÑis because the human is capable only of knowing as Òflesh.Ó Following 
Gregory of Nyssa, we would say that it is the flesh that enables us to transcend 
the flesh, which Scotus suggests is improbable, for the flesh must be 
overturned rather than completed.45  One can have knowledge of a thing 
without the existence of the object or its form.46  Knowledge of the truth of a 
thing can precede the creation of the thing in truth, which is to say that the 
body and soul are ontologically separable.  In other words, divine relationality 
is first and foremost an intellectual encounter irrespective of the body.  Theory 
precedes and takes precedence over practice, for unlike Gregory of Nyssa and 
the church fathers with him, which is carried forth by Aquinas whom Scotus 
                                                            
42 Mary Beth Ingham and Mechthild Dreyer, The Philosophical Vision of John Duns Scotus: 
An Introduction (Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 2004), 38-51. 
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rejects, whereby God is knowable by his energies and by a similitude of 
creation and human action, Scotus locates GodÕs revelation not in likeness but 
in the radical discontinuity of the physical order.47  This is because movement 
is in no way bound together with nature, which is also radically distant from 
AquinasÕ understanding of grace completing nature.  Nature, according to 
Scotus, must be overridden.  Image and likeness, unlike it is with Irenaeus, are 
ontologically divided by Scotus bearing no essential relation.48  ScotusÕ 
rejection of the analogia entis as developed by Aquinas is the rejection of 
what has herein been referred to as a function-oriented ontology.  This 
functional ontology described above is an ontology of participation, whereby 
material realities participate in Being by their orientation to and purpose in 
Being.  ÒItÓ exists because ÒitÓ has a name and purpose.49  In other words, and 
to put the matter plainly and most explicitly, a thing exists because it has a 
form (likeness) and telos (image) inextricable from the thingÕs material 
actuality. 
As Catherine Pickstock shows, ScotusÕ Ònovel assertionÓ that 
privileges epistemology over ontology has grave consequences for Eucharistic 
theology.  ScotusÕ disjunction of ChristÕs Body and Soul alters the meaning of 
transubstantiation, such that the Eucharistic action ceases to terminate in 
ChristÕs Body.  With Aquinas, this Eucharistic ÒterminationÓ is the 
assimilation of the material bread and wine to the Eternal Son, which 
transforms the function of the bread and wine into its true and natural 
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concomitant relation as a conduit of divine grace.50  Without its teleological 
function the bread and wine remain mere food stuffs, rather than the 
transubstantiated materials that manifest the grandeur of God. The function is 
a substance, the substance a function. The irony of ScotusÕ denigration of the 
material, creating a radical disparity between material and truth, elevates the 
importance of the material in the temporal world.  Materials now possesses a 
subjectivity wherein truth is no longer understood through an ontological 
employment, but is now a separate truth in-itself in each atomistic instance.  It 
is this atomization, the severing of each particle from another, that makes the 
form of an object meaningless, for the content resides a priori in the abstract.  
This objectivity does not understand truth and reality in a functional relation to 
ends as in the ancient world; rather, a thing is true or real without, and 
necessarily without, existential or transcendental reference.  The material is 
now existentially true without a participation in God, for it exists in Being and 
bears no participatory relation to divinity except by a covenant of wills. 
The division of form and content from existential realities is already 
visible in the liturgical practices of the late medieval church.  While it is 
impossible historically to say whether a theological argument follows or 
precedes a liturgical practice, as Pickstock carefully reminds, it is no less the 
case, however, that the theoretical always arises out of a habitusÐÐeven if 
unwittingly,51 and the particular habitus of much of the church has moved, at 
least by the time of Scotus, to a sharp divisibility of body and soul, both in 
Christ and in the human subject.  It has been shown how this arose in the 
offertory.  It will now be shown what the additional, material realities are that 
make this schism between form and content imaginable, i.e. the conditions of 
perception active in liturgical praxis, especially as they relate to subjective 
understandings of relationality. 
As aforementioned, it is the regular practice of the early medieval 
church that its members bring to the mass a bread offering, and, if possible, a 
wine offering.52  They are likewise to receive communion if they bother to 
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come to church.  In one canon set forth by Clement of Rome, ratified in 692 at 
the Council of Trullo, it states clearly that 
All the faithful who come in and hear the Scriptures, but do not 
stay for the prayers and the Holy Communion, are to be 
excommunicated, as causing disorder in the Church.53 
To participate in the liturgy was to participate fully or not at all, at least as 
documented in the canons of the church.  This required not only attendance, 
but an oblation and the reception of the consecrated gifts of the LordÕs Table.  
Nevertheless, post-Constantine it becomes increasingly impractical for each 
person or family to bring a bread and wine offering.  This may be why Cyril of 
Alexandria states that only bread baked in church should be used for 
Eucharist.54  At the Council of Toledo in 693, it is stated in like manner that 
the only bread that should find its way to the altar is that which has been 
prepared for this purpose.  "Bread should not be placed on the altar to be 
consecrated if it is not complete, proper and especially made."55  This is not so 
clear as Cyril has it, as there is room to understand this bread to be made by 
parishioners but for the purpose of oblation, which bears the sacrificial intent 
noted above.  What is evidenced in both instances, however, is that the bread 
prior to consecration has become more than just bread, for its function has 
been reoriented to the Eucharist.  That is, by its very baking and preparation 
for Eucharist it is already transformed by its intended termination in Christ.  It 
is not ordinary bread intended to be consumed; rather, it is bread that is 
intended to consume.  The sacrality involved here already foreshadows how 
Aquinas will later articulate intentionality.  What is important to point out at 
this point is how the pre-sanctified gifts introduce an element of purity and 
begin already to determine whose hands are ontologically competent for 
preparing and even touching the holy gifts.  Whereas bread set apart from the 
homes of the faithful had previously been enough to transform its telos, it now 
becomes the case that it must be especially designated prior to its baking.  
What is evidenced by this new practice is a separation of the Eucharistic bread 
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from the ordinary or common bread of the home of the faithful.  This subtle 
division problematizes the gathering of the common into the Holy as an 
unconfused union.  It is not to say that it nullifies this gathering or makes it 
impossible; this would wrongly construe the capacity of God to transform the 
ecclesial body.  It does, however, alter the Eucharist as a participatory action 
of a gathered people with the sacrifice of the Son to the Father and how grace 
is now understood to be communicated.  That is, to cease gathering an 
oblation for sacrifice by the people changes how God is perceived to mediate 
his presence.  Phenomenologically, it ceases to be the self-mediation of God; 
the body and blood are now mediated by one other than the Eternal Son. 
While the lay person is continually encouraged to receive Holy 
Communion, at the same time of the Eucharistic controversies of the ninth 
century, piety is already shifting liturgical practices of receiving the Eucharist.  
It is in this same period that the bread of Eucharist is no longer to be placed in 
the hands of the faithful, but only in their mouths.  Only the bishop, presbyters 
and deacons have the bread placed in their hands,56 giving new meaning to the 
EucharistÕs post-consecration announcement: ÒHoly things for Holy [people].Ó  
As canonized at the Synod of Rouen (878), "None are to place the Eucharist in 
the hands of lay men or women, but only in their mouth."57  Again, it is 
impossible to draw a direct link between what is being argued theologically 
and the liturgical practices of the time; however, it is important enough to note 
that the church is in transition and the quarrels over who can touch and receive 
is taking place along parallel lines.  It is also of consequence that during this 
same period is developed a separate anointing of the priests hands at his 
ordination.58  One formula from the Missale Francorum reads as follows: 
May these hands be anointed with holy oil and with the chrism 
of holiness.  As Samuel anointed David king and prophet, so 
may [these hands] be anointed and perfected in the name of 
God the Father and of the Son and of the Holy SpiritÐÐas we 
trace upon them the image of the holy cross of our Lord and 
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Savior Jesus Christ, who freed us from death and leads us to the 
kingdom of heaven.59 
As Nathan Mitchell notes, it is of further significance that lay reception of 
communion only in the mouth, not with their hands, occurs in the Gallican 
territory where this anointing has been introduced.  This is also attested to in 
the sacramentary of the abbey in St. Denis and in the Liber officialis of 
Amalarius of Metz, each in the middle of the ninth century.60  The practice of 
anointing the hands of priests at ordination became common enough that it 
was wide-spread by the tenth century.61  The concern for this present 
investigation, however, is the anointing of hands in relation to the manner of 
Eucharistic reception and the capacity to prepare bread for offering.   
Historically, at least up until the late eighth century, it remains 
(mostly) common throughout the church that bread is offered by the people, 
and that the bread is the everyday bread of oneÕs home.  It is ordinary bread 
with an extraordinary purpose.  When the transition from Eucharistic bread 
being produced in the home to being baked within the bread house of a church 
or monastery, the material elements of the bread are initially the same.  In the 
late eighth century with Alcuin of York, however, there is strong evidence of a 
shift from leavened bread to unleavened, especially with AlcuinÕs disciple 
Rhabanus Maurus, who chides Paschasius for not being forthright enough in 
insisting upon unleavened bread.62  What both Radbertus and Maurus have to 
say about the leaven, however, is a crucial association that will transform the 
understanding of the everyday or common, both regarding the lay person and 
what is made by her hands.  The leaven of the bread is compared with the 
leaven of Òmalitiae et nequitiaeÓ by Radbertus.63  Maurus will cite Levitical 
law, saying that it should be Òpanem sine fermento.Ó64  Leaven is hereby 
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linked to wickedness or sin, and the reference to Levitical law is a return to 
purity.  The bread for Eucharist must now be made by pure hands from pure 
elements.  That is, only hands set apart for offering the sacrifice may bake and 
touch the bread and only the pure elements of life, not the everyday elements 
of the home, may be used.  This theological articulation of the liturgical shift 
from leaven to unleavened, the bread of the non-cleric (leaven) to the bread of 
the cleric (unleavened), perpetuates the fear that had grown to surround this 
meal, further alienating the lay person from the relation binding tool of the 
Eucharist.65  The connection between the leaven of malice and the bread of the 
lay person is made without difficulty, especially with the growing distance 
between the nave and sanctuary in the architecture of the church.  Again, this 
is a transition from a functional ontology, whereby the material is intimately 
bound up together with its use and telos, to a substance ontology that separates 
form, content, and the material each from the other, giving way to truth 
without contingency or referent of any kind.  The cleric, by his ordination and 
the consecration of his hands, has received special powers, which are even 
contained in his hands, to which the dirty hands of the laity cannot compare.  
Baptism no longer serves as a mark of the faithful, in this sense; it is now 
ordination and the anointing of hands that make one fit to handle Christ.  The 
ancient tradition of ordination, which goes back to the inception of the church, 
is a designation or setting apart for a particular administration of the ecclesial 
economy.  That is, ordination is for an authorized (ordained) function within 
the hierarchy of the ecclesia, granting ÒpowerÓ and authority to particular 
persons (clergy) for the administration of the power and authority given to the 
church as the medium for and manifesting of the glory of the Lord.  Apart 
from the unity of the body in the orchestration of the salvific economy, power 
and authority become centralized and dominating, and cease to participate in 
the polyphonic unity of the Holy Trinity.  This unity is a power and authority, 
as shown in chapter two, of mutual submission and shared primacy within the 
                                                                                                                                                           
Perhaps there is an element of ÒhypocrisyÓ that is desired to be kept out to the Eucharistic 
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Godhead.  To designate an authority within the body that divides the body is 
to nullify the power and authority it is given to administrate. 
Think back to IllichÕs understanding of a tool and its ability both to 
extend and limit the range of human freedom.  The Eucharist and clerical 
offices as toolsÐÐmediums of the glory of the LordÐÐbecome specialized by 
the liturgical reforms.  When unleavened bread is introduced, a further 
disconnect from the laity and the table occurs, as bread-baking becomes more 
troublesome, especially as various liturgical acts and prayers begin to 
accompany the fashioning of this special bread.  The Eucharistic bread ceases 
to be a tool used by the laity, at once the medium/extension of the human and 
the self-mediation of Christ to the human; rather, the laity, especially with the 
rise of votive masses, become the tools of the Eucharistic bread, now relating 
to the bread as spectator, both by its purchase for special intention and as 
suspended by ocular reception.  As in the medicinal tools of modern 
capitalism, where only few are able to handle certain means for treating 
illnesses, likewise are the clergy the select few of a specialized class whose 
sole purpose is to expose the sacrament for a groping laity.  Once again, just as 
there are certain toolsÐÐespecially as related to medicineÐÐthat should be 
handled by those who are well-trained, likewise should the church have well-
trained clergy who preside over Eucharist.  This is not the issue.  Rather, the 
issue regards the matter of accessibility to the tools, and whether or not 
persons have appropriate access to the means of grace. 
What the early controversies over the Eucharist show, coupled with the 
change in ordination practices, is that the mundane has become profane, but in 
a way that does not seek simply to differentiate that which is set apart; rather, 
it is to divide clean from unclean.  The mundane ceases to bear an innate 
potency for manifesting GodÕs grandeur, as seen in Maximus Confessor and 
others before him.  What is introduced into liturgical practice with the 
anointing of clerical hands and the specifications of bread types and 
preparation for communion is a radical distancing, materially, of sacred and 
profane, i.e. of sacred and secular.  One explicit example of this transition in 
Eucharistic bread manufacturing is found in The Monastic Constitutions of 
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Lanfranc, where the recipe for bread baking becomes a ritual act in its own 
right. 
It is [the sacrist's] task to prepare the hosts, and he should take 
every care to ensure that they are perfectly pure and seemly.  In 
the first place, if it be possible, the wheat is to be picked out 
grain by grain with great care, and then put into a clean sack 
made of good cloth and prepared and reserved for the purpose; 
a servant of good character shall carry it to the mill, and there 
shall see that other corn is ground first, so that that from which 
the hosts are to be made may be ground without any admixture 
of dirt.  When the flour is brought back the sacrist shall draw a 
curtain round the place and the vessel in which the flour is to be 
bolted, and he shall carry out his work in an alb and with an 
amice over his head.  On the day the hosts are to be made, the 
sacristan and those who help him shall wash their hands and 
faces before they begin; they shall wear albs and amices, save 
for the one who is to hold the irons and ministers with them.  
One shall sprinkle the flour with water as it lies on an 
absolutely clean table, and shall knead it firmly and press it 
thin, while the brother who holds the irons in which the wafers 
are baked shall have his hands covered with gloves.  
Meanwhile, while the hosts are being made and baked, these 
brethren shall recite the 'familiar' psalms that go with the hours 
themselves, or, if they prefer, psalms of equal length taken in 
order from the psalter.  Absolute silence shall be maintained.66 
Resonances of a spotless lamb for sacrifice are readily noticeable in this recipe 
for the host bread.  There is without a doubt a pietistic concern that prevails 
and it should not be read in another way.  The piety and desire to create a pure 
vessel for the Holy One is quite prominent.  Nevertheless, it is the 
consequences of this refined bread making that is of concern, not so much the 
pietistic rationale behind it.  The pure bread is an ideological move that 
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consequentially distances the laityÐÐwicked, dirty leavenÐÐfurther from the 
relation-of-participation in Christ's offering to the Father. 
Thus far, it has been shown how the liturgical procession, with the 
offering of bread and wine, establishes a radically participatory role in the 
economy of salvation, whereby both clergy and lay person are actively 
engaged in the sacrificial offering of the Son to the Father, by the power of the 
Spirit.  It has also been shown how various reforms in liturgical practice 
throughout the medieval era give way to a sharp division between the lay 
person and the liturgical economy, rendering the lay personÕs actions 
inconsequential to the sacrifice of the church, severing the Soul of Christ 
(sanctuary, clergy) from the Body of Christ (nave, laity).  Additionally, the 
various factors described above have shown how liturgical praxis throughout 
the late medieval world provides the perceptive conditions to imagine an 
ontological chasm between the sacred and profane, such that material reality 
ceases to manifest the grandeur of God through functional use but rather 
communicates or reveals God substantively by sovereign decree, explicitly by 
priests, their anointed hands, and the consecration of holy gifts offered by the 
holy hands of the same priests.  In other words, what is evidenced in the 
nominalism and deism logically constructed in the theology of John Duns 
Scotus is active and at work in the liturgical practice of late medieval 
Christendom. 
This liturgical distancing of the mundane from the holy of holies, 
rather than the sacramental gathering of the mundane to intensify its inherent 
truth as that which manifests the glory of the Lord, is the invocation of the 
secular human identityÐÐa being who bears no inherent relation to God outside 
of individual, sovereign choice.  Transitions in liturgical practice that bear this 
invocation are not limited to the Eucharist, however.  There are structural 
mechanisms that fall into place that create the necessary support to ensure 
these liturgical forms are sustained.  It will be explored below how the 
development of the missal and changes in ordination reinforce this sacred-
secular chasm. 
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III 
At the height of liturgical reforms in the ninth and tenth centuries, occurring 
simultaneously alongside the increasing piety among lay persons, is the 
compiling of liturgical books into what is now known as the missal.  There are 
a variety of reasons for this transition, not least of which is practical.  
Throughout the Carolingian era, there is much transition in liturgical practice 
and the books needed to do liturgy are incorporated into this  reformation.  
With the rise in ceremonies during this period comes the rise of texts for 
ceremonials.  There are numerous books used for any number of liturgical 
services that it becomes quite cumbersome to figure out which texts are 
needed for each liturgy.  What is of interest in terms of the growing schism 
between clergy and laity, however, are the texts used in the everyday liturgy 
for mass on Sunday.  It is also of consequence that these texts are in Latin, and 
the rise of the vernacular will aid in the division among head and the body of 
the church, at least throughout much of Christendom. 
To have mass on Sunday, unlike it is today with the modern missal, 
Book of Common Prayer, or projected words on a screen, it was necessary to 
have the texts that contained all the various parts.  Without a printing press, 
the added difficulty was the costs involved in producing these texts, especially 
as they accumulate with the growth of commemoration masses or special 
liturgies.  Therefore, it made the most sense to only write in each book that 
which each person/office needed for the mass.  The mass, therefore, is divided 
into three primary books, none of which contain the texts of the other.  The 
sacramentary, which is the central liturgical book of the ninth century, 
contained everything a priest needed to perform his duties in liturgy.  It would 
have contained the Collects, Prefaces, and the Canon of the Mass, but it would 
not have contained any scripture lessons, Introits, Graduals or Offertories.67  
Other books were produced to account for each of the other parts of the mass, 
which were used not by priests, but by deacons, subdeacons, the choir, 
cantors, lectors, and so on.  Each office had a particular role, and each office 
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used a particular book.  The role of the laity, if they did not hold an official 
office, was responsory.  Texts were not needed for congregants, as they were 
given cues by each office when to respond and they learned what the 
responses were either catechetically or through participation in the mass itself.  
What is chiefly evident with the liturgical books is the fact that the mass, 
understood to be a whole assemblage of thoughts, words, and deeds that 
gathered the liturgically body into the drama of God, was a compilation, not 
simply of books, but of the volitive words and actions of those gathered for 
liturgy.  To do liturgy required each office, each person, each book, and all 
working harmoniously to gather the whole of the body into the offering of the 
Son to the Father.  To be most clear: a priest could not do mass on his own. 
 The shape of this liturgical economy is distinctly polyphonic.  There 
are many voices at work; there are many movements occurring 
simultaneously; it is a mimetic relation of Trinitarian relationality manifest in 
Jesus the Messiah that this Body of ChristÐÐthe ChurchÐÐis participating in 
and to which it is eternally being assimilated.  The liturgical texts make this 
polyphonic speech-act possible in new and beautiful ways; however, with 
growing concern in the manner of non-clerical participation in the liturgy and 
the decline already in Eucharistic participation, liturgy becomes something 
that is increasingly relegated to the office of the presiding cleric.  In the early 
ninth century, Theodulph of Orleans proscribes the following rule: 
A priest should never celebrate mass alone; for just as it cannot 
be celebrated without the priestÕs greeting, so it cannot be 
celebrated without the peopleÕs response.  Most certainly, 
therefore, Mass ought never to be celebrated by one individual 
alone.  For there must be others who stand about with the 
priest; others whom he may greet; others whom may respond to 
him.68 
Among other things, what the Capitulary of Theodulph reveals is that there 
were priests celebrating mass alone, without the aid of any other.  By the 
eleventh century, the liturgical books have evolved and the priests' 
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sacramentary now contains in or with it the sung pieces and the lectionary 
readings for the mass.  Though the missal had been developing in the 
monasteries, it arises in large part out of the unsuccessful 
Constantinian/Gregorian ideal of Charlemagne and Charles the Bald to unite 
the empire through its worship and the growing pietistic concerns of purity for 
those who enact and participate in the liturgy.  There are a number of practical 
concerns as well, for instance the Franciscan mission to convert the Germans, 
which was a liturgically tedious affair.  To do mass, the friars had to lug 
several books around when traveling in order to celebrate the Eucharist 
outside the monastery.  This instance of compiling of the liturgical books into 
one was a particular missionary need.  Likewise, the establishment of parishes 
further and further away from a cathedral made in continually difficult to fill 
the offices of lector, deacon, sub-deacon, choir, etc. These varying factors 
seemed to place a greater stress on the cleric, whose new elevated role, even 
perhaps isolating role, in the liturgy becomes the genesis of the missal.  By the 
eleventh century, the celebrant was obliged to recite each sung part and each 
lectionary reading of the mass, at least in a low voice, even though the choir, 
deacons and subdeacons are still fulfilling each of these roles.69  It is here that 
anything not said or done by the priest becomes superfluous, mere pietistic 
devotions that bear solely upon the sentimentality of the laity.  What is truly 
done is done by the priest.  All else is a matter of individual piety. 
The fault-line between clergy and laity only opens further following 
the Eucharistic controversies of the ninth century.  The importance of what 
takes place in liturgy is consistently placed, not upon the action of the 
gathered body and each person fulfilling their liturgical role within the whole 
of the liturgical drama in its mimetic relation to the Liturgy-Christ, but upon 
the confecting powers of the priest and his anointed hands.  There is a 
regression to the priesthood of the Jewish Temple, whose economic tables 
Jesus turned on their heads, whereby a divine power or substance is mediated 
by a priest over against the manifesting of human nature as assimilated and 
sustained by participation in the singular offering of the Son to the Father.  
The removal of all but clergy from a role and function within liturgy 
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establishes an ecclesiology liken to a capitalist market, especially when it 
becomes evident that the offerings of the people after the seventh century are 
largely monetary.70  Jungmann is quick to point out that these monetary gifts 
by the laity remain gifts given to God, not simply to be understood as money 
given to clergy for their daily sustenance.71  Nevertheless, with the ability to 
Òsay massÓ for the sake of a special need or loved one who has died, the whole 
posture of the lay person in relation to the liturgical action is transformed and 
all but eliminated. The above emphasis on the relation between the bread/wine 
offering and the offerer in no way to suggest that the monetary offerings of 
individuals are abstract or philanthropic donations; rather, it is to underscore 
the material relation of the human as a granule that is gathered together as 
Eucharist with Christ in the offering to the Father and the receiving of oneself 
recapitulated in Christ as GodÕs deifying reciprocation.72 The very nature of 
bread and its use in the human home and its eschatological function in the 
LordÕs Supper is a bond with no replaceable alternative. Money is not 
transubstantiated in the Eucharistic feast! Once again, this is not to take away 
from the sacrificial importance of tithing; it is to ensure that tithes and offering 
are not confused or deemed synonymous. 
As shown in the first chapter of this work, the understanding of an 
oblation and sacrifice for the church has been contextualized by the ancient 
Hebrew sacrificial system.  The Hebrew understanding of sacrifice, unlike that 
of the ancient Greeks, were offerings of thanksgiving for something God had 
done, given, or would be doing or giving that God had promised, or a 
reparation for sin by a person or people.  The rise of private masses of special 
intentions in the ninth century, however, building on a priestÕs ability to say 
mass by himself, changes the nature of the sacrifice altogether, at least in 
many if not most instances.  These private masses were masses said by priests 
alone, purchased beforehand by lay persons for the sake of gaining GodÕs 
support, whether in this life or the next.73  The mass begins to look more like 
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the sacrifices of the ancient Greeks to the gods, whereby an offering is made 
with the expectation of a favorable return.  The priest has the power to call 
down the beneficence of heaven, both of which are now purchasable.  
Additionally, throughout the twelfth century the rationale behind ordination to 
the priesthood has been altered by this growing votive mass economy.  No 
longer is a priest ordained because of a pastoral need for those who attend 
mass on Sunday and receive care otherwise.  Rather, ordination to the 
priesthood is contingent upon oneÕs ability to earn a living, primarily by 
celebrating masses of special intent throughout the day, generally in a side 
chapel of a cathedral or abbey.  The sense of the liturgy as a communal action 
had become quite tenuous.  Increasingly, the Eucharist is separated from 
Sunday, the day of resurrection, objectified as a substantive power in its own 
right apart from the liturgical action of ChristÕs gathered body.74 
The transformation of liturgical practice carried in the compilation of 
the liturgical books further shows the radical distancing of the commoner from 
any sense of a contingent relation-of-participation.  There remains a strongly 
felt need for liturgy to be done on oneÕs behalf; however, oneÕs being is no 
longer a matter of participation in the liturgical action proper.  This alienation 
from the liturgical action, as shown in the last chapter, is the alienation of the 
human from the movements that manifest oneÕs contingent relation on the 
Liturgy-Christ. 
Before going any further, it is important to stop and clarify again what 
is not being said.  Late medieval society is a complex matter, and it is 
impossible to impose upon medieval subjects a historicity to which they are 
not privileged and for which they cannot answer.  It is easy to step outside of 
time and see the unfolding events of history and assume the people of the late 
medieval world, or any period of time for that matter, were aware of what they 
were unaware.  This, however, would be a great injustice to the whole of the 
medieval customs and norms, which were far more complex than is often 
credited.  For the modern viewer, situated in the twenty-first century in a time 
when the church and state are governed separately and do not interact 
economically, at least throughout most of the world, to unpack the above 
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unfolding developments in liturgy can only incite indignation and concern, 
smelling of what the Reformers called Òpapist.Ó  What needs to be on the 
table, however, is that indignation is likely to be the furthest thought from the 
medieval mind.  Liturgy throughout medieval Christendom is something 
woven into the fabric of society; it is a social ritual that reaches well beyond 
the confines of the liturgy proper.75  Late medieval society is a society of 
reciprocity, and is to such a large extent that even the living and the dead are 
but two distinct aspects of a single whole.76  The rationale behind offering 
prayers for the dead, intercessory prayers for friends and kin, or having special 
masses said for others, is understood as the actions of the beneficiary named.  
Gabriel Biel speaks of this in soteriological terms. 
The suffrages which are made for the living and the dead can 
be said to be the works of those for whom they are doneÉ For 
the work is appropriate to [the recipient] (i) by the intention of 
him who does it, and (ii) because that which is his who is one 
with me, is in a certain sense also mine.  Whence it is not 
against divine justice if one man receives the fruits of works 
done by another who is one with him in charity, particularly 
when they are done specifically on his behalf.77 
What this helps to contextualize is the dynamism of the liturgical action as the 
very soul of medieval society that truly animates the social body, not as a 
conglomerate of isolated sovereign wills, but as an organic, liturgical web of 
persons whose union was assumed and reciprocated rather than contracted.  In 
a society ordered by guild systems, which are themselves liturgical by nature, 
the church had become the power source that made sense of the medieval, 
social body.  To emphasize the division between clergy and lay persons at this 
time must be understood within this system of relations, for as John Bossy 
rightly emphasizes, this division was not as explicit or "felt" as it may have 
seemed.  What I am attempting to show is not a simple clericalism gone awry, 
but to show how the above reforms in liturgical praxis not only transform the 
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roles and relations of clergy and laity, but actually create an enclosure of 
power that spatializes time and temporalizes space, such that a contingent, 
participatory relation to God in absolute reciprocity of Being becomes 
unimaginable. 
 
IV 
The complexity of the social body in medieval society is a web of reciprocal 
relations between persons and communities that is not easily deciphered or 
mapped in modern terms.  In the modern secular world the apparent divide 
between the sacred and secular makes it difficult to see the intricate union 
between the two in the medieval world. The divide did not exist in any formal 
sense nor in a way that could be articulated or understandable to the medieval 
mind.  To use the word secular would only describe the sacred outside the 
religious (monastic) community.  The secular was the sacred of the common, 
differentiated only by a vow of monastic orders and those who had not taken 
such a vow.  Even this differentiation is inconclusive, as some religious orders 
did not involve or necessitate a life-long vow to the religious community 
itself.  What needs to be clear in the argument I am making is that the sacred-
secular divide is not a simple X caused Y and begat Z.  Rather, what I have 
argued is that medieval liturgical practices, primarily in their ninth through 
thirteenth century developments, inadvertently alienate lay men and women 
from the active manifesting of his or her true self as a participant in Divine 
BeingÐÐsecular autonomy.  This is not to say that the medieval Christian felt a 
radical distance from God or anyone else, as lay piety throughout the medieval 
world only show signs of increase.  As Catherine Pickstock has convincingly 
shown, the complexity of medieval rituals and charitable institutions made 
possible a fusion of love and power by a liturgical foundation.78  Such a 
liturgical fusion of love and power, because it was the Host that guaranteed 
the reality of the Body of Christ, refused abstraction or a Pax that did not 
entail reconciliation.79  Nevertheless, the separability of the liturgical mystery 
of making and being made Eucharist from the tangible synaxis of this body 
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made Eucharist is the primary condition of possibility latent in the extraction 
of the laity from their being-gathered into liturgical procession and return.  
Rather than Christ himself as mediator and medium in, by, and through the 
mystery of the sacrament, it is the priest who mediates and receives 
vicariously for all Christians.80  Because the non-cleric is unable to participate 
materially and actively in the sacrificial oblation of the altar on earth, which is 
gathered and assimilated to the altar in heaven, and because the reciprocal 
return of the oblation by God who mediates himself under the Eucharistic 
species is received vicariously by priests, the reciprocal relation between the 
ecclesial body and the Eucharistic body occurs only within the holy of holies, 
by holy words and holy hands, on behalf of, but not with, the common among 
the faithful. 
The spatialization of the Eucharistic presence in the host, both in its 
theological articulation beginning with the Corpus of Paschasius Radbertus in 
the ninth century and in the isolated speech-acts of the medieval liturgies, 
seals the fictional divide between sacred and profane, which again is a 
theology that runs in tandem with the practice of compartmentalizing the 
sacred by the holy words and hands of the priest.  It is a phenomenological 
construal of action that gives way to an ontological chasm and eventually to 
the epistemological event of being for the Reformers. 
The liturgical practice of the late medieval church, whereby the laity 
cease to participate reciprocally in the sacrifice of the mass, gives way to an 
understanding of the Eucharist that separates the action of the mystery from 
the sacrament of mystery.81  In the late twelfth century, Peter the Chanter is 
able to claim for the first time that the accidents of bread and wine have 
nothing to do with the Eucharistic substance.82  William of St. Thierry will 
likewise press for a ÒspiritualÓ reception of the Eucharist.83  The separation of 
the sacramental substance from the material elements of bread and wine enters 
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theological articulation in large part, if not solely, as a justification for ocular 
reception of the Eucharist.   Ocular reception of the Eucharist is the primary 
means of lay reception in the late medieval world.84  Indeed, the high point of 
medieval liturgy was seeing the consecrated Host.85  Only at Easter would lay 
persons receive the host.  Spiritual reception, therefore, was the primary 
means of communication for the lay person through the mediation of the 
priest. 
This is no less true with Aquinas in the middle of the thirteenth 
century; however, with Aquinas, even though ocular reception remains 
sufficient, there is no division between the substance and the accidents.  
Following John of Damascus, Aquinas shows that the human can only receive 
and comprehend God under a veil.86  Ocular reception is possible, according 
to Aquinas, not because the spiritual substance of ChristÕs body and blood are 
separable from the accidents of the bread and wine; rather, it is possible 
because Christ is really present in the bread and wine visible to those at mass, 
not in an instrumental way as with the other sacraments, but substantively 
present, manifesting the glory of divinity that permeates created life by a 
participation in ChristÕs own priesthood.87  It is the participatory nature of the 
mystery of ChristÕs incarnation veiled under the Eucharistic species that 
makes ocular reception possible, and proportionately so.88  For Aquinas, the 
primary participation in the Eucharist is the cultivation of votumÐÐdesire, the 
liturgical community of intention, the Church.89  Votum in Aquinas cannot be 
reduced to mere affect, however; it is, rather, to participate in that which one 
has become a devote, as shown in the previous chapter.  The Church as a 
community that intends the communion of its people with Christ, graciously 
given by Christ and completed by gracious condescension, is the only 
ecclesiology that could possibly sustain any sense of a Òspiritual receptionÓ of 
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the Eucharist, one that even so must occur under the veil of bread and wine as 
made-manifest in, by, and through the Church.  Aquinas refuses any 
divisibility of the sacrament of the Eucharist, the action of its mysterious 
participation in the incarnation, and the whole of the ecclesial body.  To desire 
Christ and commune with him is always an ecclesial action and never an 
action of the individual.  It is within these parameters that medieval festivals, 
such as Corpus Christi, can be understood as sustaining the participatory 
ontology of the liturgy.  Nevertheless, while such a festival of the social body 
brings to a whole otherwise disparate parts, even in the context of Eucharistic 
presence,90 it nevertheless does so by electrifying a Eucharistic piety that has 
been rising since the inception of the church.  The problem with liturgical 
practice surrounding the Eucharist in the late medieval world, however, is 
exactly the instrumentalism that Aquinas renounces.  Theologically, Aquinas 
is able to hold together this liturgical tension in the midst of a waining 
Eucharistic participation that has been supplemented by pietistic autonomy; 
however, this balance would end with him, and the force of late medieval 
liturgical praxis would complement, if not make possible altogether, the 
severing of body and soul, and God and creation by Scotus. 
If Henri de Lubac is right, then Eucharistic realism and ecclesial 
realism are inseparable; each confirm the other, and the faithful of the ecclesia 
are only united together as one body because the Eucharist is united to them.91  
The architecture of the ecclesial body, therefore, must entail the liturgical 
construction of a social reality whereby otherwise disparate bodies (human 
individuals) continuously create and bear within their bodies the reality of 
Eucharistic reciprocity.  The Reformers saw the great need for this 
reconstruction of the ecclesial body; however, the liturgical spatialization had 
so grasped the late medieval imagination that they were incapable of doing 
what needed to be done.  In their valiant efforts to reform the church, they 
ironically formalized the division between the incarnate mystery of ChristÕs 
self-mediation and the manifesting action of the social body, not by putting the 
Eucharist back in the Òdirty handsÓ of the laity which many rightly saw to be 
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the downfall of the late medieval church, but by so doing over against the 
tangible reality of the ecclesial body becoming Christ through Eucharistic 
manifesting.  In reaction, the Reformers posited an Òeither/orÓ relation 
between the church in its visible and invisible realities.92  The ecclesial 
community hereby came to be understood not as the manifestation in likeness 
to the image of its materially present Lord, Christ, but as a sign of an 
eschatological kingdom wholly other and separate from it.  Image and 
likeness, once differentiated parts of the assimilated whole recapitulated in 
Christ, had now become impossible relations.  Liturgy was slowly transformed 
into abstract time and space within which the moment of ChristÕs presence 
occurred, rather than the creating, and therefore inhabiting, of time and space 
by the actions of a gathered body of Christ, the Church. 
 The movement of liturgy hereby ceases to be an end in itself, and the 
spatialization of the Eucharistic power to the sanctuary of the church and its 
priests serve to distance sacred from profaneÐÐsoul from body, creating a 
dichotomy that heretofore did not exist in any formal sense, giving rise to a 
secular human imaginary that posits an absolute gulf between God and 
creation, whereby the distance is bridged only as momentary events of 
sovereign choosing that do not necessarily cohere.  It is true that the Eucharist 
had achieved an exceedingly strong emphasis in late medieval society, but 
once again, the material elements no longer consisted of the common, making 
common-union (communion) increasingly difficult to perceive. The horizons 
of perception distanced the Eucharist from any sense of a Òcommon-union.Ó  
What is being enacted and transmitted in late medieval liturgy and the 
Eucharistic elements proper, having ceased to be an action to gather and create 
the church as polis, is a territorialization of the sacredÐÐand, therefore, the 
secularÐÐthat serve only to alienate the human from any awareness that she in 
her commonness or ÒrawÓ humanity bears an inherent telos as a manifesting 
agent of divine glory.  That is, a participant in Being/God by virtue of her 
existence and nature.  Separating act and being in this mannerÐÐsoul (anima) 
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and body (corpus)93ÐÐleaves the Cartesian Cogito only waiting to be named.94  
The manufactured nature of the Eucharist had lost its analogous relation to the 
Liturgy-ChristÐÐthe gathering of creation and assimilation to himself as a 
single offering to the Father, and had become a purchasable, controlled 
substance that could be carried around the city for special observance, 
blessings, or protection.95  In other words, by clericalizing the liturgy, the 
Eucharist becomes a centralized power source bound neither to the day of 
resurrection nor the common of the people. 
 
Conclusion 
The liturgies of the church throughout antiquity and the early medieval era 
evidence a distinct form of participation in the death and resurrection of Christ 
that seeks to charge human sensibilities in such a way that each person's 
movement within the liturgical action manifests their being-in-participation.  
It is impossible and wrongheaded to idealize the liturgies of the early church, 
just as it is likewise insufficient to denounce wholly the liturgies of late 
medieval Christendom.  What is evidenced in the above investigation, 
however, is the series of liturgical transformations that nonetheless, even if 
accidentally, serve to alienate the human subject from a manifesting awareness 
of her contingent relation to the reciprocal life of the Holy Trinity.  The human 
loses her inherent glory as the imago Dei, and ceases to bear any likeness to 
this image by her alienation from the actions of liturgy that constitute this 
same likeness.  The image-likeness distinction becomes an image-likeness 
division, such that the image has been so tainted by the leaven of sin that 
likeness to this image is only available by divine fiat.  One can see 
foreshadowed in this the doctrine of total depravity, which gives rise to 
various atonement theories, even to the extent that God hides human sin 
behind Christ.  As seen with Duns Scotus, these questions of will and 
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depravity are imaginable through a liturgical alienation of the human from her 
participation in the act-being of GodÐÐChrist the Liturgy. 
What also becomes clear in this restructuring is that the assimilation of 
the individual human to Christ through liturgical habituationÐÐthe volitive 
assimilation in likeness to the eternal assimilation of Christ of which the 
human is an image, by ceasing to be available as a participatory act but now as 
a purchasable good, suspends the relation of each to the other.  What the 
liturgy accomplished, among other things, for human society throughout the 
medieval world was a bounded union.  Each person related to the other, not as 
individual sovereign choosers but as Christians yoked together by eachÕs 
assimilation to the offering of the Son to the Father.  Assimilated to the 
offering of the Son, the individual ceases to know herself as individual but as 
one with the body in eachÕs exclusive relation to God.  Again, as aforesaid, 
this exclusive relation is inherently social but only inasmuch as each one 
participates in her assimilationÐÐthe social as a consequence of oneÕs 
exclusive relation to Christ.  Without the capacity to know this assimilation, 
the social body remains open to fragmentation.  As Charles Taylor has argued, 
human identity as social depends upon a shared agency.96  Likewise, any sense 
of human society in its contingent relation to God depends on the shared 
action of the churchÕs liturgy.  Human identity is carried in social praxis, for 
human understanding is always embodied and no one can escape their 
environment.97  The breakdown of the liturgical economy as a social action, 
having become the action of clergy only, is that which gives way to the secular 
imaginary, which is to say that the articulable Òdeath of GodÓ is possible only 
when God has been removed from the body.  The alienation of the laity is that 
which separates the soul from the body, except perhaps for clergy, emperor-
king and aristocracy.  It is hereby that late medieval liturgical reforms give 
way to the secular imaginary, a bodily comportment that bears no contingent 
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relation to God as Being qua Being.  The liturgical practices of the church 
were only waiting for Scotus and others to theorize and give them force, 
which had the paradoxical outcome of birthing the very society the church 
sought to fend off.  By the time of the Reformation, Luther and others, perhaps 
even more accidentally, sever the remaining cartilage left dangling and hand 
the body over to the state. 
The creation of the secular did not perhaps arrive prior to the 
seventeenth century with GalileoÕs telescope and Descartes Cogito; 
nevertheless, the architecture of secular society becomes imaginable long 
before by the alienation of the common from the sacred.  In its attempts to 
preserve the holy from the profane, the liturgical reforms of late medieval 
Christendom have the ironic effect of quarantining not only God from the 
body polis but God from creation altogether, rendering Being abstract, as seen 
with the time and space of capitalism, only to relate to God as sovereign equal.  
Liturgy ceases to be both the extension of God and of humanityÐÐthe active 
body as a tool for manifesting the grandeur of God, whereby each relate to the 
other in a relation-of-participation by bodily comportment, and became a 
Òvoluntary,Ó unilateral relation purchased by individuals, with the promise of 
eternal returns. 
Modern forms of liturgical practice often fall prey to this same 
voluntarism, primarily due to an epistemological prioritization over against 
ontology.  What is needed at this juncture, in the midst of the current secular 
age, is the liturgical reform that never happened.  That is, what is needed are 
liturgies that bear a distinct participatory relation to the Liturgy-Christ, in all 
differentiated unity, which constitute and reconstitute the human as homo-
liturgicus, whereby all human action is intelligible only in its contingent 
relation of participation to the liturgy of the church that assimilates in likeness 
what God in Christ has assimilated in truth. 
  
Conclusion 
 
ÒOnly he lives fully who is capable of labor and who actually engages in 
labor.Ó 
ÐÐSergei Bulgakov 
ÒOne truly knows only what one can create.Ó 
ÐÐGiambattista Vico 
 
 
 
 
The most fundamental Christian conviction is that the Triune God revealed in 
the Messiah, Jesus of Nazareth, is the creator and redeemer of the universe and 
all that is therein. How this has been related to succeeding generations since 
the inception of the church has not been through systems of ideas, nor even 
ecclesiastical councils, as important as these have been throughout the history 
of the one holy catholic and apostolic church. Rather, the transmission of this 
distinctive participatory relation of the human to her Creator has been 
mediated through the everyday staples of lifeÐÐbread, wine and water, and all 
the liturgical movements surrounding their communication. For the Creator to 
create is hereby understood as a transmission. That is, the Creator, by his act 
of creating, endows the created with his Spirit. This endowment is not 
understood as inert or as separable from God; rather, it is inherently relational 
and is dynamically conditioned for deification through gratuitous 
condensation by God in the Eucharist, which begets the mutual indwelling of 
which the apostle Paul speaks. This consumptive reality is not to be 
understood as a spatialized power source, however; rather, as Henri de Lubac 
has convincingly shown it is to fully appreciate the inseparability of the trinity 
of ChristÕs bodies: historical, sacramental and ecclesial. It is the person of 
ChristÐÐincarnate, died, resurrected and ascended, who inhabits the bread and 
wine that makes the church, wherefrom the Christian goes forth to inhabit the 
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world as an extension of this inseparable, though differentiated, historical, 
sacramental and ecclesial body. Liturgy as the extending of ChristÕs body is 
crucial to the meaning of this word. The agency of Christ in the liturgical 
action that gathers the human to gather creation into the divine economy is a 
kind of centripetal force, which makes of the human an assimilating tool who 
mediates both God to the world and the world to God. No where is this more 
intensely available to the senses than through the offertory rite, which is to be 
the procession of the human to the altar of God for the continual re-
membering of the individual bodies of the faithful to Christ, who is himself 
offerer and offering, uniting the individual bodies together as a single body-
offering with the Son, by the power of the Holy Spirit, to the Father. Just as a 
tool is an extension of the human, which binds together the artisan and her art, 
likewise does the human become a tool of God for the reconciling of the world 
to himself. 
There is, therefore, no autonomy in Christ. This centripetal movement 
of the liturgical action comports the human body to know in very particular 
ways. It is a knowledge that, while not caused by the liturgical act of making 
Eucharist, is conditioned (or opened) by the movements that member the 
human to the self-knowing of the Trinity in the SpiritÕs return to the Father 
through the self-offering of the Son. This is analogous to AristotleÕs 
understanding of God's self-knowledge. 
For the actuality of thought is life, and God is that actuality; 
and God's essential actuality is life most good and eternal. We 
say therefore that God is a living being, eternal, most good, so 
that life and duration continuous and eternal belong to God; for 
this is God.... Therefore it must be itself that thought thinks, 
and its thinking is a thinking on thinking.1 
Aristotle articulates in similar fashion, though with obviously differing 
insights, what Gregory of Nyssa and Maximus Confessor express in relation to 
how the human manifests the divine nature through ascetic discipline. God 
knows, and to say that God knows is to say that the eternal act of divine self-
knowing is who God is. God is his own object of thought, which is to say that 
                                                            
1 Aristotle, Metaphysics, XII.7.25-30, 9.30-35. 
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God knows all other things in relation to God's own inner-movement of self-
objectifying thought. Aristotle obviously does not relate this to Jesus of 
Nazareth, but what the theologians in the early and medieval world were intent 
to relate together is this very self-knowledge of God and the human as part of 
God's own self-knowing. Human knowing is hereby a participation in God's 
own self-knowledge. For Aristotle this is the privileged position of the human, 
who in transcending herself encounters an inner portion of the divine whereby 
the human gains awareness of herself as divine, coming face to face with 
knowing herself only in relation to God's own self-knowledge. This knowing 
is not accidental. It is first and foremost the supreme desire of the human, the 
very essence of what it means to be human.2 Understanding this essential 
nature of the self is to understand all knowing as participation and self-
knowledge as bound together with and made possible by GodÕs own self-
knowing. Aristotle will not separate this knowledge from the form of 
knowing, in particular the form of knowing made possible by virtuous 
habituation. Likewise, Gregory of Nyssa, Maximus Confessor, and the vast 
majority of early and medieval theologians with them, will refine this virtuous 
habituation as available only through the human's participation in the liturgical 
actions of the Church. Only through the sacramental life of the ecclesial body 
does the human manifest herself as a portion of the Transcendent, capable 
through liturgical formation of knowing herself in being known by God's 
knowing himself within her as a portion of his own self-objectivity. Following 
Aristotle, God can only think himself; for, if God can only think that which is 
best then God can only think himself, lest thought extend to that which is not 
himself making that object best and, therefore, God.3 With and beyond 
Aristotle, the early fathers, perhaps none better than John Damascene, carry 
forward this inherent dignity of human nature as a portion of divine thought 
that penetrates the human to know as she is known within God's own being-
known. What cannot be overlooked, however, is that an awareness of the self 
as part of God's own self-knowledge comes through and only through the 
liturgical habitus of the Church. 
                                                            
2 Aristotle, Metaphysics, I.1.1. 
3 Ibid., XII.7.15-25. 
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This habitusÐÐthe structuring structure of the human imaginaryÐÐis 
what liturgy is and does. It is how the early and medieval church understood 
the participatory nature of this action and how it effects human knowing, 
especially as it regards self-knowing as dynamically contingent upon God's 
own self-knowledge. As liturgy increasingly becomes the soul of society 
throughout the medieval world, it is easy to see how this must have worked on 
the human imaginary. However, by this same measure it is likewise to be 
made clear, as shown above, that the availability of this formative awareness 
becomes centralized and spatialized in such a way that disconnects the human 
from knowing herself in this contingent, mediated relation. That is, the non-
cleric ceases to be an extension of divine self-knowing, gathering the whole of 
creation into the being-known of God, becoming the external object of divine 
grace, rather than one in the self-objective gnosis of God. By ceasing to 
participate materially in the labor of the liturgical economy, even though 
remaining a recipient of its benefits and grace, the perceptive capacity of the 
non-cleric is moved toward an externalized, mutually objectifying relation to 
God. God remains the object of worship, while the human remains the object 
of GodÕs love; however, no longer is this objectivity located within the self-
contingent, reciprocating force of the divine economy. God and the human 
become external, non-permeable identities who relate to one another as 
absolutely other, unilaterally and by sheer act of will. This impenetrable 
relation is the logic of the late medieval liturgical economy, spatializing divine 
grace in such a way that sharply divides sacred and profane. 
How this economic structuring in the liturgy works on the human 
imaginary cannot be over emphasized. It is oneÕs primary social structure that 
construes the imagination, which always stands in some relation to all other 
structuring structures of the social body or bodies one inhabits. Despite what 
we might think or believe, we are affective creatures and we are continually 
affected by the disciplines of society, which move us in directions we 
ÒnaturallyÓ choose because we are so moved. Any liturgical action must, then, 
appreciate and account for this formative nature of human perceiving. It is to 
recognizes that the material involvement (or lack of involvement) by the 
faithful in the liturgical economy will condition how they perceive their 
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relation to God and, therefore, what it means to be human. For instance, it is 
difficult (if not impossible) to perceive oneself lying upon the altar as bread to 
become one with the Son in his offering to the FatherÐÐtransformed in the 
Eucharistic species to be returned to oneself recapitulated in Christ through the 
bread and wine thereby made to dwell in Christ as he dwells in the faithful, if 
one never participates in the preparatory acts of baking bread, walking in 
procession, or a whole host of other actions involved in making Eucharist. 
When Paul says in his letter to the Philippians that he desires to know Christ 
and the power of his resurrection, Paul is keenly aware that to know this Christ 
is to share in his sufferings and become like him in his death.4 It is to know by 
following. Liturgy is hereby the acoluthetic reasoning, the way of 
Christological reason.5 It is the conditions for inhabiting the world, as James 
K. A. Smith puts it, Òwith a certain lightness of being.Ó It is Christ walking on 
water; it is St. Francis not permitting the grass to grow under his feet. Liturgy 
is the how that denies separation from the what, the action that gives way to 
this whatÐÐChrist. To divorce liturgical movements from the subject is to 
divorce the human from her telos, rendering the human impotent of 
knowledge. When Alasdair MacIntyre calls for a new St. Benedict at the close 
of ÒAfter Virtue,Ó it is the mimetic relation to inhabited reason-by-following 
to which he refers. To recapture the union of sacred and secular there must be 
a return to being as analogia entisÐÐthe Liturgy-Christ. 
Knowledge is hereby context-determined.6 To speak, then, of liturgy as 
the Òwork of the peopleÓ is to divorce the action of liturgy from the act-being 
of God in Christ; it is to separate human liturgical action from the contextually 
determined reality in Christo. What occurs in late medieval liturgical reforms 
is a gradual bifurcation of the non-cleric from the movements of the liturgical 
action. What happens in the late nineteenth century is a reaction against this 
binary division, which only extends the logic of the late medieval liturgy by an 
Enlightenment articulation of Christian worship incapable of making sense of 
words that have lost their meaning because they are no longer part of the very 
                                                            
4 Philippians 3.10. 
5 See Introduction, n. 2. 
6 Paul L. Holmer, The Grammar of Faith (San Francisco: Harper & Row Publishers, 1978), 
186. 
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dispositions of the faithful. MacIntyre may be right, but this new Benedict is 
only imaginable within a liturgically constituted community whereby the 
faithful are acoluthetically conditioned to perceive all things, especially 
themselves, in their contingent and participatory relation to Christ, by 
becoming like him in, by and through his Liturgy. 
  
Bibliography 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Agamben, Giorgio. Homo Sacer. Translated by Daniel Heller-Roazen. 
Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998.  
  
Ambrose. Hexameron, Paradise, and Cain and Abel. Translated by John J. 
Savage. Vol. 42. The Fathers of the Church. New York: Catholic 
University of America Press, 1961.  
  
Ambrose. Seven Exegetical Works. Translated by Michael P. McHugh. Vol. 
65. The Fathers of the Church. Washington: Catholic University of 
America Press, 2003.  
  
Ambrose. Theological and Dogmatic Works. Translated by Roy J. Deferrari. 
Vol. 44. The Fathers of the Church. Washington: Catholic University 
of American Press, 1963.  
  
Anderson, Benedict R. O'G. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin 
and Spread of Nationalism. London: Verso, 1991.  
  
Anderson, E. Byron. Worship and Christian Identity: Practicing Ourselves. 
Collegeville: Liturgical Press, 2003.  
  
Aquinas, Thomas. Summa Contra Gentiles. Edited by Anton C. Pegis, James 
F. Anderson, Vernon J. Bourke, and C. J. O'Neil. Notre Dame: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 1975.  
  
Aquinas, Thomas. Summa Theologica: Complete English Edition in Five 
Volumes. Vol. I-V. Notre Dame: Christian Classics, 1981.  
  
Aristotle. The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation. 
Edited by Jonathan Barnes. Vol. II. Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1984.  
  
Aristotle. The Nicomachean Ethics. Translated by H. Rackham. Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1999.  
  
Christ the Liturgy 
 228 
Aristotle. Poetics. Translated by Stephen Halliwell. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1995.  
  
Aristotle. Politics. Translated by H. Rackham. Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1944.  
  
Arnaoutoglou, Ilias. Ancient Greek Laws: A Sourcebook. London: Routledge, 
1998.  
  
Arndt, William, F. Wilbur Gingrich, Frederick W. Danker, and Walter Bauer, 
eds. A Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament and Other Early 
Christian Literature: A Translation and Adaptation of the Fourth 
Revised and Augmented Edition of Walter Bauer's Griechisch-
deutsches Wrterbuch Zu Den Schriften Des Neuen Testaments Und 
Der brigen Urchristlichen Literatur. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1979.  
  
Asad, Talal. Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power in 
Christianity and Islam. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1993.  
  
Asad, Talal. Is Critique Secular?: Blasphemy, Injury, and Free Speech. 
Berkeley: Townsend Center for the Humanities, University of 
California, 2009.  
  
Atchley, Edward Godfrey Cuthbert Frederic. Ordo Romanus Primus. London: 
De La More Press, 1905.  
  
Athanasius. The Life of Antony and the Letter to Marcellinus. Translated by 
Robert C. Gregg. New York: Paulist Press, 1980.  
  
Augustine. Confessions. Translated by Henry Chadwick. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1991.  
  
Augustine. Tractates on the Gospel of John, 11-27. Translated by John W. 
Rettig. Vol. 79. The Fathers of the Church. Washington: Catholic 
University of America Press, 2003.  
  
Balentine, Samuel E. The Torah's Vision of Worship. Minneapolis: Fortress 
Press, 1999.  
  
Balthasar, Hans Urs Von. Cosmic Liturgy: The Universe According to 
Maximus the Confessor. San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2003.  
  
Balthasar, Hans Urs Von. Love Alone Is Credible. San Francisco: Ignatius 
Press, 2004.  
  
Balthasar, Hans Urs Von. Mysterium Paschale: The Mystery of Easter. 
Translated by Aidan Nichols. San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2000.  
  
Bibliography 
 229 
Balthasar, Hans Urs Von. Studies in Theological Style: Clerical Styles. Edited 
by John Kenneth. Riches. Translated by Andrew Louth, Francis 
McDonagh, and Brian McNeil, C.R.V. Vol. II. The Glory of the Lord. 
San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1984.  
  
Barnes, Jonathan, ed. The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford 
Translation. Vol. II. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984.  
  
Barth, Karl. God in Action. Translated by E. G. Homrighausen and Karl J. 
Ernst. Manhasset: Round Table Press; Distributed by Channel Press, 
1963.  
  
Bauckham, Richard. The Theology of the Book of Revelation. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1993.  
  
Baudrillard, Jean. Impossible Exchange. Translated by Chris Turner. London: 
Verso, 2001.  
  
Baudrillard, Jean. Simulacra and Simulation. Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press, 1994.  
  
Beckwith, Sarah. Christ's Body: Identity, Culture and Society in Late 
Medieval Writings. London: Routledge, 1996.  
  
Benedict. The Rule of St. Benedict in English. Translated by Timothy Fry. 
Collegeville: Liturgical Press, 1981.  
  
Benjamin, Walter. The Work of Art in the Age of Its Technological 
Reproducibility, and Other Writings on Media. Edited by Michael 
William. Jennings, Brigid Doherty, and Thomas Y. Levin. Translated 
by E. F. N. Jephcott, Rodney Livingstone, and Howard Eiland. 
Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2008.  
  
Bennett, Tony. The Birth of the Museum: History, Theory, Politics. London: 
Routledge, 1995.  
  
Berry, Wendell. Bringing It to the Table: On Farming and Food. Berkeley: 
Counterpoint, 2009.  
  
Berthold, George C., trans. Maximus Confessor: Selected Writings. New 
York: Paulist Press, 1985.  
  
Bishop, Jeffrey Paul. The Anticipatory Corpse: Medicine, Power, and the 
Care of the Dying. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 
2011.  
  
Blake, William. The Complete Poetry and Prose of William Blake. Edited by 
David V. Erdman. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982.  
  
  
Christ the Liturgy 
 230 
Blondel, Maurice. Action: Essay on a Critique of Life and a Science of 
Practice. Translated by Oliva Blanchette. Notre Dame: University of 
Notre Dame, 1984.  
  
Bloomer, Kent C., and Charles Willard Moore. Body, Memory, and 
Architecture. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977.  
  
Blowers, Paul M., and Robert Louis Wilken, trans. On the Cosmic Mystery of 
Jesus Christ: Selected Writings from St. Maximus the Confessor. 
Crestwood: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 2003.  
  
Bonhoeffer, Dietrich. Act and Being. Translated by Bernard Noble. New 
York: Harper and Brothers, Publishers, 1962.  
  
Bonhoeffer, Dietrich. The Cost of Discipleship. New York: Touchstone, 1995.  
  
Bonhoeffer, Dietrich. Ethics. New York: Macmillan, 1955.  
  
Bonhoeffer, Dietrich. Letters and Papers from Prison. Edited by Eberhard 
Bethge. New York: Macmillan, 1972.  
  
Boorstin, Daniel J. The Image: A Guide to Pseudo-events in America. New 
York: Vintage Books, 1992.  
  
Bossy, John. Christianity in the West: 1400-1700. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1987.  
  
Bossy, John. "The Mass As A Social Institution 1200‐1700." Past and Present 
100, no. 1 (1983): 29-61. doi:10.1093/past/100.1.29.  
  
Bourdieu, Pierre. The Logic of Practice. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1990.  
  
Bouyer, Louis. Life and Liturgy. London: Sheed and Ward, 1956.  
  
Boyle, David, and Andrew Simms. The New Economics: A Bigger Picture. 
London: Earthscan, 2009.  
  
Bradshaw, Paul F., and John Allyn. Melloh. Foundations in Ritual Studies: A 
Reader for Students of Christian Worship. Grand Rapids: Baker 
Academic, 2007.  
  
Bradshaw, Paul F. Ordination Rites of the Ancient Churches of East and West. 
New York: Pueblo Publishing, 1990.  
  
Bremmer, Jan N., and Andrew Erskine, eds. The Gods of Ancient Greece: 
Identities and Transformations. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University 
Press, 2010.  
  
  
Bibliography 
 231 
Brooke, Christopher Nugent Lawrence. Medieval Church and Society; 
Collected Essays. New York: New York University Press, 1972.  
  
Brooke, Christopher Nugent Lawrence. The Structure of Medieval Society. 
New York: McGraw-Hill, 1971.  
  
Brown, Peter. Authority and the Sacred: Aspects of the Christianisation of the 
Roman World. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995.  
  
Brown, Peter. The Body and Society: Men, Women, and Sexual Renunciation 
in Early Christianity. New York: Columbia University Press, 1988.  
  
Brown, Peter. The Cult of the Saints: Its Rise and Function in Latin 
Christianity. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981.  
  
Brown, Peter. The Making of Late Antiquity. Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1978.  
  
Bulgakov, Sergeĭ Nikolaevich. The Bride of the Lamb. Grand Rapids: William 
B. Eerdmans Pub., 2002.  
  
Bulgakov, Sergeĭ Nikolaevich. The Holy Grail and the Eucharist. Translated 
by Boris Jakim. Hudson: Lindisfarne Books, 1997.  
  
Bulgakov, Sergeĭ Nikolaevich. Philosophy of Economy. Translated by 
Catherine Evtuhov. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000.  
  
Bulgakov, Sergeĭ Nikolaevich. Sophia, the Wisdom of God: An Outline of 
Sophiology. Hudson: Lindisfarne Press, 1993.  
  
Cabasilas, Nicolaus. A Commentary on the Divine Liturgy. Crestwood: St. 
Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1977.  
  
Calhoun, Craig J., Edward LiPuma, and Moishe Postone, eds. Bourdieu: 
Critical Perspectives. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993.  
  
Callahan, Virginia Woods, trans. Saint Gregory of Nyssa: Ascetical Works. 
The Fathers of the Church ed. Washington: Catholic University of 
America Press, 1967.  
  
Carroll, Thomas K., and Thomas P. Halton. Liturgical Practice in the Fathers. 
Wilmington: M. Glazier, 1988.  
  
Casel, Odo. The Mystery of Christian Worship. Edited by Burkhard 
Neunheuser. New York: Crossroad Publishing Company, 1999.  
  
Cassian, John. Conferences. Edited by Colm Luibhid and Eugne Pichery. 
New York: Paulist Press, 1985.  
  
  
Christ the Liturgy 
 232 
Cavanaugh, William T. Being Consumed: Economics and Christian Desire. 
Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Pub., 2008.  
  
Cavanaugh, William T. Theopolitical Imagination. London: T & T Clark, 
2002.  
  
Certeau, Michel De. The Mystic Fable. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1992.  
  
Certeau, Michel De. The Practice of Everyday Life. Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1984.  
  
Chase, Frederic Hathaway, Jr., trans. Saint John of Damascus: Writings. New 
York: Fathers of the Church, 1958.  
  
Chazelle, Celia Martin. The Crucified God in the Carolingian Era: Theology 
and Art of Christ's Passion. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2001.  
  
Clement of Alexandria. Stromateis. Translated by John Ferguson. 
Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 1991.  
  
Colish, Marcia L. The Mirror of Language: A Study in the Medieval Theory of 
Knowledge. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1983.  
  
Copleston, Frederick. A History of Philosophy: Greece and Rome. Vol. I. New 
Jersey: Paulist Press, 1946.  
  
Cox, Harvey Gallagher. The Feast of Fools: A Theological Essay on Festivity 
and Fantasy. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969.  
  
Cross, Richard. Duns Scotus. New York: Oxford University Press, 1999.  
  
Cunningham, Conor, and Peter M. Candler, eds. Transcendence and 
Phenomenology. London: SCM Press SCM Press in Association with 
the Center of Theology and Philosophy, University of Nottingham, 
2007.  
  
Cunningham, Conor. Darwin's Pious Idea: Why the Ultra-darwinists and 
Creationists Both Get It Wrong. Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans 
Pub., 2010.  
  
Cunningham, Conor. Genealogy of Nihilism: Philosophies of Nothing and the 
Difference of Theology. London: Routledge, 2002.  
  
Cyprian. The Letters of St. Cyprian of Carthage. Translated by G. W. Clarke. 
Vols. I-III. New York: Newman Press, 1984.  
 
 
 
Bibliography 
 233 
Cyril of Jerusalem. The Works of Saint Cyril of Jerusalem. Translated by Leo 
P. McCauley and Anthony A. Stephenson. Vol. II. Washington: 
Catholic University of America Press, 1970.  
  
Danilou, Jean. The Bible And the Liturgy. Notre Dame: University of Notre 
Dame Press, 2005.  
  
Danilou, Jean, ed. From Glory to Glory: Texts from Gregory of Nyssa's 
Mystical Writings. Translated by Herbert Musurillo. Crestwood, NY: 
St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1979.  
  
Danilou, Jean. God and the Ways of Knowing. San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 
2003.  
  
Danilou, Jean. Platonisme Et Thologie Mystique: Doctrine Spirituelle De 
Saint Grgoire De Nysse. Paris: Aubier, ditions Montaigne, 1954.  
  
Davis, Leo Donald. The First Seven Ecumenical Councils (325-787): Their 
History and Theology. Collegeville: Liturgical Press, 1990.  
  
Debord, Guy. The Society of the Spectacle. Translated by Ken Knabb. New 
York: Zone Books, 1994.  
  
Deleuze, Gilles. Kant's Critical Philosophy: The Doctrine of the Faculties. 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984.  
  
Demosthenes. Orations 50-59: Private Cases in Neaeram. Translated by A. T. 
Murray. Vol. 351. Loeb Classical Library. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1939.  
  
Dix, Gregory. The Shape of the Liturgy. London: Continuum, 2005.  
  
Dmitriev, Sviatoslav. City Government in Hellenistic and Roman Asia Minor. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005.  
  
Donna, Bernard, trans. Saint Cyprian: Letters. Washington: Catholic 
University of America Pr., 1964.  
  
Duffy, Eamon. The Stripping of the Altars: Traditional Religion in England, 
C.1400-c.1580. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992.  
  
Eagleton, Terry. Reason, Faith, & Revolution: Reflections on the God Debate. 
New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009.  
  
Eliot, T. S. Notes toward the Definition of Culture. New York, 1949.  
  
Evans, Fred, and Leonard Lawlor, eds. Chiasms: Merleau-Ponty's Notion of 
Flesh. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2000.  
  
 
Christ the Liturgy 
 234 
Feldman, Yael S. Glory and Agony: Isaac's Sacrifice and National Narrative. 
Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010. 
 
Fish, Stanley Eugene. Is There a Text in This Class?: The Authority of 
Interpretive Communities. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980.  
  
Foley, Edward. From Age to Age: How Christians Have Celebrated the 
Eucharist. Collegeville: Liturgical Press, 2008.  
  
Foucault, Michel. The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collge De France, 
1978-79. Edited by Michel Senellart. Translated by Graham Burchell. 
New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.  
  
Foucault, Michel. The Foucault Reader. Edited by Paul Rabinow. New York: 
Pantheon Books, 1984.  
  
Foucault, Michel. The Hermeneutics of the Subject: Lectures at the Collge 
De France, 1981-1982. Translated by Frdric Gros, Franois Ewald, 
and Alessandro Fontana. New York: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2005.  
  
Fowl, Stephen E. Philippians. Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Pub., 
2005.  
  
Frank, Tenney. An Economic Survey of Ancient Rome,. Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins Press, 1933.  
  
Fretheim, Terence E. Exodus. Louisville: John Knox Press, 1991.  
  
Gadamer, Hans-Georg. Truth and Method. Translated by Joel Weinsheimer. 
London: Continuum, 2006.  
  
Galavaris, George. Bread and the Liturgy: The Symbolism of Early Christian 
and Byzantine Bread Stamps. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 
1970.  
  
Gardner, Percy. A Manual of Greek Antiquities. New York: Charles Scribner's 
Sons, 1895.  
  
Gavrilyuk, Paul L., and Sarah Coakley, eds. The Spiritual Senses: Perceiving 
God in Western Christianity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2012.  
  
Geertz, Clifford. The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays. New York: 
Basic Books, 1973.  
  
Gillespie, Michael Allen. Nihilism before Nietzsche. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1996.   
 
 
 
Bibliography 
 235 
Glimm, Francis Xavier., Joseph Marie-Felix Marique, and Gerald Groveland 
Walsh, trans. The Apostolic Fathers. Washington: Catholic University 
of America Press, 1969.  
  
Goodchild, Philip. Capitalism and Religion: The Price of Piety. London: 
Routledge, 2002.  
  
Grant, Robert M., ed. Irenaeus of Lyons. London: Routledge, 1997.  
  
Greer, Rowan A. Christian Life and Christian Hope: Raids on the 
Inarticulate. New York: Crossroad Publishing, 2001.  
  
Gregory. The Book of Pastoral Rule. Translated by George E. Demacopoulos. 
Crestwood: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 2007.  
  
Gregory of Nyssa. The Life of Moses. Translated by Abraham J. Malherbe and 
Everett Ferguson. The Classics of Western Spirituality ed. New York: 
Paulist Press, 1978.  
  
Gregory of Nyssa. On the Soul and the Resurrection. Translated by Catharine 
P. Roth. Crestwood: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 2002.  
  
Griffiths, Paul J., and Reinhard Htter, eds. Reason and the Reasons of Faith. 
New York: T & T Clark International, 2005.  
  
Hall, Edith. The Theatrical Cast of Athens. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2006.  
  
Hardt, Michael, and Antonio Negri. Commonwealth. Cambridge: Belknap 
Press of Harvard University Press, 2009.  
  
Hardt, Michael, and Antonio Negri. Multitude. New York: Penguin Press, 
2004.  
  
Harvey, David. Spaces of Global Capitalism. London: Verso, 2006.  
  
Hefele, Charles Joseph. A History of the Councils of the Church: From the 
Original Documents, to the Close of the Council of Nicaea, A.D. 325. 
New York: AMS Press, 1894.  
  
Heffernan, Thomas J., and E. Ann. Matter, eds. The Liturgy of the Medieval 
Church. Kalamazoo: Western Michigan University Press, 2001.  
  
Herbert, Arthur Gabriel. Liturgy and Society: The Function of the Church in 
the Modern World. London: Faber and Faber, 1935.  
  
Hinton, David Alban. Archaeology, Economy, and Society: England from the 
Fifth to the Fifteenth Century. London: Routledge, 1998.  
  
  
Christ the Liturgy 
 236 
Holmer, Paul L. The Grammar of Faith. San Francisco: Harper & Row 
Publishers, 1978.  
  
Holmes, Brooke. The Symptom and the Subject: The Emergence of the 
Physical Body in Ancient Greece. Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2010.  
  
Homer. The Iliad. Translated by Augustus Taber Murray. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1988.  
  
Hughes, Dennis D. Human Sacrifice in Ancient Greece. London: Routledge, 
1991.  
  
Illich, Ivan. Tools for Conviviality. New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 
1973.  
  
Ingham, Mary Beth, and Mechthild Dreyer. The Philosophical Vision of John 
Duns Scotus: An Introduction. Washington: Catholic University of 
America Press, 2004.  
  
James, Mervyn. Society, Politics, and Culture: Studies in Early Modern 
England. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986.  
  
Jameson, Fredric. Postmodernism Or: The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism. 
Durham: Duke University Press, 1995.  
  
Jasper, Ronald Claud Dudley., ed. Prayers of the Eucharist: Early and 
Reformed. New York: Pueblo Publishing Company, 1987.  
  
Jenson, Robert W. The Triune God. Vol. I. Systematic Theology. New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1997.  
  
John of Damascus. Three Treatises on the Divine Images. Translated by 
Andrew Louth. Crestwood: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 2003.  
  
Johnson, Mark. The Meaning of the Body: Aesthetics of Human 
Understanding. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007.  
  
Johnson, Maxwell E., and L. Edward. Phillips, eds. Studia Liturgica Diversa: 
Studies in Church Music and Liturgy : Essays in Honor of Paul F. 
Bradshaw. Portland: Pastoral Press, 2004.  
  
Jones, Cheslyn, Geoffrey Wainwright, Edward Yarnold, and Paul Bradshaw, 
eds. The Study of Liturgy. New York: Oxford University Press, 1992.  
  
Jungmann, Josef A. Liturgical Worship. New York: Frederick Pustet, 1941.  
  
Jungmann, Josef A. The Mass of the Roman Rite: Its Origins and 
Development (Missarum Sollemnia). Translated by Francis A. 
Brunner. Vol. II. New York: Benziger Brothers, 1955.   
Bibliography 
 237 
Jungmann, Josef A. The Place of Christ in Liturgical Prayer. Staten Island: 
Alba House, 1965.  
  
Jungmann, Josef A. The Sacrifice of the Church; the Meaning of the Mass. 
Collegeville: Liturgical Press, 1956.  
  
Justin Martyr. The First and Second Apologies. Translated by Leslie W. 
Barnard. New York: Paulist Press, 1997.  
  
Juvin, Herv. The Coming of the Body. Translated by John Howe. London: 
Verso, 2010.  
  
Kantorowicz, Ernst Hartwig. The King's Two Bodies: A Study in Mediaeval 
Political Theology,. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957.  
  
Karp, Ivan, and Steven Lavine, eds. Exhibiting Cultures: The Poetics and 
Politics of Museum Display. Washington: Smithsonian Institution 
Press, 1991.  
  
Kavanagh, Aidan. Elements of Rite: A Handbook of Liturgical Style. 
Collegeville: Liturgical Press, 1990.  
  
Kavanagh, Aidan. On Liturgical Theology: The Hale Memorial Lectures of 
Seabury-Western Theological Seminary, 1981. Collegeville: Liturgical 
Press, 1992.  
  
Kavanagh, Aidan. The Shape of Baptism: The Rite of Christian Initiation. 
Collegeville: Liturgical Press, 1991.  
  
Kerr, Fergus. Aquinas: Revisionary Versions of the Thomism. Malden: 
Blackwell Publishing, 1999.  
  
Kierkegaard, S¿ren. The Present Age: On the Death of Rebellion. Translated 
by Alexander Dru. New York: Harper Perennial, 2010.  
  
Kierkegaard, S¿ren. The Sickness Unto Death. Translated by Alastair Hannay. 
London: Penguin, 2008.  
  
King, Archdale A. Liturgies of the Past. London: Longmans, 1959.  
  
King, Archdale A. Liturgy of the Roman Church. London: Longmans, Green 
and Company, 1957.  
  
Kirchgssner, Alfons. Unto the Altar: The Practice of Catholic Worship. New 
York: Herder and Herder, 1963.  
  
Klauser, Theodor. A Short History of the Western Liturgy: An Account and 
Some Reflections. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979.  
  
  
Christ the Liturgy 
 238 
Kleist, James A., trans. The Epistles of St. Clement of Rome and St. Ignatius of 
Antioch. Edited by Johannes Quasten and Joseph C. Plumpe. New 
York: Newman Press, 1946.  
  
Knight, Douglas H. The Eschatological Economy: Time and the Hospitality of 
God. Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Pub., 2006.  
  
Krautheimer, Richard, and Slobodan Ćurčić. Early Christian and Byzantine 
Architecture. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986.  
  
Kunzler, Michael. The Church's Liturgy. London: Continuum, 2001.  
  
Lagerlund, Henrik. Representation and Objects of Thought in Medieval 
Philosophy. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007.  
  
Lang, Bernhard. Sacred Games: A History of Christian Worship. New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1997.  
  
Latour, Bruno. Pandora's Hope: Essays on the Reality of Science Studies. 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999.  
  
Lear, Jonathan. Aristotle: The Desire to Understand. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1988.  
  
Lefebvre, Henri. The Production of Space. Translated by Donald Nicholson-
Smith. Oxford: Blackwell, 2005.  
  
Leo the Great. Letters. Translated by Edmund Hunt. Washington: Catholic 
University of America Press, 1963.  
  
Levenson, Jon Douglas. Abraham between Torah and Gospel. Milwaukee: 
Marquette University Press, 2011. 
  
Levering, Matthew. Christ's Fulfillment of Torah and Temple: Salvation 
According to Thomas Aquinas. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame 
Press, 2002. 
 
Lindbeck, George A. The Nature of Doctrine: Religion and Theology in a 
Postliberal Age. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1984.  
  
Long, D. Stephen. Divine Economy: Theology and the Market. London: 
Routledge, 2000.  
  
Long, D. Stephen. Speaking of God: Theology, Language, and Truth. Grand 
Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Pub., 2009.  
  
Lossky, Vladimir. In the Image and Likeness of God,. Edited by John H. 
Erickson and Thomas E. Bird. Crestwood: St. Vladimir's Seminary 
Press, 1974.  
  
Bibliography 
 239 
Louth, Andrew. Greek East and Latin West: The Church, AD 681-1071. 
Crestwood: St. VladimirÕs Seminary Press, 2007.  
  
Louth, Andrew. The Origins of the Christian Mystical Tradition: From Plato 
to Denys. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.  
  
Louth, Andrew, trans. Maximus the Confessor. New York: Routledge, 1996.  
  
Lubac, Henri De. Catholicism: Christ and the Common Destiny of Man. 
Translated by Lancelot Shepherd and Elizabeth Englund. San 
Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1988.  
  
Lubac, Henri De. The Christian Faith: An Essay on the Structure of the 
Apostles' Creed. Translated by Richard Arnandez. San Francisco: 
Ignatius Press, 1986.  
  
Lubac, Henri De. Corpus Mysticum: The Eucharist and the Church in the 
Middle Ages : Historical Survey. Edited by Laurence Paul. Hemming 
and Susan Frank. Parsons. Translated by Gemma Simmonds and 
Richard Price. London: SCM Press, 2006.  
  
Lubac, Henri De. The Mystery of the Supernatural. Translated by Rosemary 
Sheed. New York: Crossroad Publishing Company, 1998.  
  
Lubac, Henri De. The Splendor of the Church. Translated by Michael Mason. 
San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1999.  
  
Luibhid, Colm, and Paul Rorem, trans. Pseudo-Dionysius: The Complete 
Works. New York: Paulist Press, 1987.  
  
MacIntyre, Alasdair. After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory. Notre Dame: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 1984.  
  
MacIntyre, Alasdair C. Dependent Rational Animals: Why Human Beings 
Need the Virtues. Chicago: Open Court, 1999.  
  
MacIntyre, Alasdair C. Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry: 
Encyclopaedia, Genealogy, and Tradition : Being Gifford Lectures 
Delivered in the University of Edinburgh in 1988. Notre Dame: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 1990.  
  
MacIntyre, Alasdair C. Whose Justice? Which Rationality? Notre Dame: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 1988.  
  
MacIntyre, Alasdair. Marxism & Christianity. London: Duckworth, 1995.  
  
MacIntyre, Alasdair. A Short History of Ethics: A History of Moral Philosophy 
from the Homeric Age to the Twentieth Century. Notre Dame: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 1998.  
  
Christ the Liturgy 
 240 
Marcuse, Herbert. Eros and Civilization: A Philosophical Inquiry into Freud. 
Boston: Beacon Press, 1966. 
 
Marcuse, Herbert. One-dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced 
Industrial Society. Boston: Beacon Press, 1991.  
  
Marion, Jean-Luc. God without Being. Translated by Thomas A. Carlson. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991.  
  
Marion, Jean-Luc. Prolegomena to Charity. Translated by Stephen Lewis. 
New York: Fordham University Press, 2002.  
  
Marx, Karl, and Friedrich Engels. Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 
1844. Translated by Martin Milligan. Amherst: Prometheus Books, 
1988.  
  
Mauss, Marcel. The Gift: Forms and Functions of Exchange in Archaic 
Societies. New York: Norton, 1967.  
  
Mazza, Enrico. Mystagogy: A Theology of Liturgy in the Patristic Age. New 
York: Pueblo Publishing Company, 1989.  
  
McCormack, Bruce L., and Kimlyn J. Bender, eds. Theology as Conversation: 
The Significance of Dialogue in Historical and Contemporary 
Theology : A Festschrift for Daniel L. Migliore. Grand Rapids: 
William B. Eerdmans Pub., 2009. 
 
McLuhan, Marshall. Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man. 
Cambridge: MIT Press, 1994.  
  
McNeill, John T., and Helena M. Gamer, eds. Medieval Handbooks of 
Penance: A Translation of the Principal "libri Poenitentiales" and 
Selections from Related Documents. New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1990.  
  
Melchior-Bonnet, Sabine. The Mirror: A History. New York: Routledge, 
2001.  
  
Menzies, Allan, ed. The Gospel of Peter, the Diatessaron of Tatian, the 
Apocalyspe of Peter, the Visio Pauli, the Apocalypses of the Virgin and 
Sedrach, the Testament of Abraham, the Acts of Xanthippe and 
Polyxena, the Narrative of Zosimus, the Apology of Aristides, the 
Epistles of Clement (complete Text), Origen's Commentary on John, 
Books I-X, and Commentary on Matthew, Books I, II, and X-XIV. Vol. 
IX. Ante-Nicene Fathers. Peabody: Hendrickson Publishers, 1999.  
  
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. Phenomenology of Perception. Translated by Colin 
Smith. London: Routledge, 2002.  
  
 
Bibliography 
 241 
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. The Primacy of Perception. Edited by James M. 
Edie. Chicago: Northwestern, 1964.  
  
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. Sense and Non-sense. Translated by Hubert L. 
Dreyfus and Patricia Allen. Dreyfus. Evanston: Northwestern 
University Press, 1964. 
 
Meyendorff, John. Byzantine Theology: Historical Trends and Doctrinal 
Themes. New York: Fordham University Press, 1979.   
 
Meyendorff, John. Christ in Eastern Christian Thought. Washington: Corpus 
Books, 1969.  
  
Meyendorff, John. Imperial Unity and Christian Divisions: The Church, 450-
680 AD. Crestwood: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1989.  
  
Michel, Virgil George. Christian Social Reconstruction: Some Fundamentals 
of the Quadragesimo Anno. Milwaukee: Bruce Publishing Company, 
1937.  
  
Migne, Jacques Paul, ed. Patrologia Graeca. Paris, 1857-1886.  
  
Migne, Jacques Paul., ed. Patrologia Latina. Paris, 1844-1864.  
  
Milavec, Aaron, trans. The Didache: Text, Translation, Analysis, and 
Commentary. Collegeville: Liturgical Press, 2004.  
  
Milbank, John, and Catherine Pickstock. Truth in Aquinas. London: 
Routledge, 2001.  
  
Milbank, John. "Can A Gift Be Given? Prolegomena To A Future Trinitarian 
Metaphysic." Modern Theology 11, no. 1 (1995): 119-61. 
doi:10.1111/j.1468-0025.1995.tb00055.x. 
 
Milbank, John. The Suspended Middle: Henri De Lubac and the Debate 
concerning the Supernatural. Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans 
Pub., 2005.  
  
Milbank, John. Theology and Social Theory: Beyond Secular Reason. 
Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers, 1991.  
  
Minchin, Basil. Outward and Visible. London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 
1961.  
  
Mitchell, Nathan, and John Francis. Baldovin, eds. Rule of Prayer, Rule of 
Faith: Essays in Honor of Aidan Kavanagh, O.S.B. Collegeville: 
Liturgical Press, 1996.  
  
Mitchell, Nathan. Cult and Controversy: The Worship of the Eucharist outside 
Mass. New York: Pueblo Publishing Company, 1982.  
Christ the Liturgy 
 242 
  
Mitchell, Nathan. Meeting Mystery: Liturgy, Worship, Sacraments. 
Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 2006.  
  
Mndez, Montoya Angel F. Theology of Food: Eating and the Eucharist. 
Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009.  
  
Mondzain, Marie-Jos. Image, Icon, Economy: The Byzantine Origins of the 
Contemporary Imaginary. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005.  
  
Morrill, Bruce T. Anamnesis as Dangerous Memory: Political and Liturgical 
Theology in Dialogue. Collegeville: Liturgical Press, 2000.  
  
Mueller, Mary Magdeleine, trans. Saint Caesarius of Arles: Sermons. Vol. III. 
Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 1973.  
  
Murdoch, Iris. The Sovereignty of Good. New York: Schocken Books, 1971. 
 
Neusner, Jacob. The Four Stages of Rabbinic Judaism. London: Routledge, 
1999. 
 
Noort, Edward, and Eibert J. C. Tigchelaar, eds. The Sacrifice of Isaac: The 
Aqedah (Genesis 22) and Its Interpretations. Leiden: Brill, 2002. 
 
Oberman, Heiko Augustinus. The Harvest of Medieval Theology: Gabriel Biel 
and Late Medieval Nominalism. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1963.  
  
O'Donovan, Oliver, and Joan Lockwood O'Donovan. Bonds of Imperfection: 
Christian Politics, past and Present. Grand Rapids: William B. 
Eerdmans Pub., 2004.  
  
O'Donovan, Oliver, and Joan Lockwood O'Donovan. From Irenaeus to 
Grotius: A Sourcebook in Christian Political Thought, 100-1625. 
Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Pub., 1999.  
  
Ong, Walter J. Orality and Literacy: The Technologizing of the Word. 
London: Methuen, 1982.  
  
Origen. The Song of Songs: Commentary and Homilies. Translated by R. P. 
Lawson. Edited by Johannes Queasten and Joseph C. Plumpe. Ancient 
Christian Writers ed. Vol. XXVI. New York: Newman Press, 1956.  
  
Ouspensky, Lonide. Theology of the Icon. Vol. I. Crestwood: St. Vladimir's 
Seminary Press, 1978.  
  
Ouspensky, Lonide. Theology of the Icon. Vol. II. Crestwood: St. Vladimir's 
Seminary Press, 1978.  
  
 
Bibliography 
 243 
Palazzo, Eric. A History of Liturgical Books: From the Beginning to the 
Thirteenth Century. Translated by Madeleine Beaumont. Collegeville: 
Liturgical Press, 1998.  
  
Pallasmaa, Juhani. The Eyes of the Skin: Architecture and the Senses. 
Chichester: Wiley-Academy, 2005.  
  
Pamphili, Eusebius. Ecclesiastical History. Translated by Roy J. Deferrari. 
Vol. I. Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 1953. 
 
Papanikolaou, Aristotle. Being with God: Trinity, Apophaticism, and Divine-
human Communion. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 
2006.  
  
Parker, Robert. On Greek Religion. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011.  
  
Pelikan, Jaroslav. Christianity and Classical Culture: The Metamorphosis of 
Natural Theology in the Christian Encounter with Hellenism. New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1993.  
  
Pelikan, Jaroslav. Jesus through the Centuries: His Place in the History of 
Culture. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985.  
  
Perelman, Michael. The Invention of Capitalism: Classical Political Economy 
and the Secret History of Primitive Accumulation. Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2000.  
  
Perrin, Nicholas. Jesus the Temple. Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2010.  
  
Phan, Peter C., ed. The Cambridge Companion to the Trinity. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2011.  
  
Pickstock, Catherine. After Writing: On the Liturgical Consummation of 
Philosophy. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1998.  
  
Pinches, Charles. Theology and Action: After Theory in Christian Ethics. 
Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Pub., 2002.  
  
Plato. Timaeus. Translated by Robert Gregg Bury. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1981.  
  
Pulleyn, Simon. Prayer in Greek Religion. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997.  
  
Rashkover, Randi, and C. C. Pecknold, eds. Liturgy, Time, and the Politics of 
Redemption. Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Pub., 2006.  
  
Ratzinger, Joseph. Holy Week: From the Entrance into Jerusalem to the 
Resurrection. Vol. II. Jesus of Nazareth. San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 
2011.  
  
Christ the Liturgy 
 244 
Ratzinger, Joseph. The Spirit of the Liturgy. San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 
2000.  
  
Reynolds, Susan. Kingdoms and Communities in Western Europe, 900-1300. 
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997.  
  
Rimbaud, Arthur. Rimbaud: Complete Works, Selected Letters : A Bilingual 
Edition. Translated by Wallace Fowlie. Compiled by Seth Adam 
Whidden. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005.  
  
Roberts, Alexander, and James Donaldson. The Apostolic Fathers with Justin 
Martyr and Iren¾us. Vol. I. Ante-Nicene Fathers. Peabody: 
Hendrickson Publishers, 1999.  
  
Roberts, Alexander, and James Donaldson, eds. Fathers of the Third and 
Fourth Centuries. Vol. VII. Ante-Nicene Fathers. Peabody: 
Hendrickson Publishers, 1999.  
  
Rordorf, Willy, ed. The Eucharist of the Early Christians. Translated by 
Matthew J. O'Connell. New York: Pueblo Publishing Company, 1978.  
  
Rorty, Amlie, ed. Essays on Aristotle's Ethics. Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1980.  
  
Rubin, Miri. Corpus Christi: The Eucharist in Late Medieval Culture. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991.  
  
Ruskin, John. The Stones of Venice. London: Smith, Elder and Company, 
1867.  
  
Russell, Norman, trans. Cyril of Alexandria. London: Routledge, 2000.  
  
Saliers, Don E., E. Byron. Anderson, and Bruce T. Morrill, eds. Liturgy and 
the Moral Self: Humanity at Full Stretch before God : Essays in Honor 
of Don E. Saliers. Collegeville: Liturgical Press, 1998.  
  
Schaff, Philip, and Henry Wace, eds. Select Writings and Letters of Gregory, 
Bishop of Nyssa. Translated by William Moore and Henry Austin 
Wilson. Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers ed. Vol. V. Peabody: 
Hendrickson Publishers, 1999.  
  
Schaff, Philip, Henry Wace, and W. Sanday, eds. Hilary of Poitiers, John of 
Damascus. Translated by Edward William Watson and Leighton 
Pullan. Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers ed. Vol. IX. Second Series. 
Peabody: Hendrickson Publishers, 1994.  
  
Scharlemann, Robert P. The Reason of Following: Christology and the 
Ecstatic I. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991.  
  
 
Bibliography 
 245 
Schmemann, Alexander. Church, World, Mission: Reflections on Orthodoxy 
in the West. Crestwood: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1979.  
  
Schmemann, Alexander. For the Life of the World: Sacraments and 
Orthodoxy. Crestwood: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1973.  
 
Schmemann, Alexander. Introduction to Liturgical Theology. New York: St. 
Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1966.  
  
Scotus, John Duns. Duns Scotus on the Will and Morality. Translated by Allan 
Bernard Wolter. Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 
1986.  
  
Scotus, John Duns. Philosophical Writings: A Selection. Translated by Allan 
Bernard Wolter. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1987. 
 
Seasoltz, R. Kevin. Living Bread, Saving Cup: Readings on the Eucharist. 
Collegeville: Liturgical Press, 1982.  
  
Senn, Frank C. New Creation: A Liturgical Worldview. Minneapolis: Fortress 
Press, 2000. 
 
The Seventh Seal. Directed by Igmar Bergman. Stockhold, Sweden: Svensk 
Filmindustri, 1957. DVD. 
 
Simson, Otto Georg Von. Sacred Fortress: Byzantine Art and Statecraft in 
Ravenna. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987.  
  
Sokolowski, Robert. Christian Faith & Human Understanding: Studies on the 
Eucharist, Trinity, and the Human Person. Washington: Catholic 
University of America Press, 2006.  
  
Solnit, Rebecca. River of Shadows: Edward Muybridge and the Technological 
Wild West. New York: Penguin Books, 2004.  
  
Sorel, Georges. Sorel, Reflections on Violence. Edited by Jeremy Jennings. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.  
  
Spaemann, Robert. Essays in Anthropology: Variations on a Theme. 
Translated by Guido De Graaff and James Mumford. Eugene: Cascade 
Books, 2010.  
  
Stanislavsky, Konstantin. Creating a Role. Translated by Elizabeth Reynolds 
Hapgood. New York: Theatre Arts Books, 1961.  
  
Stern, Robert. Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Hegel and the 
Phenomenology of Spirit. London: Routledge, 2002.  
  
Stevenson, Kenneth. Eucharist and Offering. New York: Pueblo Publishing 
Company, 1986.  
Christ the Liturgy 
 246 
Stoker, Bram. Dracula. London: Puffin, 2009.  
  
Straw, Carole Ellen. Gregory the Great: Perfection in Imperfection. Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1988.  
 
Talley, Thomas J. The Origins of the Liturgical Year. New York: Pueblo 
Publishing Company, 1986.  
 
Taylor, Charles. A Secular Age. Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, 2007.  
  
Taylor, Charles. Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity. 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989.  
  
Teschke, Benno. The Myth of 1648: Class, Geopolitics, and the Making of 
Modern International Relations. London: Verso, 2003.  
  
Thiselton, Anthony C. Hermeneutics: An Introduction. Grand Rapids: William 
B. Eerdmans Pub., 2009.  
  
Thompson, Bard, comp. Liturgies of the Western Church. Cleveland: Meridian 
Books, 1961.  
  
Thunberg, Lars. Microcosm and Mediator: The Theological Anthropology of 
Maximus the Confessor. Chicago: Open Court, 1995.  
  
Thurian, Max. The Eucharistic Memorial. Richmond: John Knox Press, 1960.  
  
Tierney, Brian. The Crisis of Church and State: 1050-1300. Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press [etc., 1988.  
  
Tillard, Jean-Marie-Roger. Flesh of the Church, Flesh of Christ: At the Source 
of the Ecclesiology of Communion. Collegeville: Liturgical Press, 
2001.  
  
Tnnies, Ferdinand. Community and Society. New Brunswick: Transaction 
Books, 1988.  
  
Turcescu, Lucian. Gregory of Nyssa and the Concept of Divine Persons. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005.  
  
Turner, Victor W. Dramas, Fields, and Metaphors; Symbolic Action in 
Human Society. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1974.  
  
Underhill, Evelyn. Worship. New York: Harper, 1957.  
  
Vico, Giambattista. The New Science. Translated by David Marsh. New York: 
Legal Classics Library, 1996.  
 
 
Bibliography 
 247 
Voegelin, Eric. The New Science of Politics, an Introduction. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1952.  
  
Vonnegut, Kurt. Player Piano. New York: Delacorte Press, 1952.  
  
Vries, Hent De, and Lawrence Eugene Sullivan, eds. Political Theologies. 
New York: Fordham University Press, 2006.  
  
Wainwright, Geoffrey. Eucharist and Eschatology. New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1981.  
  
Walton, John H. Ancient Near Eastern Thought and the Old Testament: 
Introducing the Conceptual World of the Hebrew Bible. Grand Rapids: 
Baker Academic, 2006.  
  
Walton, John H. The Lost World of Genesis One: Ancient Cosmology and the 
Origins Debate. Downers Grove: IVP Academic, 2009.  
  
Ward, Graham. Cultural Transformation and Religious Practice. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005.  
  
Ward, Graham, ed. The Postmodern God: A Theological Reader. Oxford: 
Blackwell Publishers, 1997.  
  
Ward, Graham. The Politics of Discipleship: Becoming Postmaterial Citizens. 
Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2009.  
  
Weber, Max. The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. New York: 
Scribner, 1958.  
  
Weber, Max. The Sociology of Religion. Boston: Beacon Press, 1963.  
  
Wells, Samuel. God's Companions: Reimagining Christian Ethics. Malden: 
Blackwell Publishing, 2006.  
  
Westphal, Merold. Whose Community? Which Interpretation?: Philosophical 
Hermeneutics for the Church. Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2009.  
  
Whitaker, E. C. Documents of the Baptismal Liturgy. London: S.P.C.K., 1960.  
  
Willey, Basil. The Seventeenth Century Background: Studies in the Thought of 
the Age in Relation to Poetry and Religion. Garden City: Doubleday, 
1953.  
  
Williams, Charles. The Descent of the Dove: A Short History of the Holy Spirit 
in the Church. Vancouver: Regent College Publishing, 2002.  
  
Williams, Rowan. Eucharistic Sacrifice: The Roots of a Metaphor. 
Nottinghamshire: Grove Books, 1982.  
  
Christ the Liturgy 
 248 
Williams, Rowan. The Wound of Knowledge. Oregon: Wipf and Stock, 1998.  
  
Wilson, Peter. The Athenian Institution of the Khoregia: The Chorus, the City, 
and the Stage. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.  
  
Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Culture and Value. Translated by G. H. Von Wright 
and Heikki Nyman. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984.  
  
Wood, Allen W. Karl Marx. New York: Routledge, 2005.  
  
Wood, Ellen Meiksins. Citizens to Lords: A Social History of Western 
Political Thought from Antiquity to the Middle Ages. London: Verso, 
2008.  
  
Woolley, Reginald Maxwell. The Bread of the Eucharist. Alcuin Club Tracts. 
London: A. R. Mowbray &, 1913.  
  
Wybrew, Hugh. The Orthodox Liturgy. Crestwood: St. Vladimir's Seminary 
Press, 1989.  
  
Yarnold, Edward, trans. Cyril of Jerusalem. London: Routledge, 2000.  
  
Zajonc, Arthur. Catching the Light: The Entwined History of Light and Mind. 
New York: Bantam Books, 1993.  
 
 
